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I 
In  1986  the  European  Parliament  commission~d  a  research  study  from  the 
Trans  European  Policy  Studies  Association  <TEPSA)  on  the  subject:  Beyond 
Traditional  Parliamentarism:  The  European  Parliament  in  the  Community  System. 
13  individual  papers  were  submitted  to  Parliament,  which  were  drawn  together 
on  behalf  of  TEPSA  by  the  Institut  fur  Europaische  Politik  in  a  Summary 
Report.  These  documents  were  discussed at  a  Symposium  held  in  Strasbourg  on 
17  and  18  November  1988. 
The  present  Research  and  Documentation  Paper  contains  the  Summary 
Report,  and  also  the  speeches  made  at  the  plenary  sittings  of  the  Symposium  on 
17  and  18  November.  The  speeches  are  based  on  the official  interpretation of 
the  proceedings  and  therefore  speeches  not  made  in  English  are  slightly 
reduced  in  length;  editing  has  been  limited  to  the  avoidance  of  repetition 
and  the  achievement  of  clarity. 
A companion  version  of  this document  will  be  published  in  French.  A 
Later  document,  in all  languages,  will  include  a  summary  of  the discussions  in 
the  working  groups  of  the  Symposium. 
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- 7  -1 •  INTRODUCTION:  THE  CHANCES  AND  CHALLENGES  OF  1989 
AND  1992 
In  June  1989  the  European  Parliament  (EP)  will  be  directly 
elected  for  the  third  time.  In  regard  to  this  institution 
Euro-Parliamentarians  and  voters  largely have  been  and still 
are  oriented  to  national  parliamentary  experience1.  But  in 
terms  of  competences  and  political  influence  the  European 
Parliament  is  obviously  different  from  national  parliaments 
and  - what  is of  crucial  importance  in  this context  - the  EC 
system  cannot  be  compared  with  national  political  systems. 
Therefore  a  new  way  of  thinking  is needed. 
In  order  to  seek  a  new  understanding  of  a  parliament  in  a 
supranational  context  the  Trans-European  Policy  Studies 
Assocation  (TEPSA)  and its various member  institutes2 decided 
in  1986  to start a  research  project  "Beyond Traditional Par-
liamentarism:  The  European  Parliament  in  the  Community  Sy-
stem".  The  research is focussed  on  four  questions: 
1.  Are  there  differences  between,  and  common  basic  charac-
teristics,  of  national  parliaments  and  the  European 
Parliament?  And  if so:  How  have  they evolved? 
2.  What  new  concepts  can  be  identified  for  the  European 
Parliament in the  Community  framework? 
3.  How  can  the  activities  of  the  European  Parliament  since 
1979  be  interpreted  in  the  light of  these  new  parliamen-
tary concepts? 
4.  What  are the European Parliament's strategies and options 
ahead? 
This  joint  report  by  the  general  rapporteurs  of  the  project 
is intended  to stimulate discussion on  the  institutional and 
political role of the European  Parliament in the  Community. 
- 8-rn  che  present  situation  of  the  Comm~nity an  lntensified 
discussion  on  instit~tional matters  is  extremely  necessary: 
European  elections  seem  to  be  beco:ning  "!"lorrnal"  2vents 
for  politicians,  party  activists  and  votdrs.  The  question 
is  open  if  the  EP  is  content  with  the  achieved  d~gree cf 
"nor:nality"  both  in  terms  of  ca:-npaigning,  ~obilizing and 
voters  turn-out  and  in  terms  or  its institutional  role 
in  tha  Com~unity.  European  election  carn~aigns  could  be 
chanc~s to  propagate  the  institutional  aims  of  the  insti-
tution  to  be  voted  for. 
In  July  1987  tha  "Single  European  Act~  came  into  force. 
9y  this  first  substantial  reform  o~  the  EC  treaties,  the 
powers  of  the  EP  were  ~nlarged in  the  fields  of  legisla-
tion  and  tra~ty-making  (accessions  and  associations  to 
the  Community).  The  li:nited  experience  we  have  to  date 
with  these  new  powers  indicate  that  they  rnay  chang~ 
substantially  the  ima~e of  the  E:P  from  a  "forum"  towards 
a  responsible  partner  in  the  uecision-making  process. 
The  envisaq~d completion  of  the  internal  mark~t  in  1992 
opens  new  frontiers  for  the  Co~munity future  and  in 
particular  a  ne~d for  enhanced  decision  making  at  EC-
level.  The  accepted  target  "1392"  could  be  1 inked  \oli th 
a  call  for  further  institueional reforms.  The  ~P  should 
be  in  the  centre  of  a  new  reform  process. 
Thus  the  time  is ripe  for  a  qcneral  debate  on  tha  institutio-
nal  position ot  the  EP  and  the  chances  for  an  enhanced  rol=. 
This  role  must  be  adequate  to  the  politi~al system  in  which 
it has  to  function.  A clear  idea  of  the  present  role  and 
~ossible future  developments  ot  the  EP  ~ay qive  voters  and 
parlia:nentarians  orientation and  ~ay contribute  to  a  bett8r 
understanding of  this  institution. 
The  central  messa~e of  this  report is the plea  for  an  adequate 
parliamentary role  concept  for  the  EP  beyond  traditional 
parliamentarism.  The  structures  of  the  EC  system  with  its 
qrowinq  interlocking  and  int~rferenca  betwoen  the  member 
states  and  the  Community  and  the  predominant  influence  of 
- 9  -national  governments  and  administrations  have  so  pr~v~nted 
the  EP  from  becorr:ing  a  "l<:!gislature"  (like  the  t:S  Congress} 
or  ~  dominant  actor  in  tht:t  "gubernative"  (like  ~he G.::rr.an 
Bunddstag)  th~t  can  ~lact and  dis~iss  the  governm~nt.  A role 
as  a  "foru:n"  (lii<e  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  Council 
of  Europe}  -even  if  so~=  other  ingredients  ware  add~d­
seeres  to  be  unsatisfactory  for  the  dir~ctly elected  E?. 
Owing  to  the  structures  of  the  EC  system  we  propose  that  th~ 
EP  should  follow  a  "co-pluyer-conceot"  in  the  Comrr.unity  game 
with  its  variety  of  more  or  less  important  national  and 
Suropaan  actors.  The  EP  ~ust be  acceptad  within  the  se~sitive 
decision-making  process  as  an  important  co-play~r whose 
assent  is necessary  to  all  important  d~cisions.  It  shou:d  at 
first  concentrate  on  selected  ~eans  to  increase  its influ-
ance  in  important  political  fields.  The  Singl~ Eurcpuan  Act 
points  out  that  way:  Since  July  1987  the  EP  has  to  give  its 
assent  to  treaties o!  association  and  accession.  Mor~over.  its 
involvement  in  legislation  was  strengthened.  In  the  last 
chapcar  of  this report  proposals  for  further  institutional 
refo~ms in  this  line  can  be  found.  These  proposals  do  not 
exclude  the necessity of  a  "grand  design"  continuing  the 
approach  ot  the  Draft Treaty establishing  the  European  Union 
of  1984.  Such  a  project  ~ay  give  orientations  fer  voters, 
Community  institutions  and  national  authorities. 
Tha  term  ~co-player" tor  the description  of  the  EP's  role 
may  provoke  some  criticiism  for  being  not  "serious"  enough. 
But  ie  explains  the  necessity  (~ore  than alternatives like 
"partner'')  that  the  EP  has  to  take  part  in  the  "Community 
play",  that  there  are  certain bindinq  rules  in  the  qame  and 
that conflicts  are  possible.  A parliamentary  role  o!  "co-
pla~er"  has  certain facets  like  ~o-decidor,  co-laqislator, 
eo-articulator  and  co-controller. 
- 10  -Cf  c~urs~.  the  EP's  institutional  role  today  partly  can  ca 
described  as  a  "co-player''  as  well,  but  there  are  certain 
important  fields  of  the  EC  syste~  where  it  is  totally  0 ~ 
~artly excluded  from  decision-~akinq:  the  agricultural  or 
trade  policy,  the  European  Monetary  System,  activities  in  the 
"!:lixed  areas"  like  the  EuropE'an  Developrr.ent  Fund  or  instru-
ments  in  the  intergovernmental  cooperation  field,  like  EUREKA. 
The  concept  for  tha  E:P  as  a  "co-player"  implies  that  in  tho: 
long  run  it ~ay effectively  in  one  way  or  the  other  influ~nce 
decisions  on  all  those  rr.atters:  it should  not  do~inate those 
decision-making  processes,  but  should  seek  to  share  the 
power  with  the  Council. 
This  concept  cakes  into  consid~raticn that  th~  legitimacy  of 
the  EC  systerr.  derives  both  from  a  national  and  a  European 
source.  The  national  one  is  ~epresented  by  the  European 
Council,  thu  Council  and  the  various  bodies  with  representa-
tives  of  the  ~e~ber states,  the  EC  source  is  represented  by 
the  European.  Parliament  and  the  Corn~ission.  For  important 
decisions,  th.::  assent  of  repres~ntatives of  bot,h  is necessary, 
otherwise  "the  ga;.e  will  not  go  on".  Of  course,  such  a  parlia-
~.entary concept  as  "co-player"  requires  :najor  learning process 
from  the  EC-citizens,  who  are  oriented  on  their national 
parliamentary experience. 
2.  STARTING  ~OINT:  THE  VOTERS  AND  THE  TRADITIONAL 
PARLIAMENTARY  HERITAGE 
The  introduction  of direct  European  elections  in  1979  was 
acco:npanied  - besides  th~  feeling  of· curiosity  for  somethinq 
n~w - by  dieferent,  partly diverging  hopes  and  fears'.  Expec-
tations  were  focussed  in tour directions: 
(1)  Direct  European  elections  would  lead  to  a  higher  degree 
of  4emocratization  and  legitimacy  in  the  Community,  by 
strengtheninq  the  EP  directly  and  thus  strengtheninq 
- 11  -indirectly  the  influence  of  the  vor.ers  on  Community 
leQislat:ion. 
(2)  Secondly,  direct  European  elections  would  have  positive 
effects  on  the  integration of  th~ diverging  forces  in  the 
EC.  The  interest  and  engagement  of  the  European  party 
federations  and  of  the  pressure  groups  at  the  EC  level 
would  become  stronger.  National  cleavages  would  be  re-
placed  at  least  in  part  by  po~itical/ideological clea-
vages. 
(3}  Thirdly,  the  voters  expected  from  a  directly elected 
European  Parlia~ent  a  positiva  i~pact on  the  efficiency 
of  the  decision-making  process.  The  Council  being  abso-
lutely  predominant  in  this  pro~ess.  had  often been  seen 
decision  rnakin9  blocked  by  its  commitment  to  unanimity. 
A  strengthen~d  Parliament  - voting  by  majority  - could 
lead  the  way  out  of  the  EC's  "decision-making  trap"1 •  At 
the  same  time  direct  el~ctions to  the  EP  would  increase 
the  "learning capacity"  of  tht~  EC-system  by  an  enhanced 
pressure  on  the  political parties  to  react  to  new  challan-
Qes. 
(4)  Finally it was  expected  in  some  o!  the  member  countries 
that  the  introduction of  general  elections  in  the  long 
run  as  is  the  case  in  all  SC-member  countries  would 
provide  the  mechanisms  for  a  peaceful  change  of  political 
power  in  the  Com~unity. 
All  these  expectations  were  influenced  by  perceptions  of  what 
the  role  ot  a  parliament  should  be  on  the  basis  of  national 
~xperience.  In  fact.  h~wever.  there  is  not  one  perception  of 
that  role,  but  several.  in  vi~w of  difterences  between  natio-
nal  traditions.  between  current  pr~ctices and  between  con~lic­
tino political ideas.  What  the  member  states clearly have  in 
common,  however,  is  a  commitment  to  what  they  see  as  a  parlia-
mentary  form  of  qovernment,  thouoh  that  form  may  be  qualified 
- 12 -b~ oth~r  vital constitutional  al~ments  (as  by  the  role  of 
the  French  President  or  by  the  Ger~an  F~deral  systeml~.  There 
~xists  a  plenitude  of  co~captions r=Qardinq  ~he  nat11re  of 
and  the  basic  requirements  for  parliaments: 
Starting  from  a  constitutional  point  of  vi~w,  parlia~ents 
may  be  d~scribed as  elective  bodies  with  some  share  of 
governance  and  majority consent.  They  carne  to  be  under-
stood  pri~arily  in  ter~s  of  the  exercise  of  for~al. 
constitutionally guaranteed  powers  such  as  reprensenta-
tive,  deliberate,  legislative,  =xecutive, appointing  and 
electoral  powers6 
Citizens,  qroups  and  organizations  outside  Parlia~~nt 
articulated  a  profile of  expectations  what  a  parliament 
should  be.  Essential  attributes  in  those  expressions  are 
responsiveness,  representativeness  and  the  ability  to 
react  on  new  challenges  by  majority  consent7 • 
Th~ self-concept  of  parlia~~ntarians  ~ay have  relevance 
for  the political  aims  of  the  institution.  Here  the  hold 
on  ~overnment power  is  seen  as  essential.  Only  the  oppo-
sition is interested in  an  openly  debated  strong  scrutinq 
and  control' . 
Academic  conceptions  of  parliament  started  from  the 
crucial question  conccrninq  the  basic  requirements  of  a 
rQpresentative.  Nowadays  the  academic  debate  at least  in 
social science is centered around  the  functions  a  parlia-
ment  should  perform  in  the  political  system. 
Going  back  as  far  as  ~he Enqlisn commentator,  Walter  Baqehot, 
writing  in  1867~ ,  many  stu~ents have  described  the  rol~ of 
parliaments  in  terms  of  the  performance  of  various  functions 
in relation to qovernment  and  societyao.  In  a  symposium  that 
was  organized  by  the  EP  in  l974  Klaus  von  Beyme  arqued  that 
a  distinction can  be  drawn  between  six principal  functions 
- 13-of Parliaments in the input and  output sectors of  the politi-
cal  systems11: 
The  representation and articulation function; 
the  communication  function; 
the controlling function; 
the  function  of  participation  in  the  appointment  and 
dismissal of  the executive; 
the  legislative function; 
the recruiting function. 
The  emphasis that is placed by  th~ national parliaments them-
selves and  by observers  on  these  individual functions  and  on 
the  use  of  the  trad  1 tiona  1  powers  in  Western  Europe  (and 
elsewhere)  has  been  profoundly  affected  in  the  past  by  four 
major  developments: 
1.  Constitutional  limitation  on  the  national  assembly, 
designed  variously  to  provide  for  a  greater  degree  of 
horizontal  (between national/regional level) and vertical 
(between  different  institutions  representing  the  legis-
lative  I  executive  power  and  the  jurisdiction)  separa-
tion  of  powers,  to  allow  direct  consultation  of  the 
people and to recognize the rights of regional assemblies. 
2.  The growth of highly organized political parties, capable 
of  dominating  the  electoral  process  and  the  procedures 
of  the assembly,  as well as acting as a  vital element  in 
the  pcocess of government-formation. 
3.  The  increasing need for governments to take account of the 
demands of strong economic and social interests inside and 
outside parliament altogether. 
4.  The  emergence of an international di.enaiOD limiting the 
capacity of national parliaments to perform their tradi-
tional  role.  Part  of  this  fourth  factor  is,  of  course, 
- 14  -th~  establish~~nt  and  evolution ot  t~~  European  co~~unity 
with  supranational  powers. 
Many  developments  in  European  society  and  politics  must  lead 
us,  theretore,  to  question  the  realism  in  current  circumstan-
ces  of  traditional  conceptions  of  parliament  at  lsast  1n 
some  of  the  member  states.  Even  advocat~s of  parliamentar1srn 
may  abandon  or  ~t  least  modify  substantially  the  traditional 
~odel.  The  national  experience  is  even  less  h~lpful  for  under-
standing  and  guiding  the  Eu~opean  Parliament,  due  to  the 
fact  that  this  institution  do~s not  form  part  of  a  political 
order  identical  to  a  nation state.  To  the  extent  that  th~ 
development  of  the  EC  system  has  not  followed  the  t~aditional 
linas  of  nation states,  comparisons  o!  the  E~'s  ~cle and 
!unctions  with  those  traditionally  belonging  to  national 
parliaments  can  therefore  be  ~isl~ading.  Such  comp~riso~s 
can  cause  frustration  and  an  inc~easinq lack  of  interest  1n 
the  work  of  the  European  Parliament  ~nd in  Europea~  el~c­
tions.  At  the  same  time  they  ~ay urge  the  E?  to  develop  in 
directions  that  miqht  not  be  suitable  to  the  political  system 
in  which  it has  to  function,  having  in  mind,  however,  that 
this  system is developing  too. 
This  leads  to  the question of  what  kinds  of  model  exist,  if 
any,  tor  understanding  and  explaining  the  European  ?arlia-
ment  - what  it is,  what  it does,  how  it relates  to  the  wider 
issues of  European  integration  and  to  traditional  ideas  of 
parliamentarism.  Obviously  those  ~odels  depend  first  and 
foremost  on  the  understandinq  and  perception ot  the  EC  itselt. 
3.  THE  INTERLOCKED  EC  SYSTEM  AND  THE  INSTITUTIONAL 
ROLE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
3.1  The  con1titutional system of  the  EC 
The  EC·system  - as  it is discussed here  - includes  the  Commu-
nity in  the  sense  ot  the  treaties as  well  as  other  common 
activities,  closely linked  to  the  Community,  such  as  the 
~uropean Political Cooperation  (EPC)  and  the  European  Monetary 
- 15  -Syst~m  (EMS).  Ona  o~  the  ~est  striking characteristics  of 
the  EC  system  is  its dynamism,  e.g.  its ability  to  react  on 
new  chall~nqes  in  ~  pragmatic,  but  often  suboptimal  ~ay.  Th~ 
binding  character  of  the  Community  law  and  the  positive  role 
ot  the  c~urt of  Justice  in  ~volving and  concretizing  that 
law  is of  crucial  im~'rtancd in  this  context  as  well. 
If  we  have  a  closer  look  at  th~  structur~s of  the  EC  syste~. 
we  can  s~~  that  th~re is  a  qrowinq  interdependence  and  inter-
ference  between  the  EC  and  its  rn~~ber  states  in  n~arly all 
fields  of  political activity.  Sut  d~spite thos=  evolutions 
the  Europ~an Co~~unity has  not  duveloped  - as  much  as  so~e 
had  thouqht  into  a  supr~-national  system  in  which  th~ 
Commission,  by  technical  eY.pertisc,  would  exclusively  run  the 
com::~unity  bus  inessL :l  •  The  Co:;::mission  h.'\$  not  become  a  strong 
Community  Govern:':'.ent.  The  European  Com:nunity  has  neithr:!r 
developed  inLC  a  pure  fed~ral  systa~ along  classical  medals. 
in  which  a  federal  qovernment  (•  the  EC  Co~~issionl,  guid~d 
and  controlled by  two  chambers  of  parliament  ( 2  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council).  would  be  responsible  tor  the 
Community's  policies  independently  of  tho  coexisting  though 
weakened  nation  states,  nor  has  it fallen  back  into  a  tradi-
tional  international orqanisation,  in  which  only  Qovernments 
decide.  and  do  so  by  unanimity. 
th~ interactions botween  EC  institutions  have  daveloped  in  a 
way  which  does  not  qualify  the  Community  for  this  kind  of 
traditional categorisation.  The  European  Co~municy since  the 
beqinnin~ of  the  seventies  can  instead be  characterised  by 
three qeneral  trends: 
(A)  The  scope  of  activities of  the  EC  has  constantly  b~en 
broadenud,  so  that  more  and  more  topics  of  national  interest 
are,  in  one  or  the  other  of  tha  means  described,  being inte-
grated  into the  Community  or  into  mechanisms  which  are  closely 
linked  to  the  community  - like  European  Political Coopera-
tion  or  European  Monetary  System. 
- 16  -(B)  This  increase in  the  scope  of  the  EC  system's activities 
has  not  been  matched  by  a  transfer  of  exclusive  sovereign-
ties/competence&  to the  Community.  Although  articles of  the 
EEC  treaties  (especially  Art~  100  and  235)  have  been  used 
more often in the last decade,  there· has been no  major radical 
change  in  the  formal  division  of  competences  between  member 
countries  and  the  Community.  The  EC  treaties  provided  the 
space  for  political action,  but  in  some  fields  (e.g.  the 
transport  policy)  there  were  little attempts  to  occupy  it. 
Even  the  Single  European  Act  with  its  new  priorities  in 
certain  fields  (environment,  research  and  technology,  EPC) 
included only  a  limited shift of  competences  from  the member 
states towards  the Ec13. 
(C)  What  has  been  witnessed,  however,  is  a  considerable 
increase  of  "interlocking"  between  na tiona  1  and  Community 
actors:  ministers  and  civil  servants  of  member  countries 
have  grown  more  and  more  accustomed  to  solving  problems 
together with  the Community  or among  themselves.  The  charac-
teristics  of  the  constitutional  evolut~on of  the  Community 
in  the last one  and  a  half decades  have  been  not  a  transfer 
of  sovereignty  but  a  pooling  of  sovereignties  among  member 
states and  the Community.  Member  states have increased their 
participation  in  and  control  of,  Community  activities,  not 
because they have reduced the importance of the Community,  but 
because they have increased the relevance of the Community for 
their own  national policies;  from  the Heads  of Government  to 
the  desk officer  in .any ministries  the  understanding  of 
some  kind  of  common  problem-solving  in  the  EC  framework  has 
increased.  The  completion of  the  internal market  in  1992  may 
turn  out  as  a  mobilizinq  factor  in  those  developments.  The 
mutual  interdependence  will  increase,  but  at  the  same  time 
new  frontiers  may  be  built  up  by  the  new  possibility of 
"opting out" for environmental or health reasons14. 
In many  sectors EC  policies exist parallel to separate natio-
nal  policies.  In  the area of external relations,  the inter-
- 17-locked  character of  European  policy  making  also can  be  seen, 
especially  with  the  so-called  mixed  treaties  (more  than  100 
up  to  1987),  in  which  agreements  with  third  countries  are 
concluded  in such  a  way  that Community  competences  (as deter-
ained by the EC  treaties) and  those of member states are "poo-
led"15.  The  negotiation  procedures  are  - in  these  cases  -
quite  complex,  but  they  have  become  on  the  !C  side  to  be  a 
normal  procedure of decision making. 
The  interlocked system can be  understood as a  specific way  in 
which  the  Western  European  nation states try to tackle prob-
lems of interdependence among  "welfare" and  "service" states. 
As  governments  are  elected  to  provide  their  citizens  with 
certain services  and  goods  they realize,  in  the situation of 
mutual interdependencies,  that only joint decision-making can 
help  to  reduce  some  of  their common  problems.  The  EC  offers 
certain  possibilities  of  assisting  the  solution  of  such 
problems. 
The  attitudes of  national  politicians towards  the Community, 
however,  were and still are conflicting:  On  the one hand,  they 
realize  the  necessity  of  joint  European  actions  to  solve 
existing problems  in fields  such  as  foreign policy,  monetary 
policy,  environmental  protection etc.  On  the other hand,  they 
did  not  accept  the  transfer of  competences  from  national  to 
Community  level.  They  have  preferred  ad  hoc-procedures  and 
interim-regulations, they have pooled national and  EC  instru-
ments  and  they  have  used  traditional  Community  channels  to 
achieve their aims.  In all cases of exclusive  EC  competences 
they  have  increased  the capacity of member  states to control 
Community  activities,  as  has  been  documented  in  particular 
by  various  committees  of  national  experts  who  influence  the 
Commission's  executive  power16.  The  existing  complexity  of 
the EC-system in terms of the division of competences between 
the Community and the member states can be seen in the follow-
ing  Graph  1  (see next page). 
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Being  usetul,  the  Com~unity  h~s shown  a  high  degree  of  dyna-
mism  and  stability,  in  spite  of  all crises  and  blockages. 
The  European  Community  has  not  become  obsole~e but  evolved 
its areas  ot  activity  and  its  institutional set-up,  though 
not  always  in  the  direction  or  at.  the  speed  some  of  its 
founding  fathers  wanted it to. 
To  the viability  and stability of  the  EC  system  one  has  to  ~dd 
the  cumbersome  and  ~  to  a  larqe  degr&e  - undemocratic  deci-
sion-making  process.  Althouqh  the  Community  tak~s many  deci-
sion~that  directly  or  indirectly  affect  citizens  in  the 
~ember states,  those  officially responsible  !or  th~ decisions 
have  little,  if  any,  dir~c~ responsibility to  the  citizens 
themselves,  who  have  little  direct  means  ot  influencing or 
controlling the  makinQ  ot  decisions  at  an  EC  level.  Since 
1979  the  Europe~n Parliament  has  been  directly elected  and 
is  playing  a  certain,  though  limited role.  The  important 
- 19 -decisions,  however,  are  still  mainly  pre-formulated  and 
controlled  by  the  national  administrations,  quite  often 
without  any direct parliamentary decision  and  open  political 
debate  as  is  customary  in  national  decision-making.  The 
consensus on important political matters  the  EC  system prima-
rily  is  between  national  and  European  administrations  and 
leading political circles, thus reducing the role for national 
parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament.  Only  step  by  step 
the  EP  has  gained  some  influence  on  the  decision-making 
processes.  Those  procedures  are  not  only  lengthy,  but  they 
normally  lead  to decisions which  are  "suboptimal",  i.e.  they 
do  not  represent  efficient solutions  for  the Community,  but 
reflect short term package deals  between  national  positions. 
European Parliamentarians therefore do quite often categorize 
the  Community  system as  "undemocratic"  and  "inefficient". 
It  is  traditional  to  start an  analysis  of  the  EP  in  the 
structure of  governance  of  the  Community  by  und~rlining  the 
existing  democratic  deficit in  EC  decision-making17.  Accor-
ding  to  this  "orthodox"  view  the  directly  elected  European 
Parliament  is  the  only  (or  at  least  the  principal)  reposi-
tory of  legitimacy and  democracy  in the Community  structure. 
But  in  spite of  this democratic .quality its powers  are weak 
and  the  decision-making  process  as  a  whole  is  inefficient. 
MEPs  and  observers  have  often  claimed  that  both  facets  of 
the malaise could be corrected by  more  use of majority voting 
in  the  Council,  combined  necessarily  with  a  significant 
increase in the legislative and control powers of Parliament. 
From other perspectives  such conclusions are at least. dispu-
table.  Of  course,  no  modern  polity aspiring to democracy  can 
govern  itself  today  like  the  Greek  Polis  or  the  New  England 
town.  Representative  (parliamentary)  democracy  has  replaced 
direct participation. Nonetheless,  one yardstick of democracy 
should  be  the  closeness,  responsiveness,  representativeness 
and  accountability of  the  governors  to  the  governed.  There 
are  two  normative  requirements  for  representative  political 
- 20  -syste~s  in  the  W~st:  The  qovern~ent  ~ust !ulfil  de~ocratic 
~or~s  and  valu~s  and  - at  the  sa~e  ti~e  - it  ~ust enJoy 
legitimacy,  both  in  a  for~~l  (legal!  and  in  a  social  (erepiri-
cal l  sense.· 
In  the  prucass  of  integration  between  independent  states  ac 
a  regional  level  there  will  as  a  rulu  initially be  a  diminu-
tion  of  dc~ocracy in  the  ~ewly  int~grated body  in  comparison 
to  the  o:d  s~aller polities.  The  reason  for  this  is  the  fact 
that  the  controlling influence  of  the  voters  in  the  integrated 
Co~munity  r.or~ally  is  less  close  than  in  the  former  entity. 
Sut  nev~rth~l~ss the  citizens  may  opt  for  and  forreally  lugi-
ti~ize  this  int~grative  process  because  of  th~  possible 
gains.  Sy  agqreqatinq  the  national  resources  the  total  welf~re 
of  citizens  may  be  enhanced  despite  the  loss  of  the  more  im~~­
diat~  influ~nce on  their  govern~ent policies.  Indeed,  such 
governreental  policies  may  well  have  be~n  little more  than 
symbolic  in  those  policy  ar~as  wher~  a  broader  geographical 
approach  is necessary  to  deal  with  a  problem. 
The  open  question  which  remains  is  it  the  ~inority will 
accept  majority decisions  in  the  ~nlarged  inteqr~ted  ~olity. 
There  is  no  theoretical  answer  dufininq  the  boundaries  of 
the  polity within  which  the  ~ajority  principlu  should  be 
applied.  The  acc~ptance is  deter~ined by  long-ter~ factors 
such  as  political continuity,  social,  cultural  and  lingui-
stic aftinity,  a  shared  history  and  a  sense  of  common  purposes 
at  least within certain spheres.  ~~ople accept  the  majorita-
rian  principl~  of  de~ocracy  within  a  polity  to  which  th~y 
see  themselves  belonging.  As  long  as  this  social  legitimacy 
is not  attributed  to  the  Community  in all member  states,  the 
v~to right ot  national  qov~rnments  in  the  Council  may  be 
seen  in  thos~  reluctant  countries  as  the  sinQle  and  most 
legitimizing element  in  the  Community.  But  the  political  and 
the  economic  cost  of  this  instrument  are obviously hiqh,  as 
well  as  its democratic  cost  ~hen a  minority  can  continually 
frustrate  a  majority  in this  way. 
- 21  -But  even  a  substantially  strc~gthened  ~~~opean  Parl1a~e~t 
cannot  nec~ssarily solve  tha  lagiti~acy  ~roblem  at  once  and 
by  itsul!.  To  this  ~nd,  an  ~nhanced social  lagiti~ation  o~ 
the  Co~~unity  see~s  to  be  n:cassary.  with  a  stronger  Eeelinq 
of  belonqlr.Q  to  Co~munity and  acc~pting its decisions  in  all  .  ,  . 
its  me~bar states.  The  Parlia~ant inself  could  contribute  t~ 
achieve  this  aim. 
3.2  The  institutional role  of  the  ~P within  the  EC-system 
The  EP's  flegall  powers  and  (political)  !orrns  of  influence 
can  be  ~:<pres  s~:otd  in  three  categories  1 A  : 
1.  Decisional  powers  enable  the  ?arlia~ent to  influence  th~ 
outcome  of  a  decision  making  ~:oc~ss  by  legal  means.  On 
the  eve  ot  tha  third  European  elections  three  ~~~n 
decisional  powers  are  at  the  dispos~l of  the  E?: 
the  power  to  force  the  Commission's  resignati=~ by 
passing  a  motion  of  censure, 
the  power  to  adopt  (or  rej~ctl  the  budget  {includi~g 
its marqin  for  manoeuvre  to  add  expenditure  and  to 
alloca~e  expenditure  within  the  non-compulsory 
sector  and  to  qive  discharge  in  respect  of  tha 
audited accounts)  and 
the  power  to  qive  its assent  to,  or  ~efusa.  tr~at~~s 
o~ association and  fteeession. 
2.  Participatory  powers  guarantae  on  s  l~qal base  tha  in-
volvement  of  the  EP  in  decision-~akinq procedures  withoue 
giving  it  the  possibility  to  "dominate"  the  outcome. 
This  includes  primarily  the  EP's  consultation  in  the 
"normal"  Comnlunity  legislation.  The  EP's  strengthcru~d 
legislative power  within  the  cooperation procedure  accor-
ding  to  article  149  (2)  should  also  be  classified  as 
participatory:  The  !P  may  influence  the 
in  the  end  the  Council  will  always  have 
by  unanimity)  the  last  word.  According 
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(by  majority or 
to article 1J8 (3)  of  the  EEC-Treaty  the  E?  has  ~he obligation  to  ini-
tiaca  proposals  for  a  unifor~  European  electoral  pro-
c~dur~.  Moreover  it has  gained  the  right  to  appeal  th~ 
Court  of  Justice. 
3.  Political  means  of  influence  ref~r  to  those  possibilities 
for  the  EP  to  influence  decisions  that  are  not  based  on 
the  EC  treaties,  but  on  the  representative  I  deliberate 
powers  of  the  EP.  inter-institutional  agreements  or  the 
EP's  internal  rules  of  procedure  and  its plenitude  of 
contacts  with  national  and  EC  actors  (''corridor  poli-
tics").  This  includes  tha  in!or~al  information  of  tha  E? 
on  the  negotiation  of  trade  and  association-treaties  by 
Council  and  Commission  <"Luns  - Westerterp-procedura''l. 
the  conciliation procedure  for  i~portant legal  acts  with 
major  financial  impact,  the  budgetary  conciliation  ("tri-
'logue"},  the  right  to  put  questions  to  the  Council  and 
J 
to  the  Foreign Ministers,  the  right  to  set-up  committees 
of  inquiries  and  the  right  to  pass  resolutions  and  to 
send  delegations  and  fact  findinq  ~issions  to  third 
countries. 
Decisional  and  participatory  powers  are  li~ited to  those 
matters  which  are  legally  based  on  the  EC-treaties.  Other 
fields  ot  activity in  the  EC-system,  which  are  not  or  ar~ only 
partly within  tha  competence  of  the  Community.  can  only  be  in-
fluenced  by  the  EPs  weak  (political)  ~eans of  influence. 
This  partly explains  the  tensions  between  the  growinq  inter-
lockinq character  of  the  EC  syst~m and  the  EP's  clai~ for  an 
enhanced  role  in this  syste~.  To  expr~ss it  clearly:  The  EP 
has  no  chance  of  influenci~g by  legal  ~ethods organs  such  as 
EUREKA  the  intergovernmental  agreement  of  19  European states 
on  intensified  cooperation  in  tho  field  of  research  and 
technology,  which  are  based  on  national  competences  only 
unless  the  Community  is involved as  such. 
The  patterns of  interaction between  the  Community  institutions 
are different accordinq  to  treaty rules,  policy sectors  and 
political  constellations,  but  there  are  also  some  common 
- 23  -faaeures  (see  Sche~e  2  on  tha  following  page).  At  the  'or~al 
b8ginnino  of  aach  process.  the  Co~~ission puts  forward  propo-
sals  for  aither  Co~~unity legislative  acts.  for  the  Co~~unity 
budget  or  for  aqraements  and  treaties  with  third  countries. 
The  process  normally  ends  with  a  d8cision  of  the  Council 
which  - in  most  casas  - has  at  least  to  consult  the  EP  ~nc 
the  Econo~ic and  Social  Council. 
!n  the  budQetary  process,  the  Europe~n  Parliament  plays  s 
crucial  role.  as  it is.  together  with  the  Council,  the  bud-
getary  authority  o!  th~  Com~unity 1  q.  The  Parliamantarians 
can,  up  to  a  certain limit,  increase  aud  alter  the  non-obli-
qatory  expenditures  which  are  about  20  to  30  % of  the  EC 
budget.  and  can  bloc~ the  ~hole budget. 
In  legislative acts,  the  Co~rni~sion's proposal  is  communicatad 
to  the  Parliament,  which gives  its opinion,  and  to  the  Council 
who  in  the  end  will  take  a  decision  - or will  fail  to  do  so. 
After  the  Single  European  net  which  came  into  force  on  1 
July  1987,  the  Parliament  possesses  n~w  powers  in  the  area 
of  legislative acts.  Within  the  new  "cooperation proeedure". 
two  readin~s are  envisaged20 •  Attar  the  Parliament  has  given 
its opinion,  the  Council  decides  on  a  common  position,  if 
approvin~ the  Commission's  position  by  ~ualified majority. 
this  common  position is  sent  back  to  Parliament  which  if it 
either  aqr~es or  takes  no  decision  at all,  allows  the  common 
position  to  be  ''ratified"  by  the  Council.  However,  if  th~ 
Parliament,  by  the  ~bsolute  ~ajority of  its component  ~embers. 
amends  the  common  position  of  the  Council,  the  Commission 
will  re-examine  the  proposal  and it can  - on  its own  de~ision 
- submit  a  revised  proposal  within  a  month's  time.  Th~ Council 
can  then  adopt  the  new  Commission  proposal  by  a  qualified 
majority  and/or  can  amend  it unanimously  includinq  those 
amendments  by  the  European  Parliament  which  the  Commission 
has  not  taken  up. 
The  European  Parliament  can  also reject  the Council's  common 
position,  aqain  by  an  absolute  majority  of  its component 
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explanations members,  and  in  this  case  the  Council  can  only  pass  the 
legislation by  unanimous  vote.  If  the Council does  not decide 
vi  thin three months after the Parliament's rejection or amend-
tlents,  the  Commission  proposal  is  classified  as  not  being 
adopted;  if  the  Commission  wishes  to  pursue  the  policy  in 
question,  it has  to start the whole  process again. 
The  positive  effects  of  these  reforms  will  depend  on  the 
political will of  the  institutions to change  the  unsatisfac-
tory situation: 
a)  If  the  Council  sticks  to  its unanimity  rule  - in  spite 
of  the possibilities of qualified  majorities  - then  the 
second  reading of  the  European  Parliament looses much  of 
its  point.  However,  the  possibility  of  "opting  out" 
according to article  100  a  (4)  may  facilitate the  use of 
rn~jor:ity voting. 
b)  For  the  European  Parliament  the  new  procedure· opens_ new 
possibilities of increasing its influence, but it is also 
a  considerable  challenge.  The  Parliament will  have  to 
organize itself in  a  way  which  allows it to  adopt  posi-
tions with the necessary majority and  to become  a  "relia-
ble"  partner in coalition building. 
c)  The  Commission's  role  is  not  weakened  but  strengthened, 
especially  in  the  case  of  amendments  put  forward  by 
Parliament,  which may  call for difficult decisions by  the 
Commission,  either  to  take up  the positions of  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament  (which  can  dismiss  the  COIUlliss~on  by  a 
vote of non-confidence),  or to take  into account  a  majo-
rity in the Council  which still has  the final word.  There 
will  be  more  pressure  on  the  Commission  from  both  the 
Council and  the  EP  to  persuade  it to  take up  their posi-
tions. 
This  strengthened  role  of  the  European  Parliament  has  no 
equivalent  in  the  area  of  concluding  trade  and  cooperation 
- 26  -agreements  or treaties  between  the Community  and  third  coun-
tries  (except  associat~on  agreements,  see  below),  or  other 
organizations;  in  policy-making  for  external  relations,  the 
European  Parliament and  its relevant committees  are  informed 
about  the  ongoing negotiation  process.  Though  the  Parliament 
may  pursue direct contacts  through its delegations to parlia-
ments  in  many  countries of  the  world,  it,  however,  does  not 
play  any constitutional role. 
However,  the Single European Act has  in~roduced two exceptions 
to  the  weak  position  of  the  European  Parliament  in  this 
field:  association agreements  and  treaties  of  accession  now 
require the assent of  the European Parliament by  an absolute 
majority  of  its  component  members21.  This  applies  also  to 
any amendments  to association agreement and  related financial 
protocols,  etc.22. 
From  this  analysis,  the  conclusion  can  be  drawn  that  the 
restricted  position of  the  EP  in  the  EC  system  results  at 
least from  two facts:  On  the one hand  parliamentary competen-
ces vis-a-vis "tradi  tiona!" EC  policies remain unsatisfactory, 
but here it has  sometimes  real decisional  powers,  especially 
in  the  budgetary  field.  On  the  other  hand,  many  activities 
of  the  EC  system  are  not  based  on  EC  competences.  On  the 
base  of  leqal  powers  the  EP  as  a  Community  institution  has 
no  possibility to decide  on  those matters.  As  long  as  there 
is  no  transfer  of  competences  from  the  national  to  the  EC 
level  this  situation will  remain  the  same.  The  introduction 
of  the  Sinqle  European  Act  in July 1987  has  proved  that  the 
EC  system is open  to limited institutional changes. 
The EP  itself has reacted in different ways  to this challenge: 
Since the introduction of direct elections,  a  rapid  increase 
in all parliamentary activities can be detected.  The attempts 
of  the  EP  to  change  the  existing  EC  system  and  by  this  to 
enhance  its  own  role  have  been  of  major  importance.  The 
adoption  of  the  "Draft  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
- 27  -Union"  can  be  rated as  a  cornerstone  in  this field.  Openings 
for  parliam~ntary role  concepts  according  to  traditional 
experience,  however,  are quite  limited. 
3.3  Concepts  for the European Parli48ent 
Concepts  - as models - are constructions to help us understand 
complex  realities.  They  serve  for  analysis  (positive  theory) 
and for programmatic strategies (normative theories).  They are 
not necessarily  immediate goals  for  strategies as  they  might 
not  coincide with  the interests of the actors. 
To  construct concepts is not  an artificial and  useless exer-
cise:  in  some  way  or  an  other  everybody  has  his/her  own  -
perhaps  implicit or incomplete - {pre)conceptions. To  present 
concepts  helps  to  make  common  ideas  combining  experiences, 
assumptions and academic knowledge,  clearer and easier to dis-
cuss.  Thus concepts on  the European Parliament should help to 
identify normal  patterns of  perceiving the  EP, 
analyse  the  empirical  performance  and  tendencies  of  the 
European Parliament, 
construct  a  desirable  and  possible  future  role  for  the 
European  Parliament - being aware  that the  actors inside 
and  outside  might  not  be  interested  in using  these  con-
cepts  as  a  yardstick  for  their  strategies.  They  might 
have different goals. 
In order  to identify concepts for  the European  Parliament  we 
can  use  a  set of  three different fields of activity  (•func-
tions)  for  the European Parliament as  a  starting po1nt23.  The 
type of  the concept will depend  on  which fields of activitiy 
(or  parts of  it) and  which parliamentary  pavers are used  by 
or attributed to the EP.  The  catalogue includes: 
- 28  -lal  activities  to  shape  policies  with1n  the  given  (ECI  system 
such  as 
taking  inltiatives, 
concluding  blnding decisions  (including  traditional  :unc-
tions  such  as: 
legislative, 
elective, 
budge:tary, 
treaty  ~aking powers, 
control1ing  policy· il'!'.plut!er.tat.ion: 
!bl  activities  to develop  the  SC  system2 •  such  as 
enlarging  the  scops  of  activities  of  the  EC  syste~. 
shifting  the  division  of  compcten:es  ~ith~n  the  EC  syst~~. 
ref  o~:":'ling  ths  ins ti  tut  lO':l.al  set  -·~p  of  the  EC  system  to 
=akd  it more  ~ffici~nt  ~nd da=ocrat1c: 
I c)  acti  viti  es  of  in  teractinc;  with  the  "constituency"~~  sue:--: 
as 
artic~lation of  concarns-and  expr~ssions of  grievances. 
agqrc;ation  of  interes~s and  information  of  the  public, 
refl=ction support  !or/opposition to particlar  ~~as~r~s. 
By  combining  certain fields  o~  activities  with  the  pow~rs of 
parliareont  which  we  have  id~ntitied in  tha  second  chapter  of 
this  report  we  can  identify  the  following  conce~ts  (s~~ 
Scheme  3l: 
In  t.!'-.a  forum  c:oncept  parl  ia:nen ts  are  "deoa  t inq  societies" 
articulatinq  inte~ests  ~nd leadinq  to  initiativas.  The 
P«rliam~nt is  a-seismographic  am~lifier of  voices  ins~­
ciety.  Elactions  guarantca  that  th~ voices  are  rapresen-
tative  and  are  heard  as  the  "will"  of  thu  people.  In  this 
model  the  representative/deliberato  power  is  accentuated. 
An  example  for  such  a  "forum"  is the  Parliamentary  Assem-
bly ot  the  Council  ot  Europe. 
- 29-Scheme  3:  The  eaphasis of different fields of activities 
in  various  concepts  (aodels)  for  the  European 
ParliUteDt 
eoneepia 
fields  o! 
actiTitiea/ 
powers 
a)  to ehape  policies 
initiatiTe 
decision  makin~ 
- le~ialation 
- elect1on 
- t>ua.@:e1i 
- treaty mu1n~ 
ooatrol ot 
1•plemeatation 
b)  developins the 
•:ret•• 
scope  enlar~emeat 
ehitt or eoapeteacea 
institutioaal re!oras 
c)  iateraotioa 
articulation of eoneerDe 
agsresation ot interest  a 
aobilization 
applicabiltiy to the 
European Parliament  as 
it stands to date 
11!orum 
concept" 
XX 
X 
XX 
high,  but 
unsatisfactory 
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•1e~islature"  "!Ubernat: 
coacept"  1 
electing  1 
over:a.men1 
X  X 
XX  X 
XX 
.{ 
.{ 
(I) 
(X)  (X) 
(X)  (X) 
(X) 
X  X 
(X)  XX 
limited  very  limite In  tha  concept  of  a  legislature  the  parliament  is  tha 
l~gislative branch  of  the  govern~untal system.  The  Par-
llu~~nt is  ~n identity distinct  fro~  ehe  executive  branch 
and  rha  administration.  Elections  are  selections  of 
p~ogrnmmes  and/or  political  actors.  In  this  ~odel  the 
legislative  power  of  tha  parliament  is  of  crucial  impor-
tance.  The  US  Congress  can  be  classified  as  such  a 
"legislature". 
!n  the  "gubernative"  concept  in  which  the  parliament  is 
electing  the  government:  the  majority  of  the  parliament. 
eha  govern~~nt  ~nd  the  administration  form  so~e kind  of 
unity.  The  parliament  is  not  acting  as  a  unit  but  as  th~ 
constitutional  place  where  the  govarnrnent  is  elected. 
G~neral elections  are  competitions  between  persons  and 
parti~s.  In  this  ~odel  the  executive  power  to  select  th~ 
executiva  authority dominates  all  th~ other  powers,  and 
usually  (but  not  always)  l~ad to  the  do:r.ination  of  !?arlia-
-:nent  by  the  executive.  The  "gubernc!tive  concept"  can  be 
attributed  to  the  Ger~an Bundestag. 
OwinQ  to  the  tact  that  the  Europ~an Parliament has  not  so 
!ar the  power  to  elect  a  European  qovernme:nt  and  possessed 
v~ry  li~ite~  legislative  powers,  parliamentary  concepts 
such  as  "qubernative"  and- "te:qislatur>3"  have  by  definition 
to  be  understood  as  dynamic.  To  realize  such  concepts  the 
EC-systa~ needs  to  b~  transfor~ed  to  a  hiqher  d~grec of 
inteqration,  9ivinq  the  EP  -at  leas~ partly  the  opportunity 
to  follow  the  lines  of  (traditional}  national  parlia~ents. 
These  developments  should not  necessarily repeat  the  models 
o!  th~  EC-membcr  states.  Swiss  democracy  with  its various 
forms  of  direct  and  indirect participation  by  the  citizens 
in the political process1', or  th~ US-system  with  the  prevai-
linq clement  of  "checks  and  balances"  between  the  main  poli-
tical  authorities  are  intarestinq  examples  of  differ~nt 
concepts~~.  The  swiss  and  tho  US  systems  are characterized  by 
th~ far-reachinq  independence  of  Parliament  from  the  govern-
- 31  -~2nt,  but  ln  both  syst&~s  represantativ~ assemblies  have  a 
strong  rcl~  to  play. 
The  experience  of  tr.e  EP' s  "~ra!t  Treaty  Establishinq  ~he 
European  Union"  of  14  February  1984  demonstrated  once  again 
the  stable character  of  the  EC-syste~.  which  proved  to  ba 
highly  resistant  to  major  constitutional  changes2 a.  The 
preference  of  the  predo~inant national  governments  with  the 
exception  of  Italy  - and  perhaps  Spain  - for  pragmatic  "step 
by  step"  decisions  will  ~ake a  rapid  transformation  of  the 
EC  into  a  "European  Union"  with  a  strong parliament  diffi-
cult. 
Seep  by  step  changes  in  th~  institutjonal  balance  o!  the 
EC-sysccm,  howevur,  aru  possible.  The  history  of  the  last 
decadd  h~s  shown  for  exareple  that  the  political  influ~nce of 
the  Co~~ission  depends  largely  on  the  personality of  its 
Presicent.  A stronq  perso~~lity  like  Jacques  Delors  with 
European  experience.  a  naci~nal  backing  and  clear political 
concepts  may  enhance  the  prestige  and  the  influence  of  his 
institution as  such.  On  the  uth~r hand  one  has  witness~d a 
re~arkable re11ationalisation  within  the  Council.  That  could 
render  all pro  european  ~volutions  mor~ difficult.  An  analysis 
of  the  EP's  institutional  rola since  the  first  European  elec-
tions  in  l97~ demonstrates  that  there  have  been  no  "big  lt:aps" 
towards  a  parliament  in traditional  terms  as  described  above. 
Nevertheless  the  EP's  institutional  iVolution  in  the  last 
decade  has  be~n of  ~ajar  i~portance. 
4.  THE  PERFORMANCE  OF  THE  EP  SINCE  1979 
4.1  Overview:  The  phases  of  the  EP's prioritiel 
The  introduction of direct elections generally was  seen  as  an 
important  turning point  in  th~ history of  the  European  Parlia-
ment.  The  newly  elected members  vigorously  sought  a  stren9-
th~ned political weiqht  in  th~ decision-making  process  of  the 
- 32  -Community.  The  internal  organs  of  Parliament  were  reformed. 
The_increase of  the EP's activities in all fields was  remark-
able:  After  1979  the  number  of  own  initiative  reports  was 
regularly  higher  than  the  number  of  reports  on  proposals  of 
the  Commission.  Priority  in  own-initiative  reports  has  been 
given besides  to traditional Comminity  matters  in  particular 
to  subjects  of  "high  politics",  like  human  rights,  South-
Africa or  the  future of  Western  Europe.  Written questions  to 
the Commission  have  risen from  1003  in 1978  to 2671  in  1986, 
to  the  Council  from  132  to  195  and  to  the  Foreign  Ministers 
from  20  to  157.  The  budgetary  procedure  was  frequently  per-
ceived  as  an opportunity to define political priorities. 
In  the  first electoral  term  (1979-84)  the  Parliament  showed 
a  great  deal  of vitality  in raising  important  issues  facing 
West  European  society.  To  some.  extent,  it functioned  as  a 
mirror,  an amplifier of interest, an initiator and a  permanent 
commentator.  Some  observers  criticised,  however;  the  fact 
that it was  too  much  concerned with  "world affairs",  such  as 
questions of human rights and development problems, neglecting 
its  "home-work"  in  the  field  of  legislation  on  traditional 
Community  matters. 
This  interest  of  MEPs  in matters  of  "high politics"  can  be 
explained on  the  one  hand  by  the media's  readiness  to report 
on  those  questions.  On  the other  hand  it can  be  interpreted 
as quite understandable reaction of politicians in concentra-
ting on  those  fields  of activity  where  they could  influence 
the political process  (or at least  the  media),  leaving aside 
all the areas that were clearly dominated  and occupied by the 
national  governments. 
In  general  the  first electoral  period  (1979-1984)  can  be 
characterized by  five major trends: 
The  first two years after the  1979 election were devoted 
to  a  process  of  self-discovery.  The  rules  of  procedure 
- 33  -were  revised.  The  political  majorities  often  changed. 
The  fact  that  the  EP  rejected  the  EC  budget  for  1980  can 
be  rated  as  an  early  attempt  with  limited  success  to 
demonstrate its strengthened  political weight.  Not  until 
1981  did  the  EP  start  to  tackle  "sensitive"  matters, 
such  as  the  institutional reform,  security questions,  or 
social  problems. 
Within  the Parliament no coherent and consistent minority 
and  majority  coalitions  were  established,  though  there 
is  a  slight majority  for  the centre-right parties.  Only 
on  highly  political  issues  was  this  majority  decisive. 
Normally other cleavages  (e.g.  agricultural against  non-
agricultural)  predominated. 
The  EP  devoted  a  major  part  of  its working  capacity  to 
relatively "new" fields of the EC-system, like development 
and  environmental  policy or human  rights.  In  "old areas" 
like agricultural or trade policy it gave its opinions and 
started  new  initiatives  - with little impact  on  politi-
cal decisions. 
Regularly the Parliament demonstrated in those cases where 
it had decisional  powers,  its ability to act in an effi-
cient way  and its responsiveness  to  the underlying prob-
lems.  Its use of  the  budgetary  procedures  in  particular 
revealed  the  EP' s  capacity  for  aggregating  diverging 
interests. 
In  the  second  half  of  the  first electoral  term  system 
development  became  one  of  the  major  working  fields  of 
the  EP.  A  Committee  on  Institutional  Affairs  was  esta-
blished.  The  EP  followed  a  double  strategy:  On  the  one 
hand it tried to revise the EC-system within the existing 
structures  by  a  series  of  reports29.  On  the  other  hand 
it voted for the "Draft Treaty establishing the European 
Union"30  giving by this the voters a  legitimated concep-
- 34  -tion  for  the  future of  the  Community.  The  aim  of  leading 
parliamentarians  to  mobilize  the  voters  behind  this 
11European Constitution"  in the  second  electoral campaign 
failed  ho~ever. But nevertheless the Draft Treaty project 
caused  important pressure for  institutional reforms. 
At  the  beginning  of  its second  electoral  tera  (1984-89)  the 
EP  was  able  to start its work  more  immediately  than  in  1979. 
The  majority of  the  "old"  MEP's  ~ere re-elected31.  The  staff 
had  become  used  to  the  working  conditions  of  the  directly 
elected  EP.  The  interest of  the  public  in the  ~ork of  the  EP 
slowly became stronger, but remained limited. Thus 
11normali ty" 
began for  the EP.  But  th.is  "normality" did not prevent impor-
tant evolutions: 
The  "Single  European  Act",  which  came  into  force  in  1  July 
1987,  can  be  seen  as  the  third  major  turning  point  in  the 
history  of  the  EP  alongside  the  acknowledgement of  the  EP's 
budgetary  powers  in  1970/75  and  the  introduction  of  direct 
elections  in  1979.  Though  in  the  negotiating  process  many 
parliamentarians  had  reservations  about  the  reform  in  form 
of  the  Act  - bearing  in mind  their own  Draft-Treaty  project 
- it has  turned out to be an opportunity for a  closer involve-
ment  of the EP  in the  EC  decision making  process aimed at the 
completion of the internal market. 
The  demanding  requirements  of  the  new  cooperation  procedure 
laid  down  in  the  new  article  149  (2)  of  the  EEC-treaty  led 
to an important revision of the EP's rules of procedure32.  The 
1 imi ted experience to date with this new  cooperation procedure 
and  the  new  rules  of  procedure  indicates,  however,  that  the 
EP  in  the  second  half of  its second electoral  term  is going 
to  emphasize  its  work  as  a  legislature,  markedly  reducing 
other activities. 
Detailed  analysis  indicates  that  since  1979  the  performance 
of the EP  in its various fields of activity - to influence the 
- 35  -existing EC  policies, to develop the EC  system and  to interact 
with  the  voters  - has  been  heterogeneous.  Some  areas  (or 
parts of them)  have  been highlighted to a  greater degree than 
others according to the priorities of the EP  and  the structure 
of  the  EC  ~y9tem. 
4.2  Policy-aaking 
As  described  above,  the  institutional  system  set  up  by  the 
EEC  Treaty does not assign to the European Parliament the full 
range of  powers  enjoyed  by  the parliaments in typical Western 
European  systems  of government.  But nevertheless,  the  EP  has 
used  its  existing  competences  to  shape  policies  within  the 
given  EC  system,  especially 
- by  acting as  an articulator and  transmitter of  ideas, 
- by  influencing  the legislative and  the  budgetary  process 
and 
- by  scrutinizing the other political actors. 
The  EP  has  from  the outset  sought  to  exploit and  extend  its 
consultative powers  to the maximum  in the legislative process 
and  to  this  end  has  been  supported  in  part  by  the  other 
institutions,  especially  by  the  Court  of Justice  and  the 
Commission.  It has  also  sought  to play  a  role  in  initiating 
Community  a-ction  and  has  usually  had  a  good  response  from 
the  Commission,  which  now  submits  written  reports  to  the 
Parliament every  six months  as  its response to  "own  initia-
tive resolu-tions".The Parliament has sometimes been criticized 
for  devoting  its attention  to  issues  on  which  it has  no 
legal  influence  (human  rights,  foreign  policy,  s~curi  ty 
policy  ••• ).  On  the  other  hand,  exactly  this  variety  of 
subjects  serves  as  an  indicator  of  its  valuable  role  as  a 
"forum"  and  a  .. moral  tribune"  in the Community. 
The  EP's  actual  impact  in  the  legislative procedure  is ex-
tremely  hard  to  judge.  The  EP  has  no  decisional  powers  in 
- 36  -legislation,  but  "hidden  impact"  may  be  as  important  as 
visible  impact.  Commission  proposals  for  example  may  already 
have.been strongly influenced by  the EP  before  they  have  been 
formally  proposed,  though  the EP's formal  powers  of influence 
over  the  initiation of  legislation are  non-existent. 
The  conciliation  procedure  on  legislation  with  significant 
budgetary impact has proved to be a  failure33. The  opportunity 
for  the  EP  to  enter  !nto  a  dialogue  with  the  Council  is  no 
compensation for the lack of bargaining power, and the Council 
has  the final  say.  Therefore  the  EP's  influence  has  depended 
on  its capacity  to  mobilize allies by  presenting  convincing 
political concepts. In doing so,  the EP  has  been more  success-
ful  in  "dynamic"  and  "moral"  policy fields  like  development 
policy  and  questions  of  human  rights  than  in  "traditional" 
EC  matters  like agricultural or  trade policies. 
One  field where  the  European Parliament has developed  consi-
derable powers  is that of  the Community  budget.  Parliament's 
budgetary  powers  have  been  frequently  analysed  elsewhere34. 
They  have  not  been  formally  modified  in  any  substantial  way 
in the recent past,  but have  been  limited  by  the  reaching of 
the ceiling on  Communi-ty  revenue.  The  1983,  1984,  1985,  1 987 
and  1988  budgets  were at or above  the  ceiling,  placing  them 
in  the  realm  of  national  governments  (rather  than  of  the 
Council  and  European  Parliament)  as  regards  the  fixing  of 
the  maximum  level  of  expenditure.  The  focus  of  the  budget 
debate  has  therefore  been  on  the  need  for  new  revenue,  the 
forms  this could  take,  and  ways  of controlling  expenditure, 
notably on  agriculture~ If anything,  there is a  greater risk 
of  Parliament's  powers  bein9  cut  back  in  practice  rather 
than in them  being  exten~ed. 
Sharpened  conflict  between  Parliament  and  Council  in  this 
situation  has  meant  that  each  of  the  four  years  since  the 
1984  elections will  have  started  without  an  agreed  budget 
- 37  -<pr~~lsional  twelfths).  Disput=s  for  the  first  ~ime  r~sulted 
in  a  Court  rulinq  in  1986  and  could  do  so  again  in  198S. 
The  annual  budgetary  proc~dure is  also  an  important  guide  to 
the  political  priorities  of  the  EP.  In  the  debate  held  1n 
December  of  each  y~ar on  th~  adopcion  of  th~ budget  for  the 
following  financial  y~ar,  th~ general  rapporteur  sets  out 
th~ EP's  prioritias  in  the  financial  sphere.  Since  1979  une~­
ployment,  social  and  reQional  policy,  energy  and  development 
(''hunger  in  the  world")  have  featured  reqularly. 
Ther~ can  be  no  mistaking  the  efforts  made  by  ~embers  to 
~onvert  their  political  ~iMs into  Community  practice,  the 
outcome,  however.  often  turned  out  r.o  be  unsatisfactory.  The 
analysis  of  the  budgetary  procedures  since  1979  shows  that 
in  fact  it proved  possible  to  achieve  increases.  in expendi-
tures  on  the  areas  classified  as  priorities  - social,  regio-
nal  and  develop~ent policy.  But  in  g~neral it  can  be  seen 
that  the  EP's  ~uccess~s  in  the  bud~etary field,  although 
undeniable,  have  been relatively  li~it~d.  Although  the  EP 
could  increase  the  share  o~  non-compulsory  expenditures  in 
che  budQet  from  l6  in  1979  to  about  28  per  cent  in  1988  the 
bulk  of  the  Community  expendttures  were  taken  by  the  agricul-
tural  policy,  on  which  the  EP  has  little influence. 
There  was  and still is a  controversy  over  the  obvious  aim  of 
~any  MEPs  to  compvnsate  for  the  EP's  lack  of  legislative 
powers  by  exploiting its  budqetary  powers.  With  some  ~inor 
exceptions  (''actions ponctuelles"l  th~ Commission  has  regular-
ly refuse4  to disburse  budqet  appropriations  voted  by  the  Par-
liament  for  which  the  Council  has  not  provided  a  legal basis. 
The  institutions'  conflictinQ viewpoints  were  brouoht  somewhat 
closer  by  the  joint declaration  of  th~ EP,  Council  and  Commis-
sion ot  30  June  1982  accordino  to which  the  Council  expresse4 
a  certain  readiness  to  provide  a  legal  basis  for  such  new 
appropriationa3s.  Notwithstandinq  such  real  successes  the 
limits of  the  EP's  budqetary  powers  have  become  obvious. 
- 38  -The  right  to  ask  questions  has  considerable  significance  as 
a  political  instrument  for  scrutiny  and  - as  we  have  seen 
above  - is  being  used  increasingly  often  by  the  MEPa.  This 
right  serves  two  main  purposes:  firstly,  it enables politi-
cal  scrutiny  to  be  exercised  on  the  bodies  concerned,  and 
secondly it is designed  to  draw  their attention  to  t.portant 
fields of activities,  and  thus  to spur  them  to  take  the  ini-
tiative. 
The  EP  has  also  strengthened  its  co-operation  with  other 
control  authorities,  especially  with  the  European  Court  of 
Auditors.  In  1983  for  the  first  time  in  its history it took 
legal  proceedings  against  the  Council  for  neglecting  its 
Treaty  obligations  with  regard  to  transport  policy36.  In 
December  1987  it used  this  instrument  for  the  second  time 
following  the  Council's  failure  to  present  a  draft  for  the 
1988  budget  in  time.  In  February/March  1988  it contested  the 
legal  base  of  a  directive on  radioactivity in  food  stuff37. 
The  presence  of  ind.ividual  members  of  the  Commission  in  the 
plenary and at Committee meetings is now  a  routine event.  The 
most striking trend of the last few  years has been the increa-
sing  presence  at  Committees  of  Council  ministers  from  the 
country  currently  holding  the  Presidency.  Furthermore,  the 
Head  of  Government  of  the  country  holding  the  Presidency 
normally  reports  to  the  EP  plenary  on  the  results  of  the 
latest meeting  of  the  European  Council.  Thus,  although  all 
political actors  in  the  EC  system  are  affected  by  the  EP's 
controlling activities the  EP  has differing opportunities  to 
force  others  to  abandon  activities  which  have  come  under 
criticism.  Specialization  within  the  EP's  committees  has 
been enhanced,  special committees of enqiry have  been estab-
lished (e.g. on the disposal of agricultural stocks and on the 
transport of  hazardous waste within the Community) • 
.. - 39  -4.3  Systea develop.ent and  system  change 
One  of  the  most distinctive  features  of  the  European  Parlia-
ment  as  compared  to national  parliaments  is  that it does  not 
regard itself as part of a  completed  institutional system but 
as  part  of  one  which  is  evolving  into  something  different, 
and  in  which  it must  itself  play  a  major  role  in  order  to 
bring about  such  an  evolution. 
The  most striking example of Parliament's attempts  to reform 
the  Community  System  was  its  proposal  for  a  new  Treaty  on 
European  Union.  This  profound  revision  of  the  EC-Treaties 
which  was  often characterized as  a  "constitution for  Europe" 
has  been  sufficiently  analysed  elsewhere38.  It  led  to  the 
adoption  of  the  Single  European  Act  which  fell  far  short  of 
Parliament's  demands.  Nevertheless,  the  Single  European  Act 
was  the  first  systematic  attempt  to  overhaul  the  Community 
treaties· and  co~tained a  number  of useful elements. 
The  Draft  Treaty  on  European  Union  is  also  significant  in 
that it lays down  a  marker for Parliament 
1 s  targets as regards 
the  future  direction  of  European  integration.  Three  major 
objectives can  be  distinguished: 
extending  the  competences  of  the  Community  to  new  areas 
of responsibility 
increasing the efficiency of  the  Community's  institutio-
nal  system  by  increasing majority  voting  in  the  Council 
and  strengthening the autonomous  executive  powers  of  the 
Commission 
increasing  democracy  by  strengthening  the  EP's  powers, 
notably by providing for co-decision on Community  legisla-
tion  and  a  vote  of  confidence  on  the  appointment  of  the 
Commission. 
These objectives can also be  found in many of the "small step" 
institutional  initiatives  that  have  been  launched  - on  oc-
- 40  -casion with success - by  the European Parliament.  These  "small 
step
11  developments  have  arisen  in a  number  of  ways: 
1.  By  using  the ordinary legislative and  budgetary  procedu~ 
res  of  the  Community  to  extend  Community  competence  to 
new  areas.  Of  particular  note  is  the  use  by  Parliament 
of  its  budgetary  powers  to  create  new  budgetary  lines 
which  have  led  to  the Community  becoming active  in areas 
such as education, youth exchanges, new  forms of research, 
etc.  A certain recognition of this practice can  be  found 
in  the  1982  Joint  Declaration  by  Parliament,  Commission 
and  Council  on  the  budgetary  procedure39. 
2.  Using  own  initiative reports  by  Parliament  to  press  for 
extension  of  Community  competence  (e.g.  on  security)  or 
for  modification  to  Community  institutional  procedures. 
Of  particular  importance  here  is  the  series  of  institu,-
tional reports adopted by  the Political Affair$ Committee 
in the early  1980s,  which  led to a  number  of concessions 
by  the other institutions. 
3.  Making  use of the Court of Justice, in particular through 
the  isoglucose ruling,  but also by itself going  to Court 
(e.g.  transport case, comitology case). 
4.  Responding to initiatives by others, notably the Genscher-
Colombo  proposals,  some  aspects of which Parliament  sup-
ported,  which  eventually  led  in  the  Solemn  Declaration 
of Stuttgart to some useful undertakings  (e.g.  on involv-
ing Parliament in the appointment of  the Commission). 
s.  Creatine; new  procedures unilaterally or with the agreement 
of  other  institutions  (e.g.  vote of  confidence  on  a  new 
Commission). 
Of  course,  the  very  existence  of  Parliament  has  helped  to 
prevent the degeneration of the Community  into a  purely tech-
- 41  -nical  dialogue  between  Commission  officials  and  national 
civil  servants.  Parliament  has  kept  the  issue  of  European 
Union  alive.  Without  it,  the  Community  might  have  a  politi-
cal visibility between  summit  meetings  not much  greater  than 
the  OECD. 
As  mentioned  above,  in its second  electoral  term  the  compe-
tences  of  the  EP  were  strengthened  by  the  Single  European 
Act:  The  EP  turned  its  mind  to  the  new  challenges  and  the 
first experiences with  the  new  procedure of cooperation have 
revealed its ability to act successfully within the new  frame-
work. 
4.4  Relations with the voters 
Interaction  between  the Parliamentarians  and  their voters is 
an  important  field  of activity as  the  development  of  the  EP 
will largely depend  on its capacity to  articulat~ the inter-
ests  of  voters  and  pressure  groups,  to  aggregate  different 
positions  and  to mobilize political forces  for  the  goals  of 
the  EP.  Of  major interest in this field are 
the direct contacts between  the MEPs  and  the voters, 
contacts  between  MEPs  and  lobbyists, 
the media  coverage of the  EP, 
the development of party  federations  and 
the relationship between the EP  and national parliaments. 
on  the  average,  one  MEP  has  to  represent  about  600.000  EC 
citi~zens.  This  mere  fact  demonstrates  that  it is  almost 
impossible  for  European  Parliamentarians  to  have  a  face-to-
face  contact  with  all  their  voters  on  a  regular  basis.  Al-
though  MEPs  regularly attend meetings with voters,  the Euro-
Barometer has  found out that 65  per cent of the EC  population 
are  of  the  opinion  that  members  are  too  remote  from  their 
needs and  problems40.  This may  be due to the fact,  that MEPs 
are  engaged  too  much  in the  "closed circle",  leavinq  insuf-
ficient  time to be devoted to their electorate.  Nevertheless 
- 42  -more  and  more  people  have  had  some  kind  of  direct  contact 
with  the  Parliament.  The  number  of visitors  to  the  EP,  espe-
cially from  West  Germany,  is increasing constantly. The  number 
of  petitions also increases regularly41. 
In  fact  MEPs  tend  to  develop  regular  contacts  with  local 
authorities in their area, with local employers,  trade unions, 
associations  and  non-governmental  organizations,  churches, 
local  press  and  political activists. 
Members  of  the  Parliament  (and  also  its staff)  obtain  an 
increasing amount  of  information from  lobbyists.  Brussels is 
becoming  increasingly  interesting  for  the  various  lobbyists 
based  there,  and  some  of  them  are  specialists  in  following 
the European Parliament, attending most or all of Parliament's 
sessions  in  Strasbourg  and  also  those  committee  meetings  in 
Brussels  which  are  open  to  the  public  (an  increasing  number 
of  committees,  Environment,  Economic  Committee  etc.  have 
·opened  their doors) • 
Since  access  to  the  Parliament  is rather open  it is  practi-
cally impossible to measure the increase in lobbying activity 
since  1979.  Nevertheless it is clear to all involved  that it 
has  increased greatly.  During  sessions,  some  200  passes  are 
issued every day  to visitors other than members  of the public 
in visitors groups,  staff of other institutions,  members  and 
their  assistants,  etc.  Of  these  200,  it is  estimated  that 
some  150  per  day are  lobbyists.  Missions  of  third  countries 
to  the  EEC  are often  present at Strasbourg  plenaries  to  put 
the  point of view of their countries. 
In all the  parliamentary work,  media  coverage is useful,  but 
not neccessarily indispensable. As  a  remote Parliament, diffi-
cult  to  cover  for  most  local,  regional  and  even  national 
newspapers,  and  not  even  holding  its plenary  sessions  in 
Brussels where the European press corps is based, the European 
Parliament is clearly at a  disadvantage  in this  respect.  To 
- 43  -an  extent it has  tried  to compensate  by  providing  good  faci-
lities for  journalists  (e.g.  equipment  for  television compa-
nies,  written  circulars  and  staff  members  to  brief  journa-
lists).  This  has  reversed  the  trend  of  the  first  fev  years 
following  the  1979  elections,  which  saw  a  decline  in  press 
coverage.  Since  1 982  there  has  been  a  higher  presence  of 
journalists and a  steady rise in radio and especially in tele-
vision  coverage  (see  Table  5).  Inevitably  the  bulk of  press 
attention has  come  from  the  Brussels  press  corps,  which  is 
specialized in European Community affairs. Attempts to supple-
ment  this  (through  the  national  information  offices  of  the 
.parliament,  through bringing out national and regional journa-
lists to Strasbourg, etc.) have met with limited success. Much 
more  could  be  done  in  "marketing",  not  just  Parliament's 
general  positions,  but  its  specific  positions  on  matters  of 
interest to regional or specialized  media. 
The  hope  expressed on  the  eve of  the first european election 
that the formation of European party federatioru would help to 
further the democratic process by  linking the electorate with 
the  European  parliamentarians  has  not  been  fulfilled42.  The 
party federations remained weak and  have  had little influence 
on  international  discussions  and  on  the  development  of  the 
national parties.  They  have  not  yet developed  into a  direct 
political base  for  MEPs.  The  weakness  of  the  trans-nat~onal 
infrastructure has  not  helped  the  EP's  capacity  to mobilize 
the  voters.  Nevertheless,  these  groupings  have  provided  a 
forum  for  multilateral  contacts  between  MEPs  and  national 
party leaders.  This has  allowed  for  a  certain degree of  "mo-
bilization"  such  as  at  the  pre-summits  organized  by  some 
groupings before certain important European Council meetings. 
They  also by virtue of negotiating common  manifestos for  the 
European elections, put pressure on national parties to deve-
lop their European policies. 
Despite  the  fact  that  national  parliaments  became  more  and 
more aware of the growing interdependence in the EC  framework, 
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<4>  A 9 •fnutel TV  comMeMOration  of  Robert  Schuman  compiled  by  EP  services was  also transmitted by  several  stations.  lt  ts  not 
included  tn these figures.  · the  re:a~:onshi? between  th£!  S?  and  natior.~l  parlia~~ncs has 
also  noc  d~velo?ed as  exp~cted 1 l.  Th~re  h~s  been  so~e  i~prove­
~ents:  EP  comrnitte~s  have  ~~t several  t~~es  wi~h  co~mittees 
ot  national  parliaments.  In  aelqium.  in  Ger~any and  since  l9S6 
in  the  Netherlands  the  national  parli~ments have  installed 
new  structures  to  ~nsure  b~tter  coop~ration wich  ~he  EP,  ~nd 
th~  ad~inistrations of  nearly  all  w~stern European  parlia~ents 
have  cooperated  intensively  on  a  regular  basis.  !n  g~neral. 
however,  the  links  between  traditional  parliam~nts and  the  EP 
started  slowly:  at  first it was  the  EP  itself which  was  sear-
ching  for  contact,  but  national  parlia~ents  wer~ slow  to 
r~act.  Especially  the  parliareentary  treatment  of  the  "Draft 
Treaty"  within  some  national  parliaments  can  be  rated  as  a 
case  study  for  ~issing  nat~?nal support,  tho~gh tho  political 
actors  :~  so~e others  ware  very  supportive. 
Owing  ro  li:~ited  ~edia  ~ov~raae  an~  Q~her negative  factors. 
such  as  the  co~plcxity of  t~e :ssues  debated.  :ittle person~­
lisation  in  the  EP  and  l~~;uaQe  p~oble~s.  :h~  EP  has  not 
been  successful  in  ~obilizi~g :he  ~l~~~~rate towards  its  ai~s. 
Obviously  it  was  not  able  to  exploi~  th~ potential of  sup-
port  that  exists  in  the  Cc~munity.  Major  progress  has  also 
been  hindered  by  the  fact  that  rathar  than  concentrating  on 
a  few  selected issues,  the  EP  - especially in  its first  el~ct­
oral  tar~ - has  been  too  scattered in its activities.  It has 
lacked clear policy strategies which  would  have  been  under-
standable  to  the  public.  Even  th~  ~craft Treatyn  was  not 
supported vigor¢usly  by  all  HEP's.In  addition,  the  time 
pressure within  the  EP  and  the  Co~muniey  systa~.  the  need  to 
travel  between  the  three  European  capitals  and  the  electorate 
and  the  multitude  of  national  and  ''european"  obligations 
could  have  caused  the  result  that  th~  EP  might  be  seen  as 
havinq  become  too  much  of  a  ~closed circle''. 
4.5  The  EP  at  the  "torum plus"  level 
It one  seeks  to  express  the  evolution of  the  EP  since its 
tirst direct election in terms  or  one  formula,  the  combination 
- 46  -of functions actually  pursued would  appear  to be  close  to the 
forum  concept with  some  elements  of  the  legislature concept; 
the  attempts  of  the  EP  to  function  as  a  "constituante"  {the 
Spinelli initiative), by  Yhich  the EP  yould turn into a  "clas-
sical" parliament with full legislative and executive/electo-
ral powers,  have  failed  so  far.  But it was  an  achievement of 
the EP  that institutional reforms constantly remained  a  major 
issue  on  the  agenda  of  the  Community  institutions.  Part  of 
th~t  "forum  plus  concept"  is  also  the  EP's  comprehensive 
view  of  a 11  European  affairs.  In  this  respect,  it may  be 
compared  with  the  European Council. 
/ 
The  evolution to and  the stability of the "forum concept" are 
due to the mutually reinforcing characteristics and tendencies 
of  the  EC  system  in general  and  the  EP  itself.  These  may  be 
summarized as weak  powers of the EP  and an internal diversity 
of the  EP  as well as the quality of the EC  as an "interlocking 
system"  as  described  in  chapter  3,  in  which  decisions  are 
made  mainly  by  consensus  in  a  "labyrinth" of administrative 
committees  and  working  groups.  Those  reinforcing  factors 
could lock the EP  into a  vicious circle of powerlessness with 
four  major  elements: 
low  reputation  ~I'E:-----
weak  decisional  low  participation 
competences  at direct elections 
I  1  .J  limited  legitimation bonus  I 
~ 
The  "Vedel-report"  of  1972  has  already  analysed  in  detail 
how  the  institutional  position of  the  European  Parliament 
could  be  strengthened44.  The  recommendations of  this report 
- 47  -aimed at  t~o directions:  direct elections  and  an  enlargement 
of  the  EP's  competences.  Both  elements  are  necessary  now  as 
before. 
In an intar!ccked system parliamentary influence- if measured 
in  terms  of  traditional  functions  - has  so  far  proved  to  be 
generally  weak  (as  is  the  case  ~ith national  parliaments  in 
the EC),  the growing tendency of interlocking European policy 
in  combination  with  the  limited  decisional  po~ers of  the  EP 
(and  its internal diversity)  have  even  increased  the loss of 
overall  parliamentary  influence.  Neither  the 'national  par-
liaments  nor  the  European  Parliament  have  been  willing  or 
able to mobilize popular political support in order to change 
the  basic characteristics of  the  system. 
If we  assume  that this  interlocking system  has  a  strong  ten-
dency  towards  stability and at the  same  time  towards ineffi-
ciency - the  governments  have  moved  the  EC  into  a  "decision-
making  trap"45  - the  call  for  reform  will  be  constant  but 
results will only be gradual.  Measured by tradi  tiona! criteria 
the  EP  will be  trapped in a  "marginal" position, fighting for 
same  kind  of reputation and  influence. 
Starting  from  this analysis  the  Single  European  Act  has  not 
basically altered this situation.  The  new  cooperation proce-
dure  can  increase  the  "nuisance"  (negative)  powers  of  the 
EP.  Only occasionally will it make  the  EP  a  full and  produc-
tive partner in the EC  decision-making system.  But, neverthe-
less, the EP  has recognized new  opportunities and has streng-
thened its functions as a  legislature. The  limited experience 
we  have  with  the  new  procedure  of  cooperation  has  revealed 
the dominant  interest of the  EP  to act as a  responsible part-
ner  in the  decision-making process. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AJm S'l'RATEGIES POR lfBB PO'l'ORE:  PROM  TBB  •FORUJI 
PLos•  MODEL  !0 !'liB  •co-PLAYER-CONCEPT• 
- 48  -The  analysis  of  the  EP's  position  in  the  EC  system  reveals 
that the expectations of the voters of  1979  to elect a  strong 
decision-making  parliament  have  not  come  true.  There  is  a 
real  danger  that  the  participation  in  future  European  elec-
tions will  be  far  lower  than  in 1979/84.  The  decision-making 
process  is  - nowadays  as  before  - cumbersome  (even  if  the 
long-term  impact  of  the  Single  European  Act  must  await  a 
detailed evaluation)  and its democratic legitimation is weak. 
The  EP's existing capacity for  innovation and  integration of 
diverging  interests  is not  exploited  to  a  sufficient degree 
in  the  EC  system. 
At  the  same  time  the  positive effects of general  elections  -
the  mechanism  for  peaceful  changes of  political  power  by 
selection  between  clear-cut alternatives,  the  pressure  on 
tradi  tiona!  parties  to  t:eact  to  new  political  challenges  -
are  not  available  to the  EC  system.  Therefore  the· "learning 
capacity" of the EC  system, its ability to react in new  situa-
tions,  is  low. 
In the present stage of the EC  system,  where the EC  exercises 
powers  by  means  of  overlapping political structures based  on 
national systems,  ~he traditional conception of parliamentary 
government  as  this  has  evolved  in  the  member  states  cannot 
be  applied without  adaptation.  The  growing  interdependence 
and interfere·nce between the member  states and  the  EC  require 
for  democratic  reasons  a  strong  parliamentary  influence  on 
both  the national  and  the  European  level.  The  EP  so  far  has 
'  difficulties  to  act  on  both  levels.  National  governments, 
who  are  actors  on  both  Community  and  national  level  remain 
dominant up  to now.  But despite all these constraints it has 
been able  to contribute  to  the  functioning  of  the  EC  system 
in at least three positive ways: 
The  Parliament  has  shown  a  great  deal  of  vitality  in 
raising important issues facing West  European society. 
- 49  -It has concentrated efficiently on  supervising the execu-
tive authority and: 
It has  articulated the  EC  citizens concerns  and  grievan-
ces. 
Obviously  the  EP  finds  itself in a  dilemma:  Its present weak 
institutional  position,  combined  vith  its  claims  for  far-
reaching  changes  of  the  EO  system are  forcing  it towards  a 
dangerous  ridge-walk  in its information  policy vis-a-vis  the 
voters: 
On  the one hand, it must give proof of its political right 
to  exist  as  it stands  today.  Therefore  it  should  make 
use  of  its  existing  instruments  and  competences  in  the 
best  possible way.  The  "grey  zones"  of  the  treaties  and 
the  new  procedures  of  the  Single  European  Act  must  be 
exploited. The voters should be convinced that ·the present 
EP  is able to play an important role within the EC  system 
by initiating new activities, by scrutinizing and by arti-
culating the will of the  people. 
On  the  other  hand,  an  EP  strategy  should  encompass  the 
goal of European Union, including not only enhanced powers 
for the EP,  but also greater efficiency both of EC  instru-
ments and of EC  government. The voters should be convinced 
that the present role of the EP  is inadequate. 
This essential dilemma  of the  EP  may  offer  two different op-
tions as  to how  it should  present itself to its voters: 
(a)  To  accept  its present role as  a  "forum"  including  some 
additional  ingredients  and  to  explain  this  concept  to  the 
voters as an adequate  form of parliamentary participation in 
a  complex  interlocked  system  of  national  consensus.  It may 
underline its positive contributions in the fields of initia-
tive,  control  and  articulation  and  it may  thus  offer  its 
- 50  -electors a  realistic yardstick by which to assess its limited, 
but  nevertheless  important  role.  If,  however,  it  were  to 
stress its real  impact within  the  given political system  the 
argument  for  mobilization  towards  a  change  of  its  own  role 
in the EC-system might  be  weakened:  if the status quo affords 
"enough"  influence why  then reform  the  system  ••• ?Or: 
(b)  To  work as effectively as possible within the interlocking 
system,  but at the same  time to develop its role in the direc-
tion of  an  "institutional co-player",  whose  assent is neces-
sary  for  all  important  decisions  in  the  framework  in  which 
it has  to  function.  This  implies  that  the  EP  gradually  ac-
quires  more  influence at  EC  level,  but  it will  not  have  an 
overall  decision-making  capacity  akin  to  that  of  national 
parliaments.  At  the  same  time  the  EP  must  seek  closer  links 
to national decision makers,  in view of  the fact that,  in the 
interlocked EC-system, national and EC-instruments are increa-
singly pooled. 
The  risks  of  a  "dual  strategy"  combining  both  elements  are 
obvious:  If it stresses  too  much  its present  role  and  func-
tions  in  a  positive  way,  there  will  be  no  pressure  for  a 
system  change.  If  it emphasizes  clearly  its  demand  for  a 
European  Union  with  an  enhanced  role  for  itself,  there  is 
the danger that the voters will be  frustrated if the foreseen 
"saut qualitatif"  is  not  achieved.  Thus,  the  clarification 
of both the present and  the future  role is equally important. 
However,  these  options  are  neither  clear-cut  alternatives 
nor  mutually  reinforcing  •. There  may  be  negative  effects  in 
pursuing  both  options:  in  terms  of  time  and  organizational 
resources as well as in terms of impact both cannot be pursued 
in a  balanced way.  From  the point of view of the voters, cer-
tain inconsistencies might  be  predominant:  if stressing  the 
necessity of institutional changes according to the option (b) 
the  voter  might  be  or  soon  get  frustrated  by  the  lack  of 
apparent  progress  overlooking,  however,  some  real  though 
- 51  -limited  im~acts  on  conc~ete  polici~s.  The  vision  and  its 
yardsticks  - created  by  the  EP  itself  - falls  back  on  the  E? 
- devaluing  a  different  ki~d of  performance. 
Let  us  therefore  take  leave  tro~ the  classical  parliamentarlsm 
model  devaluing  traditional  functions  and  emphasizing  the 
possible  !unctions  of  a  parliament  in  an  interlocking  syste~. 
The  EP  woul~ assume  functions  which  in  national  systems  are 
exercised partly  by  other  social  agents  !such  as  the  press  ana 
certain lobbies}.  Furthermore  \t would  strive  systematically 
to  win  elements  of  co-decisional  power  in order  to  ~nsure 
its acceptance  as  an  obliqatory  ~co-player''  in  the  decision-
~aking process  of  the  EC-systam.  To  propagate  such  a  concept 
of  the  EP  as  a  «institutional  co-player«  implies  that  the 
Parliamentarians  should  reduce  parts  of  their  ambitions  and 
that  the  electorate should  vote  for  a  body  wit~ a  limited,  but 
increasinQ  impact.  Thus  to  chanqe  the  paradigm  by  taking 
into  account  the  characteristics  o!  the  EC  system  seems  a 
"logical"  deduction. 
Tha  EP  must  be  accepted within  the  sansitive decision  makinQ 
process  as  a  more  important  "co-player"  whose  assent  is  nor-
mally  ne~essary  to all  important decisions.  It should  not 
se~k all-embracing decision  ~akinq powers  such  as  those  exer-
cised by  some  "gubernatorial"  parliaments  in  the  !':\ember  states 
,  but  look rather  for  selected  elements  of  ~real"  power  and 
influence  in  different  fields.  Tha  acknowl~dgement of  the 
EP's  budgetary powers  in  1970/75  and  the  new  regulations 
within  the  Sinqle  guropean  Act  ~oint  that  way:  Since  July 
1987  the  EP's  assent  is  requirad  for  treaties of  association 
and  accession  and  it has  str~ngthencd  i~s  participatory powers 
in  the  field of  leg~slation.  To  dat~  the  prlncipal  powers 
~xercised by  the  EP  have  baen  negative  (blocking)  powers, 
which  may  project its public  image  in  a  negative  sense.  In 
the  tutura  it should  also  ask  for  "positive"  powers  which 
permit  it to  influence policy making  within  the  EC-system  in 
a  constructive  way.  Proposals  for  such  developments  eould be: 
- 52  -A.  In  the field of  legislation 
The  application  of  the  new  cooperation  procedure  to 
cases  where  the  Council  decides  by  majority  voting. 
EP  could  add  weight  to  this  demand  by  pointing  to 
all 
-
The 
the 
fact  that the cooperation procedure is applied  primarily 
to  legal  acts  in  connection  with  the  completion  of  the 
internal market.  After  1992 the application of  the coope-
ration procedure,  therefore, will  be reduced  to a  smaller 
number  of cases. 
The  application of  a  conciliation  procedure  (comparable 
to  the  budgetary  trialogue  or  according  to  the  German 
"VermittlungsausschuB"  model)  to  all  cases  where  the 
cooperation  procedure applies  in order  to enable  compro-
mises  to be  negotiated  before  blockages arise. 
The  reform  of  the  conciliation  procedure  of  March  1975 
in  two  ways:  (a)  Council  and  EP  both  have  to accept  the 
outcome  and  (b)  the field of application is broadened  to 
all important matters. 
In  the  long  run  the  EP  should  ask  for  the  right  of  co-
-
decision in legislation (perhaps in the beginning limited 
to fields like environmental policy or research and tech-
nology), which means  in practice that both the EP  and  the 
Council  have  to  agree  on  important  legislation.  Accor-
ding  to  the  interlocking character  of  the  EC-system  not 
all the  existing  instruments  within  that  framework  will 
be  included in the EP
1s  legislative powers. 
B.  In the budgetary field 
Making  appropriate  use  of  the  transfer  of  money  into 
budgetary head no.  1 00 ("preliminary appropriations  .. ) with 
clear conditions for  the release of this money; 
continuing the strategy of increasing the non-compulsory 
part of the budget; 
using  the  right  of  granting  a  discharge  to  Commission 
- 53  -for controlling the spending of money  in order to exercise 
political supervision and  in  the  long  run 
to  remove  the  distinction  bet..,een  compulsory  and  non-
compulsory expenditures; 
ccntin~a to develop  new  areas of Community  activities by 
creating  new  budgetary lines. 
c.  Selection of the executive authority 
The  EP  should strive for  strenqthend co-decinional  powers  in 
the appointments 
of  a  new  Commission  (or at least of its president), 
of  the  members  of  the Court of Justice and 
of  the  members  of the Court of Auditors, 
of the heads of agencies  (e.g. Berlin vocational training 
institute,  European  University Institute  ••• ). 
o. Relations with the voters and the political infrastructure 
Concentration of the EP's activities on clear priorities, 
as  has  already been started {e.q.  within each  parliamen-
tary  session  there  should  be  on  one  day  priority  given 
to a  major  subject)~ 
personalization  of  the  EP's  work  by  highlighteninq  of 
actin9  MEP
1s  (President,  rapporteurs,  President  of  a 
Committee) ; 
strengthening  its character as  an  "ombudsman"  for  the 
voters' grievances(more emphasis on petitions, questions, 
personal help etc.); 
stronger linkage  to national parliaments and  parties; 
in  traduction  of  a  uniform  electoral  system  with  direct 
influence of  the voters  in the selection of  candidates. 
- 54  -E.  Internal  workinq  structures 
Tlght~ninq up  of  the  EP's  internal  working  ~ethods in 
ord~r  to  take  more  advantage  of  tha  use  of  its  co~petances 
and  political  means  of  influence; 
str~ngthening the  int~rnal political  l~adarship and  the 
steering capacity  of  the  EP; 
continuing  the  trend  of  a  greater  professionalism in its 
work. 
The  political  acceptance  of  such  a  concapt  as  "institutional 
co-player"  within  and  outside  the  Parliament  re~uires  so~e 
educative  initiatives.  With  a  realistic  :onq-tar~ airn  as  the 
concept  of:  the  EP  as  an  institutional  "co-player",  however, 
the  vicious  circl~ of  powerlessness  ~ay  be  broken  and  the 
voters  ~ay be  more  attracted  to  the  E?. 
The  ruture  role  concept  and  functions  of  the  European  Parlia-
ment  depend  largely  on  the  development  of  the  European  Commu-
nity  as  a  ~olitical  entity.  These  overall developments  can 
only  b~  influenced  to  a  limited extent  by  the  EP.  Three  diffe-
rent directions  ot  evolution  are  possible: 
•  Evolution  towards  a  federal  system 
The  Community  is interpreted as  a  federal  state  in  the  making: 
This  concept  r~quires an  institutional  sat-up  that  is  com-
~arable  to  the  national  systems  with  a  ~arliament according 
to  the  "gubernative"  or  the  "legislature"  concc~ts as  de-
scribed  aoove.  National  parliamentary  concepts  and  tradi-
tions  may  be  trans~erred  to  the  EC-systern,  thouqh  possibly 
in  an  altered  form. 
*  Evolution  towards  an  interqovernmental  system 
Accordin;  to  this scenario  the  Community  will  develop  into 
interqovernmentalism.  It  is primarily seen  as  an  instrument 
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citizens.  In  this  case,  the  national  governments  are  the 
most  important  actors.  They  decide  on  an  ad-hoc  basis  on 
matters of  common  interest.  The  EC  does  not need a  democratic 
legitimation  of  its own.  On  the  contrary  the  national  right 
of veto can  be  interpreted as  a  central  legitimating element 
of  the  EC  decision- making  process.  In  this  scenario  the  EP 
can  only  fulfil  the  "forum  concept"  which  is  comparable  to 
the  the  consultative  role  of  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of 
the  Council  of Europe. 
•  Continuous interlocking 
The  interpretation of the Community  as an interlocking system 
of national and Community  instruments  leads  to a  very complex 
system of  institutional checks  and  balances.  There  is a  cer-
tain requirement for democratic legitimation of the decision-
-making  process,  both  on  the  national  and  on.the  European 
level. For reasons of efficiency the "national" and  the "Euro-
pean"  point  of  view  must  be  represented.  The  parliament  can 
play  a  stronger  role  than  the  "forum  concept",  but  it will 
have difficulties to  follow  the  "gubernative" or the  "legis-
lature concept"  in full. 
According  to  type  A of evolution  (EC  as  a  "pre-federal poli-
tical system)  there exists a  considerable democratic deficit 
with  regard  to  the  EC-system.  The  capacity  of  the  national 
governmen-ts  to decide on  important political problems of  the 
present  is  hampered  by  the  growing  necessity  to  cooperate 
and  to  coordinate  their  own  activities  with  those  of  their 
EC-partners.  For  the national parliaments it is nearly impos-
sible to guarantee a  democratic control of  the European acti-
vities of  their governments  coordinated in a  European  frame-
work.  The  question  is  whether  this  practice  infringes  upon 
the national constitutions, owing to the fact that nearly all 
of  them stipulate in one  way  or the other  that the  exercise 
of  political  power  must  refer  to  the political will of  the 
- 56  -cicizens
1z.  The  activiti~s of  beth  Europ~an and  national  bu-
~aaucracies are  naither  eff~ctivcly controlled by  a  national 
nor  by  th~ !uropean  ?~rliament. 
Opinion  polls  indicate  that  the  id~a of  European  integration 
is  regularly  supported  by  more  than  two  thirds  of  the  EC-citi-
z~nsJ~.  The  support  is relatively  high  in  Italy,  the  Nether-
lands,  Belgium,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  France  and 
Luxe~bourg  (~ore than  70  %)  ,  whilst  in  Denmark  the  anti-~ar­
ket~ers  are  in  a  strong  position.  In  December  1985,  ch~ 
proposition  that  the  EP  primarily  should  strive  for  a  European 
Union  with  a  European  gov~rnment  r~sponsible  to  the  ~P was 
supported  by  57  %of  the  EC-citi~ens,  15  'were against  such 
a  proposal  and  28  %gave  no  r~plyl~.  Th~ attitudes  varied 
widely  between  the  different countria$. 
Despite  the  overall  support  for  turther  European  Integration, 
the  democratic  deticit of  th~  EC  is hardly  ever  articulated 
in  the  public  opinion  of  the  EC-countri~s.  Thc'activities  o! 
''those  in Brussels"  in  fact  are  often  criticized,  but  in 
general  the  involvement  of  national  politicians is  seen  as  a 
compensating  factor  to  the  predominant  political  weiqht  oe 
the  EC-bureaucracy.  For  many  ot  the  people  the  problem  of 
the  democratic deficit of  the  EC  may  be  a  purely  academic  one. 
If  a  national minister  is  leqitimated  to  act at  the  national 
level,  why  should  he  not  act  with  th~  sa~e leqitirnation  at 
the  EC·level?  As  long  as  unanin\ity  is  n~cessary for  institu-
tional  re!orms.  comprehensiv~  proj~cts,  like  the  EP's  Draft 
Treaty,  will  hardly  be  accepted  by  the  political actors  and 
the  citizens  in all  the  twelve  m~~b~r countries  of  the  EC. 
Within  the  evolution  according  tu  rnodel  8  ("EC  as  a  pure 
instrurn~nt of  the  nation states'')  a  European  Parliament with 
ambitious  institutional  aims  is  a  disturbing  factor  in  an 
interqovernmental  system  based  on  the  concordance  ot  the 
national  actors.  From  their point  of  view  the  best  solution 
of  the  existinq problems  would  ba  the  replacement  o!  direct 
- 57  -European elections by  the systera. of delegation, as used before 
1979.  In  such  a  scenario  the  perceived  positive  functions  of 
general elections  (mechanism  for  a  peaceful  change  of  power, 
enforcement of the system's learning capacity) do  not operate. 
If elections on  the regional  (• Lander)  level are  already of 
a  secondary  importance,  European  elections  for  a  parliament 
with  little decision-making  capacity  m1ght  even  become  of 
tertiary rank  - not even  important as test elections  for  the 
national  level49.  Mobilisation of  the  electors  would  become 
even  more  difficult. 
For those who  expect for the EC  system a  continuous interlock-
ing  between  national and  Community  instruments  the-claim for 
democracy  and effectiveness exists both  on  a  national and  an 
EC-level.  The  national  bureaucracies  and  governments  are 
able  to  act  at  both  levels,  whilst  the  links  between  the 
national parliaments and the European Parliament are unsatis-
factory.  National  governments  and  bureaucracies are  predomi-
nant,  markedly  reducing  the powers  and  the  influence of both 
the  national  parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament.  From 
the EP's  point of view it is important that further  develop-
ments of  the Community  system are directed  towards  a  streng-
thening  of  Community  instruments  and  to  an  enhancement  of 
its own  role rather than  towards an  improvement  in the degree 
of bureaucratic and  governmental co-ordination. 
The  reasons  for  the  plea  for  a  strengthened  role  of  the 
European  Parliament  are  twofold:  The  first  is  the  existing 
democratic  deficit,  the  second  the  lack  of  effectiveness. 
For  reasons of efficiency the Community  needs  an  institution 
which  represents  the  Community  position.  National  govern-
ments  and  bureaucracies  (as  well  as  national  parliaments) 
take  care  primarily of  national  interests while  compromises 
between  them  may  be  sufficient  for  a  continuous  muddling-
through,  long-term solutions of existing problems call for  a 
strong  representati~n of Community  interests. A strengthened 
European  Parliament  (in  combination  with  the  Commission) 
- 58  -could  thus  in  the  lonQ  run  increas~  th~ afficiancy  of  tha 
EC-sys'C~IT:. 
The  futur~ strategy  of  the  EP  ~ust  ~atch  the  role  concept  it 
wishes  to  adopt.  This  strat~gy call$  for  some  step  by  step 
changes  in  the  EC  system  particularly  by  shifts  of  co~pet~n­
ces  co  Com~unity level  and  ~quivalent  incre~ses in  the  pow~rs 
of  the  European  Parliament.  This  impli~s in  the  present  situa-
tlon  a  ~ajor effort  by  the  EP  to  nobilis~ forces  in  favour 
of  r~for~.  A stronger  internal  lead~rship  in  the  EP  and  a 
greater  degree  of  consistency  in  the  parliamentary  work  are 
pr~conditions  ~or  the  succ~ss of  such  a  strategy. 
In  any  case  the  EP  should  base  its strategy  on  a  dyna~ic view 
cr  its  role.  not  just  an  ~xtrapolation of  experience  up  to 
now.  Because  in  the  EC  syse~m both  the  ~e~ber states  and  the 
co~~unity are  of  crucial  i~port!nce,  such  a  strat~gy implies 
a  set  of  fine-tuned  steps  with  a  limited  appeal  to  the  voters. 
!t  means  :~or~  ''lobbying''  activities  "at  horr.e"  and  in  the 
labyrinth  of  the  Brussels  ~achinery.  The  EP  (and  each  par-
liamentarian)  would  need  ~o:-a  ex~ertis~  to  instal  a  "counter-
bureaucracy'',  The  EP  would  need  to  pursue  its  work  in  the 
present  d~centralized  fashion,  but  be  able  to mobilize  the 
whole  of  its machinery  at  crucial  points. 
3etw~en 1986  !nd  1992  the  Com~unity will  b~  devotinq  itsP.lf 
to  primarily  completinq  the  internal  ~arket,  monet~ry inte-
1ration and  to  retor~inQ  the  structural  funds  (reqional  fund, 
social  fund,  inte9rated Mediterranean  proQrammes).  In  1992 
the  ti~e will  be  ripe  for  major  in3titutional  r~for~s and 
the  re~nforcement  ot  the  EP's  powers  should  be  the  central 
alement  in this drive !or such  reforms. 
For  the  enhancement  of  the  EP's  role  the  support  of  powertul 
alli~s is  of  crucial  i~portance.  The  EP  should  consider  an 
order  oe  priorities in its  cultiv~tion of  allies  amonq  9overn-
ments,  parliaments.  parties,  the  Commission,  economic  and 
- 59  -social  groups  and  the  electorate.  The  E?  could  s~e~ :o  pro~ote 
or  facilitate  integration  in  ~atters of  lnterest  :o  kay  ~e~her 
states.  It  ~ay be  able  to  show  that  ~n  enhance~~nt of  1ts 
role  is  nec~ssary if  member  states  are  to  achieve  their  objec-
tives.  The  electors  must  be  aware  t:Jf  the  EP' s  "European" 
position on  crucial  problems  of  the  Co~~unity.  Ca~paigns  for 
European  elections  and  EP  debates  will  provid~ excellent 
opportunities  for  thus  engaging  the  interest  of  European 
citizens  in  their  Parliament. 
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Professor  Jacques  VANDAMME,  Chairman  of  TEPSA: 
Lord  Plumb,  Presidents of  the  national  parliaments,  Excellencies,  Ladies  and 
Gentlemen, 
r  would  like  to  express  my  feelings  of  gratitude  towards  the  European 
Parliament  for  the  invitation to  this  Symposium,  which  has  made  it possible  to 
discuss  the  outcome  of  the  study of  the  Trans-European  Policy  Studies 
Association  on  the  theme,  'Beyond  traditional  parliamentarism:  the  European 
Parliament  in  the  Community  system'.  As  you  all know,  this is not  the first 
occasion  on  which  TEPSA  has  held  a  discussion on  this  issue.  We  had  an 
important  conference  here  in  October  1984  after the  second  direct  election of 
the  European  Parliament  on  the  strategy of  the newly-elected Parliament. 
Mr  Pflimlin  pronounced  the  closing speech  at that  event.  Last  year  another 
gathering  in  Strasbourg debated  the  theme 
1A new  role  for  the  European 
Parliament'. 
This  is however  the first  time that  TEPSA  has  been  so  deeply  involved  in  a 
study  commissioned  by  the  European  Parliament  itself, which  is  to  be  discussed 
by  such  a  broad  spectrum  of  representatives of national  parliaments  and  of  the 
European  Parliament.  I  would  like therefore  to express  my  thanks  to  the 
President of  the  Parliament  for  making  this possible.  You  did not  hesitate, 
Mr  President,  to  run  the  risk of  turning  to academic  circles, which  are 
sometimes  inclined to consider problems  from  a  too  theoretical  point  of  view. 
But  I  do  believe that  in the  ease of  TEPSA  this  risk  is much  less great, 
because  we  are  in the first place policy-oriented academics,  which  means  that 
we  are conscious  of the political constraints.  Secondly,  because  we  are 
convinced  of the necessity of the  reinforcement  of the  European  Parliament  in 
the  Community  system,  and  also that this  reinforcement  can  perhaps  happen 
through  a  new  conceptual  approach  to the  role of the parliamentary function at 
European  level. 
Our  network  of  institutes  located in almost  all  countries of the  Community  has 
two  objectives:  to promote  research,  and  to encourage  thinking  which  can  lay 
down  guidelines  to be  followed  on  the  road  to  European  integration.  For  this 
reason  the  conclusions of our  studies are always  discussed at  the final  stage 
- 66  -with  the  decision  makers,  in  this  case  with  Members  of  the  European  Parliament 
itself.  I  am  sure  that  this  dialogue  will  be  fruitful  for  the 
representatives  both  of  the  academic  world  and  of  the  citizens of  Europe. 
Thank  you  Mr  President,  I  invite  you  to  take  the  floor. 
Lord  PLUMB,  President  of  the  European  Parliament: 
Mr  President,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
First of all,  may  I  on  behalf of all  my  colleagues  in  the  Parliament  welcome 
you  here  to  Strasbourg.  It's not  easy  during  the  course of this particular 
week  -a very  busy  week  when  we're  dealing  with  important  reports  - to  make 
the  facilities available  for  a  very  important  conference  Like  this.  But  it is 
an  opportunity where  the  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  and  yourselves  can 
meet  and  get  together,  and  many  of  my  colleagues  will  undoubtedly  be  joining 
you  from  time  to  time  during  the  course of  the day.  They  naturally are 
divided  in  themselves  as  to  whether  they should  be  in  the  hemicycle  voting or 
debating or  whether  they  should  be  at the  TEPSA  Conference,  but  politicians 
are very  good  at  dividing  themselves  into three or  four  parts and  therefore  I 
am  hopeful  that  you  will  have  the  opportunity of  meeting  with  many  of them. 
I  am  very  honoured,  Mr  Chairman,  to make  the first  keynote  address  of the day 
to  this particular symposium  because  it gives  me  a  great  pleasure to  welcome 
so  many  distinguished guests  to this  House.  Presidents of  the parliaments of 
the  Member  States  from  both  the North  and  the  South  of  the  Community  are 
present;  and  I, of course,  naturally extend  a  very  warm  welcome  to  Mr  Louis 
JUNG,  the President of the  Parliamentary Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe. 
Vice-President  Andriessen  will  be  with  you  fairly shortly from  the Commission, 
and  I  am  naturally also pleased to  welcome  all  the  academic  experts  who  are 
representing the  Trans-European  Policy  Studies  Association and  the specialist 
journalists from  all the  Member  States of the  Community. 
It was,  Mr  President, as  you  rightly reminded  us,  my  predecessor President 
Pflimlin  who  won  the  agreement  of  the  Bureau  of  the  Parliament  to the 
launching of the  research  project  whose  culmination  is this  Symposium  today. 
I  pay  tribute to  his  wisdom  and  foresight,  as  I  so  often do  on  so  many  issues, 
in  providing us  with  an  indispensable basis of  expert  papers  which  will be 
- 67  -introduced  and  debated  during  the  course  of  these  two  days.  Parliament  has 
entrusted  the  conception  and  the  execution  of  the  research  project  to  TEPSA 
under  its President  Professor  Vandamme  and  I  am  glad  to  say  that  our 
confidence  has  been  fully  justified by  reading  the  very  excellent  papers  that 
~ave been  prepared  for  us.  This  symposium  therefore  will  provide  us  with  a 
very  important  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  Parliament  on  the  eve 
of  the  third  European  elections  in  1989. 
Almost  two  years  ago,  speaking  immediately  after my  election  to  the  Presidency 
in  January  1987,  I  said that  "The  spirit and  the  motive  force  of  this 
Parliament  spring  from  the  sturdy  rock  of  democratic  legitimacy".  I  also at 
that  time  emphasized  that this  Parliament  has  a  perfect  right  - indeed  it has 
a  responsibility and  a  duty- to  point  the  way  forward  for  the  European 
Community  as  a  whole. 
Mr  President,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  in  the  absence  of  the  full  range  of  powers 
enjoyed  by  most  national  parliaments,  the  European  Parliament  h~s been 
remarkably  innovative  in making  use of  the powers  it has  and  in  achieving  new 
responsibilities  and  stronger  influence.  This  increase  in ·political  and 
institutional power  follows  no  well-laid plan;  it's not  the  stuff of  plot  or 
conspiracy;  it is  rather the most  natural  development  that  could  be  envisaged 
for  any  democratic  assembly. 
Of  course  this  is a  Parliament  with  a  difference.  It's a  multi-national 
Parliament:  it's the  world's  first experiment  in  trans-national democracy  -
and  it worKs.  It works  just  as  a  parliament  should,  albeit  in nine  languages 
with  eight different political groups  with  twelve nationalities and  with  three 
different meeting plaees.  It is not  always  easy  to achieve  public  recognition 
for  the work  that  I  and  my  colleagues  have  done  over the past  few  years,  but 
we  must  always  rememb~ that, no  matter  how  frustrating it is when  our  work 
isn't reported,  the  Press  must  play quite  an  independent  role  and  they must 
follow  the  objective of  satisfying their readers  and  not  always  satisfying the 
politicians. 
In  the  last  few  years  I  have  seen  a  very big increase  in the  knowledge  of the 
general  public  about  the  European  Community  and  about  its institutions.  There 
is a  much  bigger  awareness  of the  European  Parliament  in particular, and  much 
- 68  -of  this  is  due  to  the  publicity  surrounding  the  1992  programme.  It  is  dawning 
on  many  that  the  Parliament  has  an  enormous  responsibility  for  monitoring,  and 
in  some  cases  blocking,  but  in  many  cases  contributing positively to  the 
various  proposals  of  the  Commission  which  relate  to  the  achievement  of  the 
Singl~ Market.  The  Parliament  is  reasonably  content  for  the  moment  with  the 
Single  European  Act,  although  we  criticized it  heavily  when  it was  proposed 
and  decided  upon,  we  are  living  with  it and  we  are  using  it to  our  advantage 
much  better  than  many  others  thought. 
I  don't  particularly  like  the  use  of  the  word  'power'.  I  prefer  to  use  the 
word  'responsibility'.  The  European  Parliament  has  increased its 
responsibilities  in  the  past  few  years  to  the  distinct  advantage  of the 
European  Community  as  a  whole.  It  is  not  therefore  a  question  of  powers  but  a 
question  of  responsibilities  and  in  the  same  way  I  am  not  particularly happy 
with  the  use  of  the  word  'sovereignty',  especially  in national  circles.  The 
word  I  prefer  to  use  is  'accountability'  and  the  constitutional debate  which 
is  now  going  on  in  various  degrees  between  the national  and  the  European 
competence  for  legislation is, in  my  opinion,  more  a  debate about 
accountability than  it is a  debate  about  sovereignty. 
The  vast  majority of  Community  legislation belongs  to a  decision-making 
structure that  is not  fully democratic  in  the  sense that  the directly elected 
Parliament still doesn't  have  sufficient  influence  on  such  legislation.  The 
Parliament's major  future  task,  I  believe,  is to  secure  public  and 
institutional approval  to extend  the doetrine of  public accountability to  all 
European  Community  legislation.  This  I  believe  would  go  a  very  Long  way  to 
removing  well-founded fears  about  so-called faceless  bureaucrats  and  about 
undemocratic  decision-making  centred  in Brussels.  The  Single  Act  has  started 
to  help us  to correct this democratic  deficit.  This  has  been,  is, and  will  be 
the  mission of the  European  Parliament. 
I  would  claim  that  since the elections of  1984  it has  made  great  strides 
towards  fulfilling this particular mission  and  I  hope  this  symposium  will  help 
to  record the many  achievements  of Parliament  in  this particular respect. 
Parliament  has  become  the main  force  pushing  towards  European  integration and 
this  role  has  been  generously acknowledged  by  President  Delors.  In  the  words 
of  the  summary  report  prepared  by  TEPSA  it is now  a  'co-player'  with -the  other 
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all  but  in  many  respects- the  responsibility  for  shaping  and  for  overseeing 
the  implementation of  legislative  proposals.  It  was  Parliament  which  for  many 
years  pressed  for  A People's  Europe  which  now,  perhaps  all  too  slowly,  is 
heing  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
Parliament  also shares  now  with  the  Commission  the  very difficult  task  of 
representing  the  Community  abroad.  While  on  the  one  hand  the  Commission  has  a 
network  of  delegations  in  capital  and  other  cities throughout  the  world,  the 
Parliament's  own  delegations  meet  with  members  of  parliaments  from  third 
countries  to  explain  Community  policies  and  to  hear  about  the  problems  of 
their  fellow  parliamentarians  from  many  places  abroad.  Perhaps  the  most 
important  of  these  meetings  occur  within  the  framework  of  the  joint assembly 
with  the  ACP  countries,  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  territories  for 
whom  the  Community  has  done  and  can  do  so  much. 
Perhaps,  President,  you  might  allow  me  to  give one  vivid  illustration of  the 
extent  to  which  Parliament  has  won  and  earned its new  responsibilities.  From 
July  1987  to  the  end  of  October  1988  within  the  cooperation  procedure  at first 
reading  the  Commission  adopted  in  whole  or  in  part  72X  of  Parliament's 
amendments,  and  the  Council  42X.  At  the  second  reading of the  cooperation 
procedure,  again  in  the  same  particular period,  the  Commission  accepted  52X  of 
Parliament's  amendments  in  whole  or  in  part  and  the  Council  21%  of  such 
amendments. 
These  are the first figures  which  the  Secretariat  have  been  able to produce 
about  this aspect of the operation of  the  Single  European  Act.  So  although 
you'll  quickly realize that  I'm not  satisfied with  the  low  acceptance  rate of 
our  amendments  by  the  Council,  I  think  the  figures  represent  a  very  good  start 
and  I  think  they fully  justify the description of  Parliament  as  a  'co-player' 
in  the  institutional  game. 
So  finally,  Mr  President,  I  want  to stress the  importance of  the  relations 
between  the  European  Parliament  and  the national parliaments.  Jean  Monnet  -
whose  birth we've  been  commemorating  during  recent  weeks  and  during  this 
particular week  here  in  Strasbourg - saw  the absolute  importance of  good 
dialogue  and  of  good  cooperation  between  parliaments.  I  would  like  to perhaps 
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this  year  that  in  his  view  ten  national  parliaments  appear  to be  unaware  of 
the  transfer  of  decision-making  to  Community  level  which  would  take  place  over 
the  next  ten  years.  This  awareness,  I  believe,  has  increased  substantially 
since  then,  which  is all  to  the  good,  for  we  need  a  very  high  turnout  indeed 
at  the  next  European  elections. 
So,  Mr  President,  I  again  say  to you  and  to  all your  colleagues  in  TEPSA  and 
to  the  Presidents  of national  parliaments  and  all  who  are  assembled  at  this 
particular  conference  that  it is  with  the  very  greatest of  pleasure  that  I 
welcome  you  to  it.  I  do  believe  that it is  imperative,  as  we  look  ahead  to 
the  future  development,  both  politically and  economically,  of  the  European 
Community,  that  we  work  closely  together both  at  political  and  academic  level. 
Professor  VANDAMME:  Thank  you  very  much  indeed .for  your  keynote  address,  Lord 
Plumb.  I  now  give  the  floor  to  Mr  Konstantopoulos,  who  is  representing  the 
President-in-Office of the  Council  of Ministers. 
Mr  Sotirios  KONSTANTOPOULOS,  Greek  Ambassador  to  the  Council  of  Europe: 
Thank  you  Mr  President.  Mr  President, it is a  great  honour  for  me  today  to 
attend this symposium  in order  to  represent  the Minister  Mr  Pangalos,  on 
behalf of the  presidency of  Council.  He  has  asked  me  to express  his  regret 
that  he  was  unable to attend personally and  has  also  asked  me  to  convey  his 
best wishes  for  a  successful  symposium. 
There  are  many  points  in  common  between  the different  ways  in which  we 
organize our  constitutional affairs,  and  today  I  can  speak  on  behalf of the 
presidency  and  also  from  the  vantage  point  of  my  country.  We  too  are  well 
placed to understand the  historical origins of pluralist democracy,  because 
this  is  so  much  a part of  the  history and  the  heritage of  Greece  since the 
earliest days. 
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reasons.  We  did  this  in  order  to  break  away  from  the  internecine  struggles 
which  marked  our  history.  We  did  this  in  order  to  ensure  peace,  to  ensure 
democracy  and  to  ensure  prosperity  for  our  peoples.  I  believe  that  we  have 
been  successful  in  attaining  those  early goals,  even  with  all  the  ups  and 
downs  which  the  process  has  experienced,  and  we  now  Look  towards  future  stages 
in  this  development  in  terms  of  stabilizing what  we  have  attained  and  making 
further  headway. 
A prerequisite for  taking  stock  is  a  recognition of  the  important  part  which 
the  European  Parliament  can  play  in that  process.  This  I  believe  is  the 
proper  basis  on  which  to  base  European  union.  Reinforcing  the  function  and 
the  position of the  European  Parliament  is of  key  importance  in  this  process. 
We  must  strengthen  the  rote of  Parliament  in its  legislative capacities.  This 
has  to  be  at  the  top  of  our  list of priorities.  Given  the  way  in  which 
Parliament  is  changing  as  the  Communities  move  towards  Europe-wide 
unification,  perhaps  there  is  a  slight difference  between  the national 
parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament.  This  can  cause difficulties  and 
these  are difficulties which  the  national  parliaments  and  the  European 
Parliament  must  face  together.  A European  union  will  be  more  than  the  sum  of 
its constituent parts  and  it atone,  I  believe,  can  meet  the  requirement  and 
meet  new  challenges  faced  by  Europe.  So  I  would  simply  conclude  by  wishing 
you  well  in  your  work  and  wishing  you  every  success  in this  symposium. 
Professor  VANDAMME:  Thank  you,  Mr  Ambassador,  for your  speech.  Mr  Andriessen 
is an  his  way  but his arrival  is  a  little belated and  in the meantime  I  am 
happy  to welcome  the  President of  the Belgian  Parliament,  Mr  Nothomb,  who  will 
now  address the meeting. 
- 72  -Mr  Charles-Ferdinand  NOTHOMB,  President  of  the  Chamber  of  Representatives, 
Belgium: 
Thank  you  President,  for  having  invited  the  President  of  the  Belgian  Chamber. 
I  would  like  to  welcome  the  representatives  from  other  national  parliaments 
whom  I  see  here  and  I  would  like  to  thank  you  for  allowing  me  to  make  an 
introductory  address.  I  feel  that  my  role  in  this  colloquy  is  to  give  the 
point  of  view  of one  particular national  parliament,  the  Belgian  Parliament, 
of  which  I  am  Speaker.  I  understand  that  the  title of  our  symposium  is 
'Beyond  traditional  forms  of  parliamentary activity',  so  I'll try to  talk 
about  the  constitutional  realities that  underpin  our  activities and  less 
orthodox  forms  of  activity. 
As  a  preliminary comment,  when  I  hear  Members  of  the  European  Parliament 
debating  and  when  I  speak  within  my  European  Political movement,  the  European 
People's  Party,  and  take  part  in  debates  on  the  future  of  Europe,  it is often 
said that  if Europe  is to  remain  fully  democratic  the  European  Parliament  must 
be  given  greater powers  and  the  same  authority  as  a  national  parliament.  We 
received  introductory papers  for  this  colloquy  from  TEPSA  and  we  all  know  what 
the  four  main  activities of  a  national  Parliament  are.  First,  the  Parliament 
has  to enact  laws;  there  is the  control  function,  whereby  a  Parliament  must 
oversee  what  the  government  is doing  and  how  it implements  the budget  that 
Parliament  has  approved.  The  third task is that  a  Parliament  is a  forum,  it 
is  a  debating  chamber  where  ideas  are tried out  and  new  ideas  are  developed  by 
means  of  confrontational debate.  The  fourth  role  is an  innovatory  role. 
We  have  to create new  institutions to  meet  new  needs  and  this  is where  the 
European  Parliament  comes  in.  I  would  like to  look  at  the  four  roles  from  the 
point of view  of the national  parliaments.  I'd like to ask  whether  each 
national  parliament  is as  wonderful  as  you  think  it is, and  also if it would 
be  a  good  thing if the  European  Parliament  were  to  become  more  like a  national 
parliament. 
Obviously  I  can  only  speak  on  behalf of the  Belgian  Parliament  but  I'd  like to 
make  clear that  life in the Belgian  Parliament  is  not  so  clear-cut,  not  so 
wonderful  as  you  might  think.  Of  course one  always  sings  the praises of 
- 73  -parliaments  but  nonetheless  we  do  have  problems  and  parliamentary activities 
run  into all  sorts cf difficulties.  In  a  country  like  Belgium  the  Parliament 
is  becoming  completely  bogged  down  in  its activities  and  people  no  Longer 
actually  take  mueh  notice of  what  Parliament  does.  In  the  Belgian  press  you 
hear  that  the  Parliament  just  rubber-stamps  Government  decisions,  that  the 
Parliament  is  not  able  to  amend  Government  decisions,  nor  to  reject  them,  and 
that  it works  very  quickly  and  uses  the guillotine procedure  to  push 
Government  decisions  through.  That  is what  people  say  in  our  national  press 
about  our  parliament.  Perhaps  in  other  countries  the  press  doesn't  dare  say 
this  but  our  press  is  very  frank  and  does  say  it. 
If  you  analyse  these  accusations  you'Ll  see  that  this  is because  of  the 
governmental  role  that  we  play  in  national  parliaments.  How  do  we  get  a 
government  in  Belgium?  We  have  elections under  a  multi-party  system.  Then, 
in  order  to  find  if we  can  put  together a  majority,  we  have  a  tong  meeting. 
We  go  to  a  castle,  we  shut  ourselves off  for  three,  four,  six or  even  ten 
weeks  to  see  if we  can  hammer  together  some  sort of  parliamentary majority.  A 
document  emerges,  which  is  an  agreement  between  the political parties to 
create  a  parliamentary majority.  On  that basis  we  establish a  government,  and 
the  government•s  programme  is contained  in the  document,  and  this programme  is 
then  translated into  legislative texts which  are  put  before  Parliament. 
Now  what  can  Parliament  do  but  vote  in  favour  of  these  legislative  texts 
because  they  have  emerged  from  this very  long  process  which  the government, 
that- is the  Parliament,  itself has  trigg~ed off.  And  of  course  the 
journalists say  that  Parliament  has  no  margin  for  manoeuvre.  The  Parliament 
disappears  really.  It no  longer  figures  in  the  public  imagination  b~ause 
government  procedures are  so  complex  they take  up  all their attention.  Of 
course you  have  to try and  avoid  the drawbacks  that  that  creates. 
Now  I'm not  going  to  speak  at great  length  about  the debating  chamber  role of 
Parliament.  Obviously  national  parliaments do  maintain a  degree  of 
sovereignty but  other associations  turn  themselves  into debating  chambers. 
The  mass  media  take  over  the debating  chamber  function  as  well.  Obviously  I 
try to  stop  the  major  debates  being shifted onto  the  TV  screens.  But  on 
- 74  -Sunday  mornings  a  few  politicians discuss  topical  events  on  TV,  and  that  means 
that  again  the  wind  is  taken  out  of  our  sails  in  Parliament;  issues  are 
pre-empted  on  the  small  screen  and  that's  where  we  Lose  our  innovatory  role. 
rn  our  Parliament  we  have  been  in  existence  for  158  years  and  there  are  few 
Parliaments  which  are  older  than  ours,  but  we  have  Lost  almost  entirely our 
function  of  innovation.  All  we  have  done  recently  is  to  approve  the  Single 
European  Act,  which  gives  greater powers  to  the  European  institutions.  We're 
pleased  to  do  that  because  in  Belgium  we  are  champions  of  Europe,  but  it means 
that  we  are  devolving  our  powers  both  to  the  European  institutions - to  our 
regions,  to  our  regional  parliaments.  So  we  are  delegating  some  of  our  powers 
to  other  Levels:  to  the  European  level  because  that's  important,  and  to  the 
regional  level  because  sometimes  certain decisions  are  best  taken  elsewhere. 
That's  what  I  want  to  say  about  our  national  parliament. 
I  shall  not  talk at  great  length  anout  the  European  Parliament  because  you  are 
better  acquainted  with  it than  I  am.  Since  1979,  direct elections  to  the 
European  Parliament  have  made  it a  real  Community  institution and  it has 
better democratic  credentials than  the  Commission  which  is not  elected;  the 
Council  escapes  our  control,  which  is where  the  democratic  deficit  comes  in, 
because  the  Members  of the  Council  are  only  controlled  by  their national 
parliament.  A lot of  progress  has  been  made  by  the  European  Parliament  since 
1979,  but  you  will  have  to  seek  added  powers.  To  turn  to  the  future:  in  the 
introductory papers  for  the  symposium  three  scenarios were  sketched out.  The 
first one  is  a  federal  scenario.  There  have  been  federal  projects  around  for 
a  long  time,  but  this is really wishful  thinking:  what  would  we  do  if we 
could  come  up  with  a  federal  constitution tomorrow?  My  European  political 
group,  the  EPP,  a  week  ago  stated that  its programme  was  to progress  towards  a 
federal  Europe,  but that  can't be  achieved overnight. 
The  first  scenario  is an  optimistic one,  federal  Europe,  then there's  the 
inter-governmental  scenario,  but  I  feel  that  this  would  be  regressive,  this 
would  not  represent  progress.  Then  there's the third scenario, which  is the 
one  I  like, which  is  interdependence between  the  national  Member  States of 
Europe.  I  think  that this better reflects present  realities, especially in 
the  mid-term  perspective which  is the  year  2000  and  that's what  I  will 
concentrate on  today. 
- 75  -We  know  futt  well  that  in  a  national  parliament,  even  if  we  have  full  legal 
sovereignty  in  certain  areas  there's  one  dimension  that .escapes  us,  whether  it 
is  international  policy  or  food  aid policy  or  what  is  within  the  European 
sphere  of  competence.  We  have  to  realize  that  we  have  no  control  really over 
what  our  neighbours  do  but  we  have  to  look  over our  shoulder  and  see  what  our 
neighbours  and  the  other  European  states are  doing  about  these  major  matters. 
Out  of  this  situation arises  this  whole  question of  the democratic  deficit.  I 
feel  what  we  have  to  do  is  to  strengthen  the  European  Parliament  so  that  it 
has  greater  legal  powers  and  we  have  to  strengthen our  powers  when  it  comes  to 
interdependence  between  the  national  parliaments. 
Now  what  about  the  parliamentary  system  for  the  year  2000?  I  think  that  by 
the  year  2000  we  will  have  an  improved  parliamentary  system.  How  can  we  bring 
about  these  improvements?  Well,  first  of all - and  I  ~ardly need  to say  this 
- Parliament  has  to  enhance  its  influence,  improve  its own  decision  making 
powers.  The  national  parliaments  must  develop  their political consciousness 
of  what's  happening  at  the  European  level  and  at world  Level. 
Here  I'd  like to  protest  formally,  President,  and  r'm  not  complaining  about 
you,  I'm  complaining  about  President  Oelors,  who  said  in  the  European 
Parliament  that  10  national  parliaments out of  12  were  unaware  of  the  fact 
that  in  10  years  time  Eu~opean economic  policy would  be  hammered  out  at  the 
European  levet.  I  wrote  a  strong  letter to  Mr  Oelors  saying that  this  was  not 
accurate.  I  think  that the majority of  European  parliaments,  including the 
Betgian parliament,  are aware  of  the  European  dimension.  We  are  not  ignoring 
it, we're preparing ourselves  for this  European  future.  For  several  years,  we 
in  the  Belgian  parliament  have  had  a  joint committee  of  10  MEPs  and  10 
national  MPs,  meeting  regularly to explain what  is  happening  in the  two 
parliaments  and  to draw  up  joint  reports; the  10  MEPs  can  come  to our 
parliamentary  committees  whenever  they want  to do  so.  We  are  not  therefore 
one  of the  Parliaments  which  is  ignoring  Europe;  but of  course  we  can  all  make 
improvements  within  our  own  national parliaments. 
- 76  -As  regards  the  mid-term- and  that's what  we're  concentrating  on  today  in  this 
colloquy  - you  can't  commit  yourself  to  the  mid-term  without  having  an  idea  of 
what  you're  going  to  achieve  in  the  Long  term.  To  have  a  vision of  the  year 
2000  I  have  to  have  a  vision  of  the  year  2030.  I'm  a  champion  of  a  federal 
Europe  so  I  think  that  this  is  something  we  should  go  into  in  greater depth. 
I  think  that  in  the  Long  term  the  Parliament  of  a  federal  Europe  would  have  to 
have  a  two  chamber  system.  At  the  moment  we  have  a  European  Parliament 
directly elected  by  the  people  of  Europe.  Then  there's  the  Council  which  is 
governed  by  the  Member  States  and  acts  as  an  executive  and  as  a  Legislative 
body  at  the  same  time.  That's  not  right!  In  a  real  federal  Europe  you  would 
have  a  real  government  and  a  real  Parliament  with  two  chambers.  The  Swiss 
Parliament  has  two  chambers:  the  National  Council,  which  I  would  say  would  be 
equivalent  to  the  European  Parliament,  and  the  Chamber  of  States  which 
represents  the various  cantons  of  Switzerland.  The  latter means  that  you 
assure  diversity.  So  if we  want  a  real  federal  system  we  will  have  to  have  a 
dual  chamber. 
Of  course  this  is a  futuristic  vision but  it does  colour  my  mid-term  vision  as 
to  what  should  we  do.  I  think that  very  gradually the  European  Parliament  on 
the  one  hand  and  national  parliaments on  the other  have  got  to commit 
themselves  to  this.  In  the national  parliaments  we  should  begin  to  consider 
ourselves  as  part  of this  lower  chamber.  This  would  mean  that  you  would  have 
a  lower  chamber  with  2000  members,  which  would  be  absolutely  impossible. 
Neither  do  we  want  a  second  chamber  which  is indirectly appointed,  as  the 
European  Parliament  was  before  1979. 
However  some  things might  be  easy  to achieve.  I'm  just  going  to throw  out 
three straightforward ideas, President  Plumb,  and  a  lot depends  on  you  and 
your  colleagues.  When  the  European  Parliament  has  an  important  debate 
scheduled  on  agriculture,  the  Single  Act,  or  the  budget  for  example,  why  don't 
you  inform  the  speakers of the national parliaments?  You  know  a  month  in 
advance  what  is  coming  up  on  the agenda  of the next  part-session,  so  why  don't 
you  write  to  the  12  speakers,  your  12  interlocutors,  informing  them  of  a 
keynote  debate  on  a  certain  subject  in  the  following  month?  You  could  ask  for 
the opinion of  the  committee  of the national  parliament  responsible  for  this 
particular matter. 
- 77  -If  r  ~ere to  get  a  letter of this  nature  next  Monday,  immediately  after a 
part-session,  I  would  send  it to  the  committee  concerned.  r  would  agree  with 
the  President  of  Parliament  that  it  ~as  an  important  topic.  If  the  European 
Parliament  is  not  yet  able  to  pass  Laws,  it is  an  important  debating  chamber 
for  ideas,  which  are  of  concern  to  us  for  the  future,  and  so  it would  be 
useful  for  us  to deliver  an  opinion.  At  least  in  that  way  the  Belgian 
Parliament  would  have  had  to  deliver  an  opinion  and  to  concern  itself with  the 
matter.  The  MEPs  would  be  aware  of  that.  Of  course,  you  have  Belgian  MEPs 
here,  but  they aren't  just  here  to defend  Belgian  interests.  They  are  looking 
at  things  from  the  European  point of  view.  So,  to  follow  the  Swiss  model,  the 
Belgian  canton  would  have  given  its point  of view  in  the  chamber  of  cantons. 
I  think  we  rnust  start dovetailing  the  European  Parliament's opinion  with 
national  opinions  on  European  matters  because  they  are of national  concern. 
As  a  second  simple  idea,  perhaps  once  a  year  - at  your  initiative,  Mr 
Pr~sident, - one  could  hold  a  European  day  in the  12  national  parliaments  and 
this  year's  subject  could  be  one  thing,  next  year's  another.  There  would  be 
an  agreement  between  the  12  speakers  and  yourself that there  would  be  a debate 
on  the  same  subject  in  all  12  parliaments  on  the  same  day.·  Of  course  all 
sorts of different  ideas would  be  thrown  up,  but  never  mind!  The  12  national 
parliaments  would  have  been  playing an  important  role  in  the  European  debate 
on  that  same  day.  Even  if you  dontt  yet  have  full  powers,  you  can  still throw 
out  important  ideas. 
The  third  idea  is a  combination  of  the first  two.  On  important  subjects,  four 
or  five  times  a  year you  could  have  a  joint meeting  of the  12  parliamentary 
committees  concerned with  the  European  Parliament  committees  concerned.  They 
would  number  perhaps  240  people  altogether,  comprising  20  members  from  each 
committee concerned.  Afterwards  you  would  have  to draw  the strings of the 
different debates together  in  the  European  Parliament.  I  feel  that  your 
debating  chamber  role would  be  strengthened in this way.  Our  agricultural 
ministers or our  foreign  affairs ministers meet  together  in the Council,  and 
they  know  that their national  parliaments  have  given  certain opinions  on 
certain matters  and  they  take  those  into account.  We  need  to have  a  parallel 
to that next  year  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the national 
parliaments. 
- 78  -As  for  the  European  Parliament's  governmental  role  in  the  future,  national 
parliaments  have  a  governmental  rote.  Public  opinion  has  a  very  simplified 
view  of  what  happens  in  a  national  parliament,  and  so  the  political parties 
have  tended  to  distort  things  and  play  an  excessively  important  role.  They 
simplify debates  in  the  media  and  so  parliamentary debates  end  up  in  the 
shade.  Thus  the  political  parties,  the  parties  organizing  the  actual 
campaigns,  tend  to  pre-empt  debate  in  the  national  parliament. 
r  think  there  is  a  more  complex  situation  in  the  European  Parliament.  We  have 
political parties  that  belong  to political federations.  I  think  there  are  75 
parties  represented  in  the  European  Parliament  but  they're  not  really 
organized  outside  the  European  Parliament.  And  so  the  role of  the political 
groups  is  very  important  in  the  European  Parliament.  Whereas  nationally there 
is  Less  coordination  in  parliaments  between  the parties because  they  have 
strong  federations  outside parliament  that  back  them  up,  that  does  not  exist 
at  the  European  level.  So  you  achieve  more  coordination  sometimes  in  the 
European  Parliament  than  we  do  in  the national  parliaments.· 
To  conclude,  with  the  year  2000  in  mind  we  must  together try to benefit  from 
increasing  inter-independence,  but  that  inter-independence  has  to be 
organized.  We  have  to organize  links,  liaisons between  the  European 
Parliament  and  national  parliaments  in order to  make  up  for  that democratic 
deficit  which  we  all deplore. 
Professor  VANDAMME: 
Thank  you  very much,  President  Nothomb,  for  that  address,  which  included very 
specific proposals for  enhanced  cooperation between  the  European  Parliament 
and  its national  counterparts.  I  now  turn to  Mr  FALCIAI,  Director of the 
Private Office of  President  Spadolini,  President  of  the  Italian Senate,  who  is 
to deliver  a  message  from  President  Spadolini. 
- 79  -Mr  FALCIAl,  Director  of  the  Private Office of  the  President  of  the  Italian 
Senate: 
Thank  you.  President of  the  European  Parliament,  President  of  TEPSA,  Speakers 
of  the  national  parliaments,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
We  are  at  a  political  juncture  when  the  process  of  European  integration  is 
well  underway,  and  so  it is  most  opportune  to  follow  up  this  initiative  by  the 
European  Parliament  and  to  reflect  on  the  results of  the  research  carried out 
by  the  TEPSA.  Over  the  last  10  years,  significant  progress  has  been  made 
towards  the  strengthening  of  the  powers  of  the  European  Parliament,  and 
through  the  exercise of  those  powers  there  has  been  an  improvement  of  the 
political  representativity of  the  Parliament  and  its components.  But  it must 
be  said that  this  process  of  consolidation is a  long  way.from  reaching  its 
final  destination.  We  still have  a  long  way  to  go  before  we  achieve  a 
Community  organism which  is  able actually to  make  an  incisive  impact  on  the 
legislative procedure  and  on  the whole  process of  hammering  out  political 
guidelines.  Parliament still does  not  yet  have  sufficient  powers  in  the  whole 
area  of  the  raising of  revenue  and  the  management  of  revenue. 
I  think  it is also desirable  with  this  in  mind  to  give  new  life to  the  idea  of 
improving  the  dissemination of  ideas  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
national  parliaments.  The  idea of  achieving within  4 years  the  Internal 
Market  with  over 300  million  consumers  is a  political  idea of  very  high 
profile.  In  fact  it will  bring  about  the most  significant change  that  we've 
seen  in  the  Community  for  the  last half century.  This  is the backdrop  to  the 
present and  the future of the  Member  States of the  Community  and  it's also 
important for  those  countries  which  would  like  to  join the  Community. 
There  is a  change· on  the  international  scene  which  is of  importance  to  the 
Community  as  well.  We  will  be  seeing  new  potential  for  dialogue  between  the 
EEC  and  COMECON  and  the Member  States of  both  bodies.  These  changes  on  the 
international  scene  increase  the  importance of giving the  European  Parliament 
a  more  incisive political  role.  Parliament  has  to be  given  greater 
representativity in  order to have  greater  influence on  international 
relations.  The  enhanced  dialogue  between  the  Member  States of the  Community 
- 80  -and  Eastern  European  countries  is  something  that  is happening  at  the  moment 
and  we  don't  know  where  exactly this process  will  take  us,  but  it is 
absolutely  in~ispensable that,  in  order  to  face  up  to  future  challenges,  there 
should  be  greater political  integration between  the  countries  of  Western 
~urope. 
Of  course,  this  widening  of  the  international  scene -the fact  that  we  will 
have  improved  relations  with  Eastern  Europe  - doesn't  mean  that  we  are  going 
to  turn  our  backs  on  our  traditional  and  indispensable  relations  with  the 
United  States which  have,  since  the  Marshall  Plan,  been  of  capital  importance 
for  Europe.  Again,  the  emerging  role of the  Pacific area  and  the  increasingly 
dominant  role  of  Japan  are  of  significance for  the  Community,  which  has 
ever-closer and  more  fruitful  links  with  that  part of  the  world. 
In  a  few  months  the  European  elections will  be  taking  place  again  and  when  the 
European  electors go  to  the ballot  box  they will  be  reftecting their social, 
political  and  cultural  interests.  But  whatever  happens,  these elections  will 
be  not  just a  reflection of different  party programmes  in  the  different 
countries,  but  also an  implicit  judgement  on  what  the  European  Parliam~nt has 
been  doing  over  the  last  few  years  and  a  judgement  of  the  impact  the  European 
Parliament  has  had  on  the  life of  our  citizens.  In  fact,  the  study carried 
out  by  the  Trans-European  Policy  Studies  Association  looks  at the  links 
between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  people  it represents  and,  in  fact,  the 
area  that  the  European  Parliament  represents  is a  huge  geographical  area  which 
is probably going  to  become  even  greater. 
I  have  the  honour  of  representing the  Senate  of the  Italian Republic  here  and 
the  Senate is fully  committed  to bringing  about  the  successful  completion  of 
the  Internal Market.  In  fact,  I  can  say  on  behalf of  the  Senate  that  we  are 
going  to do  all we  can to strengthen democracy  in  the  Community  and  to 
construct political union  in  Europe. 
But  there are  institutional  links which  we  still have  to strengthen or  even  in 
some  cases  create.  It's wrong  to think that  the  European  Parliament  will  be 
stronger  if it is completely free of shackles.  I  think it would  be  a  mistaken 
judgement  to think  that  an  independent  Parliament,  which  is  independent  of 
national  parliaments,  will.have  more  power.  On  the  contrary,  I  think  the 
- 81  -Parliament  can  only  have  full  autonomy  if there  is greater  institutional 
inter-dependence  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  national  parliaments. 
In  my  view,  the  European  Parliament  and  the  national  parliaments  should  not 
ignore  each  other or  turn  their backs  on  each  other.  On  behalf  of  the  Senate 
of  the  Italian  Republic,  I  would  like  to  offer  you  my  best  wishes  for  your 
work  on  the  results of  the  research  project of  the  TEPSA. 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  I  am  happy  to  welcome  Mr  Andriessen,  Vice-President  of 
the  EEC  Commission,  who  has  just  arrived.  We  are  very  happy,  Mr 
Vice-President,  that  you  could  attend our  Symposium  this morning,  and  I  give 
you  the  floor  for  your  address. 
Mr  Frans  ANDRIESSEN,  Vice-President  of  the  European  Commission: 
Europe  today  can  look  forward  to  a  period  in  which  the  democratic  values  which 
we  share  will  fin~ a  higher degree  of expression  in our  Community 
institutions.  A series of  problems  which,  at  times,  held  up  this process, 
have  been  overcome.  The  Common  Agricultural  Policy  has  been  reformed;  our 
budgetary difficulties have  been  solved,  at  least  for  a  considerable  period 
ahead;  the vital  task  of  completing  the  internal  market  by  1992  has  captured 
the  imagination of our citizens and  consigned  Euro-pessimism  to  the  scrap  heap 
of  history;  the  Single  European  Act  has  provided a  firm  basis  for  achieving a 
working  democracy  at  European  level. 
The  Community's  institutions are  moving  in  the  right direction but  are  they 
moving  quickly enough?  The  European  Parliament  will  play a  key  role  in 
setting the pace  in  the years  ahead. 
The  third direct  elections  to the  European  Parliament  in June  1989  are 
extremely  important,  more  important  than ever before, because after 10  years, 
the electorate is becoming  more  critical and  demanding.  What,  it is asking, 
can  we  expect  from  Parliament  in  the  next  few  years? 
Parliament  has  already  strengthened its role  in  the  Community's  complex 
institutional arrangements  and  we  in the Commission  welcome  this. 
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amendments  to  the  Treaties  made  by  the  Single  Act  are  being  reinforced  by 
better working  arrangements. 
Three  innovations  can  be  mentioned  in  this  respect.  First,  Parliament  has 
increased  its  influence  in  the  assent  procedure  for  the  Community's  external 
agreements  as  its  'avis  conforme'  is  now  r~quired for  their  implementation. 
In  several  recent  cases  the  exercise  of  this  influence  has  led  the  Community 
to  reflect more  carefully on  its  relations with  the  countries  concerned  and 
obliged  these  countries  to  take  into  account  the  views  expressed  in 
Parliament. 
Secondly,  Parliament  has  acquired  real  legislative powers  through  the 
cooperation  procedure  introduced  by  the  Single  European  Act.  Thirdly,  the 
inter-institutional agreement  on  budgetary discipline,  reached  as  a  follow-up 
to the  Single  Act,  has  strengthened Parliament's  position  in  the budgetary 
process  which  should  now  function  more  smoothly  than  in  the past.  Parliament 
is  thus  gradually becoming  a  political body  exercising  certain powers 
comparable  to  those  enjoyed  by  national  parliaments. 
But  these  additional  powers  cannot  yet  be  taken  for  granted.  The  Community 
is  going  through  a  kind  of  running-in  period  in  which  these powers  are  being 
tested.  The  cooperation procedure  can  function  smoothly  only if it is 
implemented  by  Parliament  with  considerable discipline.  Our  first 
experiences  in  this  regard  are  encouraging.  As  far  as  the  Commission  is 
concerned,  its position  in  the  cooperation procedure  is somewhat  delicate  as 
it  runs  the  risk  in exercising its right of initiative of  being  sandwiched 
between  Parliament  and  the Council. 
The  Commission  and  Parliament  should strive for  the  widest  possible agreement 
at  the first  reading  stage  in  order to avoid difficulties at  second  reading, 
following  the  Council's  adoption of  a  Common  Position. 
There  are other  recurrent  problems  in the  functioning of the  Community's 
institutions which  have  not  been  eliminated despite the progress  achieved. 
Parliament's  legislative powers  are still rather  restricted and  cannot  always 
overcome  obstructions  encountered  elsewhere  in  the  system. 
- 83  -The  Council  still tends  to  block  the  final  adoption  of  certain proposals  for 
inordinate periods.  ?arliament  should,  together  with  the  Commission,  develop 
nP~ techniques  for  overcoming  such  obstructions. 
Parliament  should establish  its  own  priorities  and  insist  on  them.  It  should 
exoerirnent  with  new  means  for  challenging  the  Council,  especially where  it  is, 
responsible  for  delaying  proposals  on  which  Commission  and  Parliament  are 
agreed.  Despite  the  use  which  MEPs  make  of  Question  Time  and  other 
opportunities  to  put  us  on  our  mettle,  Parliament  still has  no  equivalent  of 
the  powers  of  a  national  legislature to press  Ministers  for  explanations  and 
action. 
Parliament's  identity  in  the  inter-institutional  triangle  is still somewhat 
ambiguous.  It is very  much  a  Parliament  su;  gener;s.  We  cannot  expect 
further  amendments  to  the  Treaties  in  the  near  future  and  so  Parliament's 
identity must  be  asserted  in  its daily work  and  through  its relations  with 
other  Community  institutions.  Although  progress  has  been  made  by  Parliament 
in  influencing  the  decision-making  process~s of the  Commission  and  the 
Council,  the  European  Council,  which  was  given  formal  recognition  in  the 
Single  Act,  stilt remains  beyond  Parliament's  reach.  We  should  give  careful 
consideration  to  ways  in  which  this gap  can  be  filled  so  as  to ensure  that  the 
Heads  of State  and  Government  can,  in their deliberations,  take  fully  into 
account  Parliament's  views. 
The  European  Parliament  and  its Members  have  built up  a  good  reputation over 
the  last  10  years.  It has  promoted  a  series of initiatives notably  related 
to  the environment  and  to transport.  If  we  have  made  progress  in  these 
fields, it is in no  small  measure  thanks  to Parliament. 
When  direct elections were  introduced, it was  stated that  Parliament  should  be 
granted wider  powers  and  some  progress  has  been  made  in this direction. 
Where  it has  exercised its powers,  Parliament  has  acted  in a  responsible  way. 
Parliament  has  demonstrated  that it is  fully equipped  to participate, in the 
legislative and  policy making  process.  There  is therefore  reason  for 
optimism  in  presenting Parliament  to the electorate  in  1989. 
- 84  -Nevertheless  the  Community  still suffers  from  a  certain  'democratic  deficit' 
and  Parliament  should  seize every  opportunity  for  overcoming  it during  the 
years  ahead. 
Thank  you  very  much,  Vice-President  of  the  Commission,  for  that  substantial 
contribution  to  our  debate.  I  think  that  you've  really  drawn  up  a  balance 
sheet  of  progress  towards  democracy  in  the  European  Communities  and  have  made 
a  fundamental  contribution  to  the  work  done  by  this  symposium.  I  now  call  on 
Professor Grabitz  to  introduce  the  General  report  to  the  session. 
Professor  Eberhard  GRABITZ,  Free  University of  Berlin: 
President,  Members  of  Parliament,  Colleagues,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
At  this  colloquium,  our  business  is to  look  at  the  legal  and  political  status 
of  the  European  Parliament  in  the  triad of  Community  institutions.  Our  main 
concern  is  what  contribution the  European  Parliament  can  make  to  help  the 
Communities  to  function  smoothly  and  how  it can  best  send  its message  out  to 
'  its electorate.  In  this  company,  I  need  not  stress that  the  role of  the 
European  Parliament  can  hardly  be  compared  to the  role  discharged  by  the 
national  parliaments,  as  has  been  said this morning.  It would  appear  to  me 
that  insufficient thought  has  gone  into the  role which  the Parliament  should 
have  in  the  Community  system,  in  the  Community  scheme  of things.  If a  legal 
expert  were  describing this  in terms  of its constitutional  format,  then  no 
doubt  the phrase,  as  Vice-President  Andriessen  has  said,  would  be  that this 
Parliament  is sui  generis.  The  purpose  of this  symposium  will  be  to  focus  on 
that  concept  and  to try to give it a  clearer form. 
Therefore,  on  behalf of the  academic  and  scientific  community  represented 
here,  I  would  like to  convey  a  word  of thanks  to President  Plumb  for  having 
~onvoked this  symposium,  which  brings together academics,  legal  experts,  those 
involved  in  the media  and  parliamentarians  in order to  have  an  exchange  of 
views. 
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1974,  something  similar  took  place  in  Luxembourg~ and  the  subject  then  was 
'European  Integration  and  the  Future  of  Parliaments  in  Europe'.  At  the  time 
much  attention  was  paid  to  the  concept  of  European  crisis.  It  was  being  said 
that  the  role  of  parliaments  was  diminishing  and  that  the  Nine  at  the  time 
were  unhappy  with  their own  parliaments'  functions;  this  was  the  backdrop 
against  which  we  looked  at  the  future  of  the  European  Parliament. 
14  years  Later  we  have,  I  think,  been  vindicated  by  the  way  things  have  gone 
since  then.  Some  of  the  demands  which  were  made  in  1974  have  now 
materialized.  We've  seen  direct  elections,  and  we  have  seen  a  number  of  other 
major  changes  in  the  way  in  which  Parliament  has  been  vested with  extra  powers 
in  the  budgetary process,  for  example,  and  recently  in  the  cooperation 
procedure.  Many  commentators  and,  I  believe,  a  majority of  parliamentarians 
themselves  are  not  by  any  stretch of the  imagination  fully satisfied with  the 
way  in  which  things  have  gone.  There  is discontent  with  the  way  in which 
Parliament  has  developed,  because  the  Council,  and  the  governments  and  states 
represented  in  Council,  is still the  legislator in  the  Community  rather than 
the  Parliament,  and  therefore it is difficult  to describe  t~e European 
Parliament  as  a  legislative body  in  any  real  sense. 
A  further ground  tor discontent  is  the poor  coverage  which  Parliament's work 
receives  in  the press,  on  television and  in the other media.  The  citizens of 
Europe  need  to understand  the  obje~tives and  the goals  which  their elected 
representatives are pursuing.  The  European  elections  so  far  have  primarily 
been  conducted  in national  terms  and  this,  I  think, must  give us  concern  as  we 
look  forward  to the third round  of  European  elections next  June.  Because  in 
this  case too  I  feel  that  the  elections will  not  be  held  under  exclusively 
European  banners. 
So  this  is the present state of affairs, and  this is why  TEPSA,  the 
Trans-European  Policy Studies  Association,  has  been  trying to bring together 
those  who  are  working  in this field  in order to produce  a  new  template which 
will  set  us  thinking  about  research  and  about  where  the  European  Parliament  is 
going.  Now  that  this process  is underway  and  has  benefited  from  wide  support, 
on  behalf of  TEPSA  we  express  our  warm  thanks  that  this has  been  made 
possible. 
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to  you.  It provides  us  with  a  synopsis  of  the  reflection  which  is  underway  in 
the  various  academic  circles.  It  is  a  paper  of  consensus,  for  it contains 
proposals,  suggestions  and  reflections  which  have  been  brought  together  in 
this  text  from  all parts  of  the  spectrum. 
Thi5  is  a  major  research  project  which  can  be  summarized  under  four  chapter 
headings.  First,  we  examine  the differences  and  the  commonality  between 
national  parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament,  looking  at  the  functions  of 
parliament  and  the  idiosyncrasies  of  the different political  systems 
concerned.  Second,  we  look  at  new  concepts  for  the  European  Parliament. 
Third,  we  examine  an  interim  assessment  of  the  functioning  of the  European 
Parliament  since  the  first direct  elections  in  ,979.  And  the  fourth  chapter 
heading  fulfils  a  widely-felt  need,  in  light of developments,  to  look  at 
options  and  scenarios  and  strategies  for  the  future of  the  European 
Parliament. 
The  first  of  these  four  aspects  concerns  itself with  the  differences  and  the 
commonality  between  national  parliaments  and  their European  counterpart.  It 
is  a  question  which  is of  significance because  the political  community  has 
expectations  and  assumed  attitudes  towards  the  European  Parliament  and  very 
often  they  are  marked  br national  experience  and  a  national  background.  There 
is not  just one  exclusive monolithic  view  of the  way  a  parliament  works. 
There  are  many  views,  which  will  stem  from  national traditions  and  heritage, 
from  different political creeds,  and  from  different day-to-day political 
experience  as  well. 
There  is one  thing which  stems  from  the  national  parliamentary heritage  which 
all  our  Member  States  have  in  common  and  this is  inter-penetration  in  terms  of 
the national  parliamentary systems,  even  though  in different countries there 
are  constitutional  restrictions placed upon  this,  such  as the  constitutional 
prerogatives of the  French  President, or the peculiarities of  the federal 
system  in  West  Germany.  In  terms of political theory,  other attributes or 
functions  of  parliaments  can  be  enumerated  as  was  done  14  years  ago  in  the 
first  colloquium.  There  is the  legislative function,  the  function  of  forming 
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representativeness,  and  the  function  of  recruitment,  in  other  words  as  the 
place  ~here political  leaders  can  be  trainee. 
These  are  different  attributes of  parliaments  and  there  are  major  variations 
from  one  parliament  to  another  and  also over  time  and  through  history.  In 
studies  which  have  been  carried out,  attempts  were  made  to  look  at  those 
traditional  attributes of  parliaments  and  to  try  to  apply  them  in  the  context 
of the  European  Parliament,  and  very often  the  result  was  unsatisfactory. 
When  one  tried to  measure  the  European  Parliament  by  those particular tests 
the  European  Parliament  could  not  elect  a  European  government,  nor  does  it 
have  proper  Legislative  functions  which  would  be  comparable  to  those  of 
national  parliaments.  Any  analysis  of  the  European  Parliament  which  looks  at 
the  attributes and  functions  of national  parliaments  would  by  necessity  lead 
one  to the verdict  that  the European  Parliament  is  capable of  improvement. 
Therefore  I  think  there is  not  a  great deal  of mileage  in  this  academic 
approach,  and  that  to try to  apply  traditional  national  standards  to  the 
European  Parliament  leads us  to  something  of  a  methodological  impasse.  We 
need  a  template  and  a  model  for  the  European  Parliament  which  would  be 
different  from  national  experience but  which  would  be  guided  by  that. 
We  believe that  the correct method  has  been  outlined by  TEPSA  in  its programme 
of  research,  in other words  looking  at a  real  authentic  programme  and  a  model 
for  the  European  Parliament  which  describes  the European  Parliament's  present 
attributes and  functions,  and  takes  account  of at  least  two  aspects of 
European  political  realities at  the  end  of  the  second  millenium.  The  first 
reality to be  built in to the academic  appraisal of things  had  to be  the 
expectations which  are vested by  the political  community  in  the development  of 
the  European  Parliament.  When  I  talk about  the political  community  I  mean 
first  and  foremost  the electorate, but also  the politicians, the political 
classes  and  those  in politics and  in  the media  who  communicate  that message 
towards  the outside world. 
These  expectations  were  considerable  in  the  run-up  to  the  1979  direct 
election.  At  that  time  expectations pursued  three different  avenues.  First, 
the  political  community  and  the public  expected  the  European  direct  elections 
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Second,  there  was  the  hope  that  this  would  have  positive  repercussions  on  the 
future  process  of  unification within  the  Community  as  a  whole.  And  third, 
there  was  the  hope  that  there  would  be  a  positive effect  on  the  efficiency of 
the  decision-making  procedure  within  the  Community,  because  a  Parliament  in 
which  more  poHers  were  vested,  a  Parliament  deciding  by  majorities  would  - it 
was  hoped  by  many  observers  - help  the  Community  to  transcend  its 
decision-making difficulties.  The  political community  and  the  public  at  large 
hoped  and  expected  that  in  the  wake  of  direct  elections  we  would  see  an 
institutional  reinforcement  and  consolidation  of  the  European  Parliament.  We 
have  seen  that  this  reinforcement,  that  this  strengthening of  Parliament's 
position  since  1979  has  really only  taken  place  in  a  very  mitigated  form. 
Now  the  reason  for  this  is, we  would  suggest,  grounded  in  the  structures of 
the  political  system  within  which  the  European  Parliament  has  to exist,  has  to 
act  and  has  to  operate.  This  is  a  system  which  must  be  viewed  as  a  nexus,  or 
as  an  interpenetration.  This  is  a  concept  which  is very  prevalent  in  the 
German  academic  debate:  the  nexus  position of the  European  Parliament. 
This  introduces  the  second  reality on  which  our  reflections were  based:  the 
Parliament's position  in  the triad of  Community  institutions. 
But  let  me  try to explain  what  I  mean  by  the  concept  of  interpenetration or 
nexus.  The  nexus  does  not  simply  encompass  the  Community  with  its treaty 
powers  and  its treaty institutions.  It would  extend to a  series of  Community 
activities such  as  European  fiscal  cooperation,  the  European  monetari system, 
or other systems  such  as  the  EUREKA  research activities.  This  nexus  of 
Community  activities is also marked  by  a  close  mutual  interdependence  between 
the  European  Community  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Member  States  on  the  other. 
This  extends  to all the  areas of political activity. 
As  we  can  now  see the  Community  is not  growing  into a  traditional  federal 
entity,  nor  has  it degenerated  into a  kind of group  of  concentric  circles 
where  individual  groups  of  countries  pursue different objectives.  It  has 
become  something  quite different  from  that. 
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recent  rast  shown  three  trends  which  are  observable.  First  of all,  Looking  at 
the  scope  of  European  activities,  clearly the  circle has  been  much  extended. 
More  and  more  important  political  positions  are  being  considered  and  finally 
adopted  at  the  European  Community  Level.  !n  the  second  place,  part  of  this 
extended  scope  of  activities  of  the  Communities  does  correspond  to  a  transfer 
of  powers,  although  this  has  been  limited.  Instead of  clear  powers  being 
invested  in  the  Community,  Member  States  have  time  and  again  used  pragmatic 
machinery  to  provide  packages  of  national  desiderata.  One  example  of this  has 
heen  the  EMS,  which  was  put  together  in  that  way.  Thirdly,  decision-making 
procedures  within  that  nexus  of  institutions take  a  long  time  and  have  proved 
cumbersome.  This  is  no  doubt  due  to  the  fact  that  everyone  has  to  be 
consensus-minded  and  that  means  that  both  national  and  Community 
decision-makers  had  to  be  involved  in  that  process.  This  means  in  turn  that 
it is difficult to  have  an  efficient  decision-making  procedure. 
This  is  something  which  has  not  been  fully  achieved  and  is  compounded  by  the 
fact  that  the  national  administrations still  loom  very  large  in  the  European 
Community  decision-making  procedure.  As  a  result  Parliament  tends  to  be 
eclipsed, despite its representativity and  its  legitimacy as  a 
directly-elected parliament.  Very  often the  process  of  building  the  Community 
has  led  to  a  diminution of  the  role of the  Parliament  in that  process. 
So  within  this  nexus  we  have  to  look  at  the  way  in  which  powers  are  allocated 
and  there is  a  large  grey area.  Much  research  remains  to  be  done  and  much 
more  thought  is  required in order to provide  legal  certainty,  because  that  is 
not  just the sole preserve of the  Court  of  Justice in Luxembourg;  it has  to be 
achieved as  part of a  wider  process. 
As  we  examine  the nexus  of the institutions  let us  look  at  them  from  the 
vantage point of the Parliament  for  the moment.  We  will  see  that that 
institution has  real difficulties in  finding  its place within  the Triad.  The 
institutional  status of the  Parliament  extends  to areas  such  as agricultural 
policy,  or  commercial  policy,  and  the  Parliament still has  much  to complain 
about  because of the  way  in  which  it is consulted.  On  the one  hand,  it has 
budgetary  powers  which,  for  example,  give it a  margin  for  manoevure  within  the 
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vote  of  no  confidence;  and  under  the  terms  of  the  Single  European  Act  it can 
give  its assent  to  association  and  accession  treaties  and  agreements. 
In  terMs  of  legislation,  on  the  other  hand,  it has  a  consultative  capacity, 
and  if  anything its  role  is  a  negative  rather  than  a  constructive  one.  In  the 
overall  nexus  of  the  Community  system  Parliament  has  to  base  itself on  the 
powers  exercised  by  the  Community,  although  often  these  are  beyond  its direct 
control.  In  regard  to  European  Political  Cooperation  and  EUREKA  the 
Parliament  has  been  effectively taken  out  of  the  decision-making  circle, and 
until  such  time  as  these  powers  are  transferred  to  the  Community  they will 
continue  to  be  an  extension  of  the  scope  of  the  Communities'  activities,  but 
the  Parliament  will  not  make  any  major  headway  in establishing  its 
credentials. 
The  Parliament  therefore needs  to  have  a  strategy for  institutional  reform 
which  must  take  into  account  the  following  parameters:  first,  enhancing  its 
own  status within  the  interplay of the  institutions within  the  Community;  and 
second,  further  extensions  and  evolutions  in  the  Communities  themselves.  The 
future  role  of  the  Parliament  will  depend  on  whether  it can  help  to  strengthen 
the  Communities'  institutions and  whether  it can  better assert  itself within 
the  nexus  of  institutions. 
Now  the  second  chapter is concerned with  new  concepts,  new  projects  for  the 
Parliament  and  I  would  like briefly to  summarise  the  thinking on  this  subject. 
Within  the  Community  nexus,  and  remembering  the  expectations  which  the 
political community  and  the  public  at  large  have  vested  in  the  Parliament, 
there are three real tasks which  are  part  and  parcel  of  the political 
functions of the  European  Parliament.  We  believe that  the  Parliament  has  a 
function  whereby  it looks  at existing policies  in the  Community  and  has  its 
say  in  forming  those policies.  It  is  involved  in the political process  by 
means  of  parliamentary initiatives, by  exerting  influence on  the 
decision-making  process  itself and  subseQuently  on  down-stream  surveillance 
and  scrutiny of  the decisions  which  are taken. 
- 91  -In  the  second  place,  the  Parliament  has  a  function  of  helping  further  to 
develop  the  Community  system.  This  is  done  by  means  of  its proposals  on 
detailed extensions  and  transfers  of  power,  so  that  areas  of  responsibility 
can  be  transferred  from  national  to  Community  tevel,  and  also  by  developing 
inter-institutional  relationships  in  order  to  make  its contribution  towards 
democratisation; this  I  think  is  a  systemic  function  which  the  Parliament  can 
discharge.  The  third area  of  responsibility  is  in  terms  of  interaction 
between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  voters,  the  electorate,  because  the 
Parliament  can  articulate,  can  represent  and  protect  the  interests of  the 
electorate  and  certainly pass  on  the  message  of  future  plans  to  the  public  to 
keep  them  informed.  This  is  a  kind  of  inter-active  role,  if you  like. 
As  we  look  at  the  past  performance  of  the  Parliament  since  1979  I  think  one 
can  form  an  assessment  of  how  things  have  gone.  I  would  not  intend  to  do  this 
in detail,  as  you  will  find  this  in  the  documentation  for  this  symposium.  The 
working  groups  will of  course  also  be  able  to  trace  the  different  trends,  and 
developments.  Examination  of  the  literature will  also  help  to  form  an 
impression  of  where  Parliament  is, of  how  far  Parliament  has  come,  and  whether 
it is  likely to  go  further  in  the  future.  The  papers  will  also  indicate  the 
kind  of  strategy which  is  required to help it reach  those objectives  with  the 
passing of  time. 
At  this  time  I  would  like very briefly to offer a  few  thoughts  on  an  inventory 
of the  Parliament's progress  to date.  Any  overview  of  Parliament's  track 
record  shou!d stress that  in  terms  of formulating  policy, particularly in 
terms  of its initiatives, its new  activities  and  also  in surveillance and  the 
control  function,  Parliament's  achievements  are clear and  undisputed.  In 
terms  of Parliament's powers,  fresh political ground  is being opened  up  in 
areas  such  as  research  and  development  and  environment,  and  there is  room  in 
these  ar~as for a  greater say  for  Parliament  than  in  the more  traditional 
Community  areas,  such  as  commercial  or  farm  policy. 
Parliament's track  record  in  terms  of  systemic  influence  has,  I  believe, 
produced  its greatest  achievements.  Parliament's draft treaty on  European 
Union  was  an  achievement  where  Parliament  pursued  a  twin-pronged  strategy.  It 
first  had  to  produce  the  comprehensive  draft of the  Treaty  founding  the 
European  Union  on  the  one  hand,  and  then  on  the other it continued  to pursue 
- 92  -the  ooticy of  small  steps  which  would  Lead  to  minor,  but  significant, 
improvements.  This  policy of  the  short  steps  has  perhaps  been  more  successful 
than  the  gre~t  leap  forward  towards  European  Union. 
However  the  biggest  deficit  has  been  in  the  third  function,  the  interactive 
function  between  the  elected body  and  the  electorate.  We  must  not  forget  that 
every  member  represents  about  600  000  voters  and  of  course  it  is  difficult  to 
keep  up  constant  regular  contacts  with  that  size  of  constitutency.  Nor  has  it 
been  possible  for  the  national  parties  really  to  function  as  a  conveyor  belt 
for  thinking  coming  from  the  European  Parliament  itself.  So  in order  to 
improve  that  communication  function  Parliament  will,  I  think,  have  to  enhance 
its presentation of  developments  in  the  media  and  through  the  media. 
Let  me  now  move  on  to  the  question  of  the strategies which  Parliament  can  now 
embark  upon.  In  our  report  we  made  the  case that  in  future  Parliament  should 
continue  to  pursue  a  twin  policy.  In  the  first  place  its draft  treaty 
founding  the  European  Union  must  be  updated  in order  to  take  account  of  the 
input  from  national  parliaments,  so  that  the electorate  can  have  a  clearer 
picture  of  the  link  between  national  parliaments  and  Parliament.  Second,  the 
policy of  small  steps  must  also  be  taken  one  stage  further.  As  things  stand-
and  this  has  been  echoed  in  interventions this  morning  - the  Parliament  is 
more  than  just a  formal  sounding  board,  which  reflects  Community  policy 
initiatives.  The  government-forming  function  is  something  else which  will 
have  to  be  improved  upon,  judging  by  Parliament's  past  experience. 
The  present,  and  of  course  the future,  function of the  Parliament  can  I  think 
best be  described as  a  co-player on  the  institutional board.  This  will 
involve  Parliament's becoming  a  power  in  the  land  within  the  institutional 
framework  of the  Communities,  asserting itself and  becoming  involved  in  such  a 
way  that it can  exert  political  influence without  wishing  to usurp  the 
functions  of other  institutions. 
And  it is  important  in that  sense  that it can  reassert itself vis-a-vis the 
other institutions.  Vice-President  Andriessen  described  the  role of 
Parliament  and  talked  about  the  institutional triad in  terms  of  the nexus 
between  the  institutions.  The  Parliament will  have  to  continue  to be  a  player 
on  the  stage and  will  have  to  work  with  the national  parliaments  as  well. 
- 93  -President  Nothomb  this morning  added  valuable  elements  to this  investigation. 
It  is  vital  that  in  future  no  major  political decisions  can  be  taken  without 
the  Parliament  being  heard  out.  In  this  process  we  must  ensure  that  this 
provides  not  only democratic  Legitimacy  but  also efficiency.  The  players  have 
to  cooperate  with  Parliament  and  act  on  the  same  stage  and  they  must  be 
involved  in  such  a  way  that  a  consensus  can  be  arrived at  at  the  end  of  the 
day. 
If  Parliament  is  going  to  assert  itself on  the  stage  as  a  fully  fledged  player 
then  Parliament  will  have  to  be  involved  in  initiating policies,  in 
decision-making,  in  surveillance,  and  as  a  fully  fledged  player  in  the 
institutional process.  I  am  convinced  that  co-decision must  be  placed  centre 
stage,  because  Parliament  will  have  to  be  involved  in  a  very delicate 
decision-making  process.  It will  have  to establish  its credentials  so  that  it 
can  have  its say on  all  important  matters  of  Community  business;  and  this  is 
not  only  a  legal,  but  a  political  imperative  as  well. 
We  have  presented a  number  of  proposals  which  would  also  help  to  extend  the 
cooperation  procedure  to all  the  legislative activities of  ~he Community, 
extending to  an  electoral  system  which  would  also  have  a  bearing on  the  way  in 
which  the  candidates  are  selected.  We  believe that  there  is  room  for  the 
Parliament  to  assert  itself and,  in  the process  leading to  the  achievement  of 
a  single  market  by  1992,  to  strengthen its  role  within  the  institutional 
concept. 
Therefore  as  a  kind of synopsis of our  investigation we  think  that the  time 
has  come  for a  new  model  by  which  to guide the  European  Parliament  which  is 
not  predicated or patterned exclusively on  national  parliaments.  My  own 
personal  view,  and  I  think  I  speak  on  behalf of  my  colleagues  who  have  worked 
on  the project, is that  a  strong and  effective Parliament  is absolutely 
essential.  However,  a  definition of its role must  take  account  of 
developments  in the  Community  and  in  the  rest of  Europe  in  a  wider  sense. 
This  new  definition  is something  to which  we  think  we  can  make  a  contribution, 
and  perhaps at the  end  of this  Symposium  we  will  have  acquired a  new 
knowledge,  we  wilt  have  a  better picture of the  lie of the  land.  Thank  you 
very much. 
- 94  -Professor  VANDAMME: 
I  would  like  to  express  my  gratitude to  Professor  Grabitz  for  that  very 
substantial  contribution,  which  has  given  us  a  coherent  picture  of  the 
different  results of  the  studies  which  have  been  carried out  on  this  subject. 
Normally  the  coordination  of different  types of  research  studies  is  carried 
out  for  TEPSA  by  one  Institute.  In  this  case,  I  would  therefore  like  to  thank 
the  Institut  fur  Europaische  Politik,  led  by  Dr.  Wessels  in  collaboration  with 
Dr.  Schmuck  and  Professor  Grabitz,  for  coordinating  this  study. 
I  give  the  floor  now  to  Mr  Fernand  Herman,  Member  of  the  European  Parliament 
and  rapporteur  for  the  Institutional  Committee  of  the  European  Parliament. 
Mr  Fernand  HERMAN,  MEP,  General  rapporteur of  the  Committee  for  Institutional 
Affairs: 
Mr  Chairman,  colleagues,  ladies and  gentlemen,  one  of  the  conclusions  drawn  by 
the  Institutional  Committee  in  its first  interim  report  on  the  strategies of 
the  European  Parliament  was  to organise  conferences  and  symposia  including on 
the  one  hand  scientists and  experts  in this field,  and  on  the  other 
representatives of national  parliaments.  We  felt  it was  a  good  thing to have 
an  exchange  of  views  and  perhaps  at  the  end  of the day  we  will  be  able  to  put 
some  order into our  house. 
It is a  good  thing to see  that  the first  conclusion that  has  been  drawn  by  the 
Institutional  Committee  is being  crowned  by  extremely fruitful  work,  and  I 
would  therefore  like to thank  TEPSA  very  much  for  the work  that  it has  done. 
Because  in fact  the conclusions  which  earlier speakers  have  put  forward  very 
much  coincide with  just  about  all the points  raised  in our  Committee.  In 
addition, their contributions  have  introduced a  series of  new  ideas,  and  I  am 
sure that  we  will  be  able  to  benefit  from  all these  ideas. 
We  know  that  the building of  Europe  is not  just something  that  is  sui  generis 
but  something  which  is  very  much  evolutionary in its process.  When  we  talk 
about  evolution  we  talk about  the  European  Parliament  as  the driving  force  of 
this evolution  and  this differentiates the  European  Parliament  considerably 
- 95  -from  national  parliaments.  Most  national  parliaments  work  within  a  more  or 
less  stable  context,  I  say  more  or  Less  because  their  powers  are  relatively 
clearly defined,  and  they  play  a  role  within  a  system  which  already exists  and 
which  has  already  been  defined. 
As  far  as  Europe  is  concerned  however  everything  is  constantly on  the  move. 
It  looks  as  if the  Commission  has  reached  the  limits  of  possibility  in 
exercising  its dual  roles  as  originator of  legislation  and  as  the  driving 
force  towards  the  development  of  the  Community,  particularly as  the 
achievement  of  the  latter will  not  be  easy. 
We  in  the  Parliament  often discuss  its  future  role.  Some  argue  that 
Parliament  should  seek  to augment  its powers  without  regard  to  the other 
institutions, which  have  sufficient  power  themselves.  I  believe  this 
argument  is  false.  In  assuming  the  function  of  the driving  force  towards 
integration,  Parliament  should  take  account  of the  other  institutions,  as  it 
has  done  in  the  'Committology'  case. 
Here  Parliament  intervened to  protect  the  autonomy  of  the  Commission,  but  the 
judgement  of the  Court  of  Justice  provokes  many  questions.  Not  only  does  the 
judgement  appear  to  conflict with  existing  jurisprudence,  but  it confronts  us 
with  the  question of the  exact  function of each  institution  in  seeking  respect 
for  the  Treaties.  Up  to  now  we  had  thought  that  any  institution which 
considered that  the  Treaties were  being  infringed  could  seek  a  judgement  from 
the  Court. 
Now  it appears  that this is not  so, because  the  Commission  will  have  to  defend 
the  interests of Parliament  when  they are  called into question  by  a  decision 
taken  by  another institution.  But  in  many  eases  the  interests of  the 
Commission  and  of Parliament  are  not  coterminous,  and  can  at  times  be  opposed 
to  each  other, and  the  ~anner in which  the  Commission  can  defend  Parliament's 
interests  when  these  are  in  jeopardy presents  a  serious  problem. 
I  believe that  Parliament  should base its action on  two  principles.  The 
first  is that  of  the double  legitimacy - on  the one  hand  of the States,  which 
is  incontrovertible and  substantive,  and  on  the other of the citizens of  the 
Community,  which  is greater than  the  sum  of purely national  interests. 
- 96  -The  second  principle  is that of  the  common  benefit  (subsidiarity).  It  is 
vital  to  emphasise  its  importance  at  a  moment  when  certain  Member  States  argue 
strongly against  the  creation  of  a  European  'super-state',  which  will 
steam-roller national  identities.  The  principle of  common  benefit  and  the 
continued  existence of  national  states  is  a  fundamental  one,  which  Parliament 
must  defend  and,  in  so  doing,  exercise  self  restraint.  Why?  Because  all 
Parliaments  are  tempted- as  are  we  ourselves- to  seek  the  greatest  power 
possible  and  to  meddle  in  matters  which  are  better dealt  with  by  other  bodies. 
So  we  must  spell  out  these  two  principles,  and  continue  to  evolve  them  as  we 
are  already doing. 
A major  step  forward  has  been  achieved  in  regard  to  legislative powers.  As 
Vice  President  ANORIESSEN  said, if the  Delors-Tindemans  amendment  to  the  draft 
Single  Act  had  been  adopted,  we  should  by  now  have  been  well  on  the  way  to 
quasi  co-decision.  In  my  view  the  fact  that  the  Council  is not  subject  to  a 
deadline  for  taking  a  final  decision  is  a  serious drawback  in the 
decision-making  process.  The  need  for  unanimity  in  deciding  on  fiscal 
harmonisation  may  prevent  this  1992  objective  from  being achieved,  and  the 
lack  of  a  deadline  for  Council  decision-making  will  have  the  same  effect.  I 
persist  in  thinking  that  the  solution  lies  in  the  proposal  that  if the  Council 
does  not  take  a  decision within  a  c~rtain time,  then  Parliament,  basing itself 
on  the principle of double  legitimacy,  could do  so.  This  would  be  one  way  of 
moving  towards  the final  aim  of  co-decision on  legislation. 
As  regards  the budgetary  role of  Parliament,  we  find  the  same  situation.  We 
have  made  pro~ess despite crises and  difficulties, but  once  again  the  way 
ahead  lies  in  the difficult art of  compromise,  which  demands  moderation  above 
all.  We  are  now  further  ahead  of  some  national  Parliaments  as  regards 
budgetary powers,  particularly in  regard to expenditure.  But  much  remains  to 
be  achieved,  especially  in the  important  fields  of financial  autonomy  and  the 
fiscal  powers  of the  Community  itself, which  should  be  our  aim. 
I  turn  now  to  control  of the executive  and  to  its  legitimation,  and  here  some 
useful  small  steps  forward  have  been  ta~en.  In  the Solemn  Declaration of 
Stuttgart the  Governments  undertook  to  consult  Parliament  before  the 
nomination of  the  ~resident of the  Commission.  But  we  must  go  further,  and 
- 97  -the  vote  of  investiture provided  for  in our  Rules  must  be  tried out,  and 
linked  with  the  vote  of  censure.  For  example  a  Commission,  some  of  whose 
members  were  nominated  by  Governments  in  a  manner  which  infringed the 
Treaties,  or  whose  members  clearly did  not  enjoy  the  confidence  of  the  large 
majority  of  Parliament's  Members,  would  be  open  to  a  vote of  censure,  linked 
with  the  vote  on  its investiture.  This  is  a  path  along  which  Parliament 
should  advance. 
Moving  now  to  the strategy of  Parliament  in  the  longer-term,  I  thought  that 
TEPSA's  ideas  were  interesting,  but  three  further  elements  should  be  added. 
The  first  is  the  conjuncture of  1992  itself, coupled  with  the  fact  that  the 
internal  market  will  call  both  for  stronger  monetary  integration and  for  a 
quasi  government  of  the  Community,  in  particular  to  manage  relations  with 
third countries.  This  multiple  conjuncture  gives  Parliament  the 
justification and  opportunity  to  put  forward  in  1992  a  proposal  for  revision 
of  the  Treaties. 
But  further  elements  exist  in  Parliament's  future  strategy in  the  form  of 
levers  usable at  present  by  Parliament.  And  the most  important  is the  assent 
required  from  Parliament  to proposals  for  the accession of third countries. 
As  the  internal  market  comes  into being,  pressures  for  enlargement  will 
increase.  If  Parliament  resists the  temptation to throw  open  the doors  to 
everyone,  and  decides  to  safeguard what  has  been  achieved  in  integration,  the 
logical  outcome  is to seek  to  strengthen  the  institutional  structure. 
Whereas  national  Parliaments  won  their powers  by  wielding  the  instrument  of 
the  power  to tax, the  European  Parliament  now  possesses  a similar instrument  -
th  assent  procedure - which  it can  use  to  seek  wider  competences. 
It  is not  a  ease of hindering the  long-term  process  of the  enlargement of the 
Community,  but  of ensuring that  enlargement  does  not  result  in  total dilution 
of the  Community's  coherence  and  of  the  progress  realised towards  European 
Union.  This  imperative  coincides  in  turn  with  the need  to  reform  both  the 
decision-making  procedure  and  Community's  ability to  conduct  a  coherent 
monetary  policy  and  also a  commercial  policy vis-a-vis major  third countries. 
Thus  the  conjuncture of  the date of  1992,  the  policy needs  and  the  instrument 
in  Parliament's  hands  offers  to it an  enormous  opportunity, which  Parliament 
must  seize,  and  seize in  cooperation with  the national  Parliaments. 
- 98  -No-one  can  wish  as  much  as  I  do  that  the  national  Parliaments  should  be 
associated  with  this  strategy of  the  European  Parliament.  ~nd this  process 
is  already  under  way.  President  NOTHOMB's  proposal  for  meetings  between 
committees  of  the  European  Parliament  and  national  Parliaments  is  in  course  of 
being  realised.  For  example,  our  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs 
has  met  nine  delegations  from  national  Parliaments  to  discuss  fiscal 
harmonisation,  and  the  Institutional  Committee  has  met  two  or  three 
delegations,  in  order  to  discuss  institutional questions.  Without  this  type 
of  collaboration  with  national  Parliaments,  our  strategy will  not  succeed. 
I  would  like  to  conclude  by  recalling one  of  Jean  Monnet's  principles, which 
was,  'If you  wish  to  bring  about  institutional  change,  link it to  an  aim  which 
everyone  can  understand'.  The  Single  Act  and  the  internal  market  have  given 
a  new  impetus  to  Europe  because  of  the  operation of this principle of  Monnet. 
This  situation creates  the  possibility of setting a  new  objective- that of 
economic  and  monetary  union,  a  consensus  in  favour  of  which  is gradually 
developing.  To  this objective,  therefore  should be  linked  that  of sufficient 
institutional  reform  to enable  monetary  union·to  be  achieved.  But  at  the 
same  time  the  principle of  common  benefit  {subsidiarity)  remains  of 
fundamental  importance,  as  does  Parliament's opportunity to use  the  new 
instrument  offered to  it by  the  assent  procedure. 
In  order  to  carry forward  its strategy to  a  successful  outcome,  there  are  two 
further  approaches  which  Parliament  must  use,  of  which  one  is broadly agreed 
and  the other is controversial.  In a  battle situation, there  are  two  methods 
of  overcoming  the  enemy;  to  outflank  him,  or to divide  him.  The  outflanking 
tactic  requires  Parliament  to bring pressure on  governments  indirectly, that 
is, by  mobilising opinion  in the Member  States.  If Parliament  can  explain  to 
the  trade unions,  the  employers•  organisations,  the  public,  the  media  and  to 
academic  and  other circles the  need  for  European  integration,  the  cost  of 
non-Europe  and  so  on,  these bodies  will  take  the  governments  in the  rear,  as 
it were,  and  oblige them  to accept  indirectly changes  which,  put directly to 
them,  they  would  probably  refuse. 
The  second  tactical  approach  is to  face  up  to  the  fact  that, of the twelve 
Governments,  some  are  ready  to  move  towards  greater  integration while  others 
are  not.  The  question  is whether  Parliament  should not  try to persuade  those 
- 99  -which  are  ready  to  make  progress  to  do  so,  Leaving  the others  to  follow  later. 
The  experience  of  the  DOOGE  Committee  shows  that  this  tactic  can  be  very 
successful,  but  that  it wilt  only  work  if the  bloc  of  the  'progressives' 
remains  united. 
So,  Mr  President,  I  conclude  these  rather brief  thoughts  on  Parliament's 
strategy by  thanking  TEPSA,  which  has  shown  that  it has  understood  many  of our 
problems;  the  solutions  which  it proposes  witt  certainly  inspire  many 
discussions  between  us,  and  I  am  grateful  for  that. 
Professor J.  VANDA~: 
Thank  you  Mr  Herman.  '  Your  comments  will  most  certainly be  taken  into  account 
in  the  course  of  our  debates  this  afternoon  and  tomorrow  morning  on  the 
strategies  of  the  European  Parliament,  and  you  have  come  up  with  some 
extremely useful  suggestions on  this  topic.  I  now  give the floor  to  Mr  Hugh 
DYKES,  who  is  representing the  Speaker  of the  House  of  Commons. 
filr  Hugh  DYKES,  Chairman  of  the  European  Group  of  the  House  of  Co111110ns  and 
House  of Lords: 
Thank  you  very  much  Mr  Chairman.  I  shall  be  very brief because  of  the  lack 
of  time  but  I  must  particularly express  the greetings  to thls  Symposium  of the 
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons  who  is  sad  that  he  cannot  be  here  on  this 
occasion.  The  exigencies  of  the  closing of  one  session  and  the  opening  of 
the  new  session  of  Parliament  next  week  prevented  him  from  coming,  but  he 
se-nds  his  very  g.ood  wishes.  I  am  grateful  to  be  here  in  his  place  as  the 
Chairman  of  the  All  Party Europe  Group  of  the  House  of  Commons  and  the  House 
of  Lords.  The  Single  European  Act  introduced  a  new  dimension  into  the 
Community's  development  as  we  know.  The  extension  of  tne  European 
Parliament's  role,  the new  titles on  economic  and  social  cohesion,  research 
and  technological  development  and  the environment,  and  the  formal  introduction 
of  a  framework  of  political  cooperation  are  vital  developments  in  the 
Community.  But  th-ere  is  a  consequent  need  for  the  procedures  of  national 
democratic  accountability and  control  to keep  pace  with  these developments. 
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~nd to  Germany  as  being  the  only  two  countries  of  the  Twelve  in  the  Community 
that  have  such  scrutiny  arrangements.  Structurally  the  House  of  Commonst 
scrutiny  arrangements,  which  were  launched  in  1974,  have  proved  to  be 
efficient  in  coping  with  the  changes  in  the  Legislative  field.  The  House 
endeavours  to  debate  proposals  before  a  common  position  is  adopted  by  the 
Council  whenever  that  is  feasible,  in  order  to  bring  its  influence  to  bear  at 
a  time  when  it can  be  most  effective.  However  the  cooperation  procedure  has 
in  fact  inc rea  sed  rather  than  dec rea sed  the  opportunities  for  the  House  of 
Commons,  particularly  as  the  House  of  Lords  has  a  somewhat  different  role  of 
examination  and  investigation. 
European  Political  Cooperation  also  falls  within  the  scope  of  the  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  of  the House  of  Commons  and  opportunities for  the  Commons  to 
consider  this  arise  both  in  the  regular  debates  held  on  the  White  Paper  on 
developments  in  the  European  Economic  Community  published  by  the  Government 
more  or  tess  every  six  months,  and  also  in  the  regular monthly oral  questions 
to  the  F.orei gn  Office.  The  remit  and  reference  points  of  the  Select 
Committee  on  European  Legislation,  of  which  I  am  one  of  the  senior 
Conservative  members,  to  report  on  the  legal  importance  of  proposals  also 
provides  it  with  an  oppo~tunity  to  monitor  the  proposed  use  by  the 
institutions  of  the  new  powers  conferred  on  them  by  the  Single  European  Act. 
This  helps  to  ensure  that  Community  legislation  which  will  have  a  binding 
effect  in  the  United  Kingdom  has  a  sound  and  legitimate treaty  basis.  The 
Committee  has  given  particular  attention  in  this  context  to  the  extent  and 
significance of the overlap of  various  treaty powers. 
One  area which  has  been  of particular interest to  the  Committee  in the  context 
of  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  is  the  relationship  between  Article 
100A  and  other  treaty articles.  There  are  of  course  those  who  took  beyond 
the  completion  of  the  internal  market  in  1992  to  closer  European  integration 
and  European  Union,  an  area  in  which  the  Institutional  Affairs  Committee  of 
the  European  Parliament  is  presently  developing  some  very  important 
initiatives.  As  the  European  Parliament  has  recognised,  it is essential  that 
discussion  of  these  issues  involves  National  Parliaments  too.  It  is  the 
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national  electorates  and  their members  who  will  consequently  account  for  them 
to  the  people  of  each  nation. 
These,  Mr  Chairman,  are  the  words  I  wish  to  say  on  behalf  of  Mr  Speaker. 
Concluding  personally,  may  I  also  join  my  remarks  to  the  best  wishes  from  Mr 
Speaker  to  the  Symposium.  I  regard  it  as  a  great  honour  and  privilege  and 
extremely  interesting  to  be  here.  Contrary  to  certain  rumours  that  the 
United  Kingdom  is  not  in  its  parliamentary  form  an  enthusiastic  European 
member  I  think  I  can  speak  on  behalf  of  the  built-in  majority,  and  also  a 
growing  number  of  Labour  MPs  as  well,  and  say  that it is  not  true.  In  fact 
there  is  enormous  enthusiasm for  these  developments  in  Britain,  even  although 
there  may  be  understandable  hesitations  in  certain quarters,  hesitations  which 
I  consider  to  be  temporary  rather  than  permanent.  Thank  you  very  much. 
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Mr  ENRIQUE  BARON  CRESPO,  Vice-President  of  the  European  Parliament,  in  the 
Chair. 
Vice-President  BARON:  This  is  the  closing session of  the  Symposium.  First  I 
would  like  to  give  you  the  apologies  of  Mrs  Veil,  who  owing  to  political  and 
parliamentary  commitments  has  had  to  go  to  Portugal  today.  This  means  that 
she  cannot  unfortunately be  with  us,  in  spite of  the  great  interest  that  she 
has  shown  in  the  work  of  the  Symposium. 
We  commence  with  the  reports  by  the 'General  Rapporteurs  on  the  three Working 
Groups.  First  I  would  invite  Professor  Jean-Victor  Louis  to  report  on  Working 
Group  2. 
Professor Jean-Victor LOUIS,  Free  University of Brussels:  Chairman,  ladies 
and  gentlemen,  Working  Group  2 was  asked  to  look  more  closely into the 
institutional  role of  the  European  Parliament.  There  were  two  specific parts 
to  the  working  programme:  we  were  first of all  requested  to  look  into the 
implications of  the  Single  European  Act  and  its beneficial effects  on  the 
European  Parliament,  and  second,  to  look  into the strategy for  institutional 
reform.  We  had  to  look  in particular into the  role of the  European  Parliament 
as  a  permanent  constituent  body.  Although  it was  rather difficult to draw  a 
distinction between  the various  aspects of the present  and  the  future 
situation,  I  will try to  retain this distinction in  my  summary. 
In  regard to the  impact  of  the  Single  European  Act  on  the  European  Parliament, 
I  do  not  intend to  recapitulate the  contents of the  papers,  such  as  those of 
Professor  Constantinesco,  Mr  Corbett,  Dr  Pinder  and  Dr  Schmuck.  In  Mr 
Corbett's  report,  which  was  written  jointly with  Mr  Jacobs,  a  view  was 
expressed that  was  generally  shared  by  all.  As  a  result·of the cooperation 
procedure  and  of its role  as  a  co-decision maker  on  external affairs, the 
European  Parliament  has  succeeded,  in at  least  some  aspects .of  Community 
competences,  to manoeuvre  itself several  steps  closer,  as  Mr  Corbett  said,  to 
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litmus  test  for  co-decision  making  and  this  term  was  in  fact  used  in  another 
paper  by  Mr  Corbett. 
Several  interventions  were  very  much  along  these  Lines,  except  possibly  for 
the  views  voiced  by  an  MEP,  Mr  Hansch.  For  him,  the  problem  with  the 
Parliament  is  that  it has  mostly  negative  powers  and  still doesn't  have  any 
power  of  co-decision.  Whatever  might  have  been  achieved  as  a  result of  the 
implementation  of  the  Single  European  Act  is  considered quite  insufficient. 
The  ability of  the  European  Parliament  to  give  its opinion  on  association 
agreements  and  accession  agreements  was  considered  by  Mr  Hansch  to be 
insufficient,  because  a  minority  could  block  an  association  agreement.  In 
fact  it  is  important  to  have  an  absolute  majority  in  order  to  approve 
important  decisions  as  well  as  to  reject  them. 
So  on  the  whole  Mr  Hansch's  views  were  rather negative whereas  when 
Mrs  Vayssade,  MEP,  spoke  we  were  given  an  idea  of  the  positive aspects  which 
are  contained  in  the  warp  and  weft  of  the  Single  Act  and  which  could  be  very 
beneficial  to  the  Parliament.  Mrs  Vayssade  explained  that Members  of 
Parliament  were  well  aware  of  the  fact  that the first  reading  was  of  decisive 
importance.  All  the  detaits of  the  cooperation  procedure  shou~d be  re-read, 
picked  through  and  turned over  from  every  angle  so  that  the Treaty would  be  so 
sophisticated as  to  be  perfect.  So  a  lot of emphasis  had  been  put  on  the 
first  reading  which  was  made  wide  use  of by  the  Parliament  and  enhanced  its 
influence. 
According  to Mrs  Vayssade  it is clear that  parliamentary  committees  preparing 
a  first  reading-act  in  a  sort of  inter-governmental  way.  For  instance  the 
first  reading of  the text  on  the structural  funds  this  year  was  discussed  in a 
way  very  similar to the approach  taken  at  inter-governmental  conferences. 
Everyone  expressed their views  but  no-one  was  in  a  position to veto  anything 
because  they all  knew  that  at  the  end  of the day  the  voting procedure  in 
Council  was  organised  in  such  a  way  that no  country would  ever be  in  a 
position  to disrupt  the  whole  procedure.  So  the  discussion  had  a  strong 
national  overtone,  but  there  was  always  a  realistic  sense  of  compromise  and 
the necessary  awareness  that it was  important  to  come  to  some  sort of 
consensus  which  was  not  only  acceptable to the Council  but  also met  with  the 
views  of  the  majority of  the  members  of  the  House.  Participants  in  Working 
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attitude  was  not·as  negative  as  all  that  or  not  as  exclusively  a  negative 
power  as  Mr  Hansch  had  seemed  to  imply,  but  that  there  was  also quite 
definitely  a  positive generating  power  in  the  Parliament. 
There  was  no  direct dialogue  with  the  Council,  which  is  an  important  point  to 
note.  Any  such  dialogue  always  used  an  intermediary  such  as  the  Commission, 
and  !  think  it was  Professor  Constantinesco  who  pointed out  that  cooperation 
strengthens  the  role of  the  Commission  because  the  Commission  acts  as  a 
go-between  in  any  indirect  relations  between  the  Council  and  the  Parliament. 
He  thought  it was  important  that  members  of the  Council  were  directly put  in 
touch  with  leaders of political  groups,  chairmen  of  committees  and  on  the 
other  side  MEPs  with  members  of  the  permanent  representations  to  the 
Communities,  but  that  this direct  relationship should  not  replace  any  other 
form  of  closer cooperation  between  the  Council  and  Parliament.  Mr  Blumenfeld, 
in  his  report  on  the  relations between  Parliament  and  the  Council,  had  felt 
for  instance  that  Council  representatives  should  be  far  more  active  in the 
work  of  committees,  because  obviously  an  opinion  or  a  first  reading  and 
ultimately  the  whole  cooperation  procedure  would  largely depend  on  this  type 
of  cooperation. 
So  it now  seems  that  the  Parliament's  role is that  of  a  legislative power 
which  is  slowly  increasing,  but  Mr  Hansch  is  right  in  saying that it has  not 
reached  the  extent  at  which  one  can  consider  Parliament  as  a  co-decision_ 
maker.  And  it would  of  course  be  important  to  see  that  the  Council  could 
never over-ride a  vote  cast  by  the  House  with  an  absolute  majority.  The 
benzene  case  has  shown  that the attitude of  the Parliament  does  not 
necessarily require the Council  to  reject  such  a  common  position  and  possibly 
one  would  have  to take  another example  to  see what  could  happen  but  I  do  think 
the  most  important  thing  is that  the  threat  looming  large over  the  Council 
should  be  a  realistic threat. 
Various  colleagues  felt that it was  amazing  to see  that  the  cooperation 
procedure  had  so  far worked  so  smoothly.  One  would  like to  regard  the 
European  Parliament  as  a  trouble-making  institution, a  b9dy  which  really put  a 
spoke  in  the  wheel  and  prevented governments  from  working  out  the  decisions 
themselves.  So  far  a  number  of decisions  have  been  taken  which  have  left the 
Parliament  out,  since the  Parliament  has  agreed,  for  example,  not  to  be 
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observations  can  be  made  as  far  as  international  agreements  are  concerned. 
For  example  there  were  association  agreements  where  the  Parliament  had  been 
left cut  in  the  cold  or  was  consulted after they'd  already  been  signed  instead 
of  on  a  prior basis  as  has  been  provided  for  in  the  rules  of  procedure  of  the 
Parliament.  So  the  Parliament,  I  think,  is  trying  to  play  the  1992  game, 
which  in  most  cases  is  a  good  thing.  On  the other  hand  some  opportunities  are 
Lost  to  develop  the  role  of  the  European  Parliament  as  a  co-legislator  or  as 
an  imminent  co-Legislator  and  to  have  the  cooperation  procedure  being  a  sort 
of  laboratory test  for  co-decision. 
At  the  same  time,  as  a  debating  forum  the  Parliament  is  losing  out,  and  this 
point  was  made  by  several  participants.  Some  colleagues  felt  that  it was 
regrettable that  Parliament  did  have  to  make  a  choice,  that  1992  was  a  too 
demanding  priority and  that  taking part  in  the  legislative process  seemed  to 
eliminate other  tasks.  On  the other  hand  the  Parliament  tried to be  the  voice 
of  European  conscience  in  the  world  and  at  the  same  time  listened to  the  moods 
of  the  nations,  but  the  latter two  functions  seemed  to  be  losing out  in  favour 
of  increasing  legislative powers. 
The  strategy of  the  Parliament  was  also discussed.  The  reports  had  insisted 
on  a  dual  approach:  on  the one  hand,  'to seek  more  juice  from  the  Treaty  as 
it is'  (J.  Pinder}  and  on  the other  hand,  to ask  for  a  reform  of the 
Community.  r  believe that the Parliament  has  to  conduct  this dual  strategy. 
It  has  to  try to  make  the most  out  of every  positive  legislative wind  that  is 
blowing  in its direction  and  it has  also to try to be  the  instrument  for 
institutional  reform. 
'Permanent  constituent'  seems  to  be  a  concept that  some  people  have  not 
entirely understood,  the  idea of the  Parliament meeting  as  an  assembly  where 
everybody  ~ould debate a  constitution for the future  European  union.  This  is 
of  course  not  at all the  image  and  is not  at  all the  idea of permanent 
constituent  power.  What  it means,  actually, is that  on  the one  hand  all 
parliamentary powers  should aim  at  developing  the competence  and  the powers  of 
the  Parliament  as  an  institution and  as  a  co-player.  It may  be  an  ambiguous 
word,  and  we  are all aware  of that, but  the  term  'co-player'  shows  at  least 
that  the  role  of  the  Parliament  would  come  closer to  that of,  for  instance, 
the  American  Congress  than that of  a  national parliament  in  the  Member  States. 
It 
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potential.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  institutional  reforms  are  inevitable, 
and  all  this despite  the  fact  that  one  sometimes  has  the  feeling  that  one 
should  not  overburden  the  Parliament  and  the  Community  itself, given  all  the_ 
work  that  it  has  to  do  to  be  ready  by  the  1992  deadline.  There  are  many 
reasons  indeed  which  will  justify an  institutional  move. 
The  1992  deadline  is  looming  larger  than  Life.  If  we  are  building  a  single 
market  which  is  well  balanced  and  which  has  full  solidarity and  expands  to  a 
true  economic  and  monetary  union,  we  need  a  centre of  economic  policy,  both 
efficient  and  democratic.  We  should  bear  in mind  of  course  that  you  can't 
have  the  Council  taking  its decisions  by  unanimous  vote,  for  the  management  of 
a  proper  economic  and  monetary  union,  because,  as  you  know,  on  economic  and 
monetary  questions  a  unanimous  vote  is still the  rule  in  the  Council. 
Another  element  in  the  1992  conjuncture  is  contained  in  Article  30,  paragraph 
12  of  the  Single  Act,  which  stipulates that  five  years  after its entry  into  _ 
force  the  political cooperation procedure  is to be  reviewed,  and  the 
intervention of  the  Parliament  may  well  be  desirable  in  thi~. 
A further  point  on  conjuncture  relates  to  the  Community's  own  resources:  it 
has  been  pointed out  that  the  decisions  of  February  1988  and  the decisions 
taken  in  June  on  own  resources  and  budgetary discipline will  remain  in  force 
until  1992.  There  will  be  another opportunity to  reflect on  the financial 
autonomy  and  the fiscal  power  of  the  Community  and  a  possible increase  in the 
Parliament's  powers. 
There  is another thing to be  borne  in mind.  After  1992  the  Commission  will 
have  seriously to consider any  further  enlargement.  We  can't  keep  the 
requests  from  various  applicant  Member  States on  ice constantly by  saying  that 
we  are  too  busy  with  the  internal  market.  It's an  easy alibi, but  sooner  or 
later we  will  have  to  decide  among  ourselves  whether  we  want  to enlarge the 
Community  any  further  or not.  At  the  moment  we  keep  saying  we  can't afford to 
add  any  further  Member  States because  of the weakness  of an  institutional 
structure, but  at the  same  time  we  say  we  can't discuss  institutional  reform 
) 
either because  we  have  just  reformed  the  Treaty  and  we  now  have  to give 
priority to the  internal  market. 
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debated  yesterday,  referred  to  the  need  for  a  draft  of  economic  and  monetary 
union  to  be  woven  into  the  whole  Community  institutional  process.  This  is  not 
a  novelty  at  all, because  European  Union  was  after all  an  idea  which  aimed 
among  others  at  slotting  economic  and  monetary  union  into  the  overall 
legislative  and  decision-making  process  of  the  Community.  Now  we  mean  to  take 
this  a  lot  further,  for  example  by  the  creation of  a  European  Central  Bank, 
which  is  an  essential  part  of  our  future  monetary  policy.  This  implies  that 
the  European  Parliament  will  most  certainty want  to  have  a  say  in  this.  In 
the  United  States,  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
reports  to  Congress.  It  would  be  interesting to  provide  for  similar 
procedures  within  the  Com~unity.  More  generally,  the  building of  a  European 
monetary  union  would  imply  changes  in the  institutional  structure  and  that  is 
something  to  which  the  Parliament's attention should  be  constantly drawn. 
I  would  like  to  conclude  by  saying  that  the  Parliament  needs  a  few  allies  and 
friends  for  the  sake  of  progress,  but  who  will these  allies be?  What  about 
the  Court  of  Justice?  Is  the  Court  of  Justice a  friend of the Parliament? 
Could  we  still consider the  Court  as  an  ally, because  the  Parliament  might  be 
a  bit  shy,  having  been  bitten by  the  Court  of  Justice?  This  question  is 
something  that  should  remain  with  us.  It seems  that,  regretfully,  limits 
have  been  put  to the constructive  interpretation of the  Court. 
The  Commission  is another natural  ally of the  Parliament.  It is  in  the 
Parliament's interests to  keep  a  good  friendship  going  with  the  Commission 
because  its role  is to act  as  a  sort of  screen  between  the  Parliament  and  the 
Council.  Hence  very close  contacts  between  the  Commission  and  the  Parliament 
or  the  Commission  and  members  of the  Parliament  are definitely called for. 
As  regards  Parliament's  relations  with  the  Council,  permanent  cooperation 
would  be  very  useful  to  avoid  violent  clashes at the  stage of  second  readings. 
As  regards  cooperation  with  individual  governments,  the  Italian government  was 
the  only  one  mentioned  in  the  Pinder  report.  The  Italians have  always  been 
very  pro-European  and  pro-European  Parliament,  but  on  the  other  hand  we  see 
that, when  meeting  at  Council  level, that  same  Italian government  joins  hands 
with  the  other  eleven  unanimously  to  share  in decisions against  the 
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the  Italian government  is  not  the  only  one  playing  a  double  act  in  these 
situations. 
A final  ~ord on  the  Community's  impact  on  the  European  elections.  The  more 
the  Community  gets  involved  somehow  the  more  the  voters  are  turned  away.  The 
major  political parties  have  a  great  responsibility for  that.  They  have  not 
yet  devoted  enough  time  and  energy  and  money  to  European  matters.  Since  the 
Parliament  doesn't  seem  to  have  any  'true-blue'  friends  it is  important  for  it 
to  get  in  close  touch  with  the  political  parties  so  as  to  be  ready  to  animate 
public  opinion. 
The  public,  whenever  requested  to  express  its views  by  way  of  an  opinion poll, 
always  comes  down  in  favour  of  Europe  and  thinks  that the  Parliament  should  be 
given  more  powers  for  the benefit of  European  Union  and  to  bolster democracy. 
But  is it possible  to  continue  electing an  assembly  by  universal  suffrage if 
that  assembly  is not  given  sufficiently wide  powers  and  actual  co-decision 
making  functions  in  the  Community's  process? 
Vice-President  BARON:  Thank  you  very  much  Professor  Louis.  Thank  you  very 
much  indeed  for  having  been  so  concise.  Now  I  will  give  Professor  Verges  the 
floor  so  that  he  can  also give  us  a  summary  of what  wai done  in Working 
Group  1. 
Professor Jean  VERGES,  University of Paris I  (Pantheon,  Sorbonne):  Thank  you 
Mr  Chairman.  Ladies  and  gentlemen,  the brief that  was  given  to Working  Group 
1  was  quite a  tricky one.  What  we  had  to do  was  to  look  for  a  successful 
concept  and  measure  the  European  Parliament's  influence  in  main  policy  areas. 
This  is a  topic of obvious  importance  because  our task was  not  merely  to  look 
at  what  had  been  achieved  in  the past  by  institutions, nor  to  look  at  intended 
changes  in institutions, nor  even  at  how  the Parliament  reacts  in  its 
environment.  What  we  had  to do  was  to  look  at this matter  by  considering the 
final  purpose  of all this.  The  actions  taken  by  the institutions are  not  ends 
in  themselves  but  should  enable  Parliament  to exercise  its function  as 
efficiently as  possible by  showing  European  democracy  to the best  of their 
abilities.  We  were  asked  to  assess  the  performance  of  the  Parliament:  in 
other  words  'How  efficient is Parliament?'  At  the  same  time  we  should  look  at 
how  its performance  could be  improved. 
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his  preparatory document;  by  Dr  Wessels,  who  spoke  about  the  Parliament•s 
performance  since  1979  in  terms  of  policy  making  and  Professor  Pelkmans,  who 
considered  the  future,  namely  what  would  Parliament  be  doing  once  the  internal 
market  had  actually  been  completed.  Two  MEPs,  Mr  de  Vries  and  Mr  Prag,  gave 
us  the  benefit  of  their experience  and  also  spoke  about  their  vision of  how 
the  Parliament  works.  It  was  very  interesting to  hear  their  experience  and  to 
hear  it set  out  so  clearly.  It  is  not  an  easy  task  to  present  a  report  of  the 
ensuing  discussion,  in  that  it was  very full,  with  a  high  level  of debate. 
We  particularly focussed  our  attention on  three  main  topics  in  the  group. 
Firstly,  it is very difficult  to  assess  the  influence of  an  organisation  such 
as  the  Parliament,  to quantify  that  influence  and  the  way  in  which  it is 
brought  to  bear.  It  is also difficult  to  find  strategies  likely to  enable 
the  Parliament  to  increase  its  influence. 
I.  The  first  question  is  how  can  the  influence of  the  Parliament  be 
measured.  One  approach  would  be  to  adopt  a  Quantitative  measurement,  such  as 
the  number  of  resolutions or the  number  of oral  and  written Questions.  We 
were  told that  these  had  doubled  over  the  last  few  years.  There  are other 
quantitative measurements  that  can  be  attempted.  When  measuring  Quantities, 
one  could  perhaps  study the  relationship between  initiative  reports  and 
consultation  reports, or,  another possibility,  could  also  consider  the 
percentage of  amendments  which  have  been  accepted by  the  Commission  or the 
Council  of  Ministers  as  part of the cooperation  procedure.  An  interesting 
fact  worthy  of note  is that  from  July  1987  to October  1988,  72X  of all 
amendments  were  accepted  by  the  Commission  and  42X  were  accepted by  the 
Council  at first  reading  in the  cooperation  procedure.  I  think  that  these 
are  some  very  important  indicators of  inftuence,  but  that  they  do  not  really 
get  to  the  root  of things.  They  do  show  how  activity has  increased,  but  this 
increase  in activity does  not  necessarily  result  in  a  corresponding  increase 
in  influence. 
Another  matter  for  consideration  could be  the opinion that  its partners  have 
of  the  Parliament.  This  is  really a  long  term  influence  which  would  also  be 
shown  by  the turnout  at  European  elections.  First of all, what  does 
'influence'  actually mean?  How  does  one  define  parliamentary  influence? 
There  are  two  aspects  to this.  First  there is the influence that  a  parliament 
can  exercise when  it is  involved  in  ideas  and  debates  with  an  international 
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rights,  Africa,  baby  seals  or  even  babies  themselves.  What  Parliament  is 
trying  to  achieve  here  is  to  become  a  forum  and  thereby  have  a  general 
influence  on  all  these  matters  and  from  there  bring  indirect  influence  to  bear 
on  the  decision-~nkers themselves. 
There  is  another  sort of  influence,  i.e.  the  influence  which  Parliament  brings 
to  bear  when  considering  legislation,  when  dealing  with  budgetary  matters, 
when  passing  legislation and  when  exercising  its watchdog  function.  In  this 
field  one  can  see  what  sort  of  work  has  been  done  on  individual  proposals. 
Once  again  influence  cannot  be  measured  merely  in  terms  of  quantity:  one 
can't  just  count  the  number  of  motions,  amendments  and  resolutions  that  have 
been  approved.  Parliament's  influence  here  wilt  be  measured  in  a  different 
way.  Its  influence  is  felt  even  before  the  resolutions  are  adopted  and  is 
already  discernible  when  the  preparatory work  is being  done.  Sometimes  if you 
go  back  up  the  decision-making  chain  you  will often  find  that it is Parliament 
that  in  ter~s of  ideas  has  been  the  prime  mover,  that  what  the  Commission  says 
has  been  gleaned  from  parliamentary debates  and  that  Parliament  has  been  the 
driving  force  behind  many  main  ideas. 
II.  The  second  general  point  which  came  out  of this discussion  was  the  very 
specific  means  by  which  this  influence  is expressed  and  the  channels  by  which 
it is carried.  As  we  said,  the  Parliament  can  be  a  forum  for  discussion,  and 
it has  a  legislative  role  not  unlike  that of the  US  Congress;  it also  has  the 
possibility of  choosing its executive  and  being  involved  in  its composition. 
If one  uses  such  a  model  as  a  yardstick  one  may  be  tempted  to  think  that  the 
Parliament  has  not  been  terribly successful  in  any  of  these  functions.  It 
does  not  have  all of the  powers  that  its models  have.  The  European  Parliament 
is  by  no  means  the  US  Congress:  it does  not  have  the  latter's functions, 
neither does  it have  the gubernatorial  function  of  the  Bundestag.  So 
measured  against  those  yardsticks  it falls  short  of expectations.  But 
referring to  models  only gives  part of  the picture.  The  function  of the 
European  Parliament  is very sui  generis.  It might  be  rather banal  to  say so, 
but  I  think  we  do  have  to bear  that  in mind,  and  I  will  explain why.  The 
three functions  that  we  have  already  identified are  very  finely balanced,  as 
for  instance  between  being  a  forum  and  being  a  legislator.  It  is  important 
that  the  Assembly  has  the moral  authority which  will  allow  it to participate 
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its  legislative  powers  in  budgetary matters,  budgetary  control  and  things  of 
that  nature. 
It  is  of  course  a  great  drawback  that  the  European  Parliament  does  not  enjoy 
gubernatorial  functions.  At  the  moment  it is not  involved  in  the  appointment 
of  the  Commission.  This  absence  of  gubernatorial  function  means  that  the 
Commission  does  not  need  to  rely  on  majorities  and  that  therefore  there  is  no 
automatic  obligation  on  the  Parliament  to  support  a  government  that  it has 
chosen.  This  gives  it a  certain amount  of flexibility.  So  the  absence  of 
gubernatorial  function  can  to  some  extent  boost  the  legislative credibility of 
Parliament. 
III.  After  looking  at  how  the  Parliament  could  become  more  effective,  we 
Looked  at  certain strategies that  could  be  followed.  We  did  not  come  up  with 
any  original  ideas.  As  I  have  just said,  these strategies can  simply  be  a 
diversification of  the  bases  of the various  models  that  have  been  put  forward. 
Its  work  as  a  forum  enables it to  be  an  international tribunal to  some  extent; 
it can  express  its  ideas  on  the  main  issues  facing  the worla  today  a  fact 
which  confers on  the  Parliament  a  certain degree  of  influence.  It allows  it 
to  figure  in  the media  and  thus  to have  an  indirect effect on  the  formation  of 
world  public  opinion.  It does  in  fact  permit  Parliament  to  be  something  of  a 
world  conscie~e, thus  helping  it to bolster its overall  credibility, while  at 
the  same  time  requiring  Parliament  itself to  be  credible. 
What  we  are  trying to  do  here  is to  show  that the  Parliament  is not  merely 
involved  in the normative  work  of  the  Community,  that  is  Community  legislation 
and  the  invotvement  with  the  budget  where  it does  have  a  decision-making 
power.  Its  real  influence  lies  in  those  areas  where  its  rapporteurs  have  been 
able  to follow  through  the  implementation  of  a  piece of  legislation over  a 
number  of years.  Useful  though  this is, there are  a  lot of  areas which  still 
have  to  be  covered,  and  in  this field Parliament must  go  beyond  what  it has  so 
far  achieved. 
Let  us  think  about  the  follow-up  to  Community  decisions  in  future-years. 
There  may  well  be  a  follow-up  to  regulations and  directives and  there  could 
welt  be  a  follow-up  to  Court  of  Justice  rulings and  this would  offer 
Parliament  a  role of  scrutiny which  it could  easily fulfil.  On  a  personal 
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out  a  study  on  the  participation of  the  European  Parliament  in  the  development 
of  European  Legislation.  Now  things  have  changed  over  the  last  25  years, 
mainly  due  to  the  great  increase  in  Parliament's  power,  now  extended  to 
matters  such  ~s  cooperation,  conciliation,  and  budgetary  issues.  Parliament 
has  wide  monitoring  powers,  and  enjoys  joint  decision-making  powers  in certain 
areas,  regarding  accession  and  association  status  for  other  countries. 
So  things  have  changed,  but  the  basic  problems  are  still the  same. 
It  is necessary  to  improve  the  efficiency of  the  work  done  by  Parliament,  and 
here  the  choice  between  an  institutional  role  and  Community  work  has  always 
been  very tricky  indeed.  The  European  Parliament  wants  very  much  to  be  the 
driving  force  behind  the  construction of  Europe.  Members  want  that  to be 
their  role,  and  they  want  the  other  institutions to fulfil  that  function  as 
well. 
Perhaps  Members  would  not  be  living up  to  their vocation  if they were  not  to 
do  this.  But  if they overdo it they  may  well  disappoint  and  dash  the  hopes  of 
the  electorate.  The  road  they  have  to tread is not  always  an  easy one: 
there  is  a  very  fine  balance between  not  doing  enough  and  doing  too  much.  You 
have  of  course  to  convince  voters,  as  it is not  always  easy  to get  them  on 
their feet  and  off  to  the polls. 
We  do  have  to  convince  people  that this  is a  useful  institution,  and  that  the 
institution is doing  a  good  job of  work.  This  has  to  be  proven  however,  and  I 
think it is only fair to  say that the  Parliament  has  done  that.  I  think  the 
Parliament  has  certainly done  right  by  Europe,  but  that  is the privilege of 
democracy.  After all, all those  who  exercise power,  all those  who  ask  for 
power  are accountable:  they  have  to  justify the use  that  they  have  made  of 
that  acquired power.  That  is democracy,  that  is the parliamentary system,  and 
that  is  the  European  parliamentary system.  It is very  important  indeed that 
every  five  years  the  Parliament  is  accountable  to its electorate. 
Vice-President  BARON:  Thank  you  very much.  I  now  give the  floor  to 
Professor  Joseph  Weiler  who  will  give us  a  summary  of  what  was  done  in Working 
Group  3. 
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Group  3 dealt  with  the  so-called  interaction  function  of  the  European 
Parliament:  how  it  relates  to  voters  and  the  electorate  and,  to  a  lesser 
extent  how  it  relates  to  national  parliaments. 
I  shall  divide  my  Report  into  three parts.  I  shall  first  report  on  a  few 
methodological  observations  made  in  session.  Then  I  shall  survey  briefly the 
highlights  of  the  data  presented  in  the  papers.  Finally,  I  shall  report  the 
analysis  of  this  data  which  emerged  in  discussion. 
I  ~outd then  Like  to  start with  three methodological  comments  which  were  made 
by  some  of  the  rapporteurs. 
1.  When  we  talk  about  the  European  Parliament,  no  matter  in  which  context, 
we  inevitably utilise a  preconceived  notion of  what  'a parliament'  is, a 
notion  which  usually will  be  that  of  the  parliament  with  which  we  are  most 
familiar.  ~e  then  set  up  the  European  Parliament  against  that preconceived 
notion  and  draw  conclusions.  The  fact  of  the matter  is  that there  is no 
unified  concept  of  what  a  parliament  is or  should  be.  There  is a 
multiplicity of  concepts  and  those  concepts  are often defined  vaguely.  It  is 
worth  remembering  that  in  relation to any  function  which  parliaments  may 
fulfill, one  can  find  that  the  European  Parliament  performs  'better'  than  at 
least  one  state model.  !ts budgetary  powers  are  probably greater than  any 
similar parliament  in  Europe.  Its  legislative powers,  which  are quite  weak, 
are still higher  than  some  national  chambers  and  so  on  and  so  forth. 
2.  The  second  methodological  problem  is not  to get  drawn  into too  much 
discussion of  str~ture and  process.  In  evaluating  the  European  Parliament 
one  ought  to  look  at  the  substance  as  well:  what  are  the values that  are 
actually being  taken  up?  What  are the  concrete achievements  and  failures? 
One  can  have  a  perfectly democratic  parliament  in  terms  of  representation 
which  will  do  pretty awful  things. 
3.  The  final  methodological  problem  which  affects what  I  have  to say  is  the 
usual  problem  of  the  half empty  -- half  full  glass.  I  shall shortly be 
talking about  voter turnout.  In  relation to the  European  Parliament  it is 
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on  one's  expectations. 
ways  around  it. 
This  is  a  dilemma  and  we  shall  have  to  try  and  find 
It  is  possible  to  organise  Group  3  discussion  around  a  basic  paradox.  The 
If  paradox  of  the  interaction  function  of  Parliament  is  very  simply  stated. 
we  Look  at  the  situation of  the  Community  (not  of  the  Parliament)  over  the 
last  three  decades  it becomes  clear that  the  so-called democracy  deficit of 
the  Community  has  been  growing.  The  stages  of  this growth  are  easy  to 
define.  The  1960s  were  characterised by  the  constitutional  revolution 
whereby  the  norms  of  the  European  Community  were  declared  to  have  direct 
effect, to  be  supreme,  and  to  have  the  backing of  a  relatively efficient 
judicial  structure  behind  them  to  give  them  effective  force.  This 
constitutional  revolution  paradoxically established  the democratic  deficit. 
When  th~ Council  of  Ministers  passes  regulations  which  are  binding,  supreme, 
with  effective  judicial  enforcement  and  there  is  no  parliamentary  check,  it 
accentuates  the  democratic  deficit.  By  contrast  if the  Community  were  to 
pass  laws  which  can  then  be  set aside by  the  Member  States, it would  not 
matter  so  much  that  the  Treaty provided  for  so  little parliamentary control. 
The  1970s,  the  second  phase,  were  characterised by  an  expansion  of  Community 
competencies.  If  we  Look  at  a  small  indicator,  the  usage  of  Article  235,  it 
grew  dramatically  from  1973  onwards,  and  this  by  design.  The  Community  went 
into  a  whole  range  of activities often not  even  contemplated  in  the  Treaty and 
only derived  implicitly from  the  powers  granted it by  the  Treaty.  Again  that 
enhanced  and  accentuated the problem  of  the  democracy  deficit because  this 
legislation was  not only binding and  supreme  but  was  growing  into areas  with 
great  social  importance,  not  legitimised specifically in the Treaties,  and  yet 
still with  no  real  parliamentary accountability. 
In  the  1980s,  the  last  phase,  the deficit  was  yet  again  enhanced  with  the 
increase  in  the number  of  Member  States of the  Community.  The  original 
number  of  Member  States  was  doubled  with,  for  want  of a  better term,  more 
difficult social  problems  coming  up  in the  North-South  cleavage,  and  with  an 
intense  institutional  debate  on  the  future of the  Community.  And  at  the  same 
time,  if we  look  very  closely we  discover that  in a  large number  of  cases the 
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takes  away  from  national  ~arliaments at  Least  some  vestige  of  control  and  thus 
removes  democratic  accountability  even  at  that  level. 
If  w~  put  all this  together,  we  come  to  see  the  basic  paradox.  One  would 
have  expected  that  this  process  of  growing  deficit  would  be  accompanied  by  a 
corresponding,  growing  increase  in  the  mobilising  power  of  the  European 
Parliament.  One  could  have  expected  that  national  parliaments,  seeing  the 
transfer of  power  to  a  Council  of  Ministers  devoid  of  parliamentary control, 
~ould seek  out  some  sort  of alliance with  the  European  Parliament.  One  could 
have  expected  that  social  groups  in  Member  States,  seeing  the  transfer of 
powers  to  Brussels,  would  seek  alliances  in  Strasbourg.  And,  finally,  one 
would  have  expected a  growing  interest  by  voters  in  their  MEPs  and  in  the 
European  Parliament.  And  yet  the  rapporteurs  tell us,  and  it corresponds  to 
our  general  knowledge,  that  this  is not  happening,  or at  least  has  not 
happened  to  a  degree  which  one  would  have  expected  and  hoped. 
If  we  take  voter  turnout,  we  see  that it is at  the  sor.  level  on  average,  and 
in  many  States  less.  We  can  argue  if that  is  high  or  low.·  But  when  we 
learn  that  voter  turnout  is declining,  this  can  only be  negative.  <It  solves 
the  methodological  dilemma  of  an  empty  or full glass>.  If in 1984  the 
turnout  is  lower  than  in  1979,  and  if people get  up  here  and,  in  my  view 
credibly,  say that  unless  something  dramatic  happens  between  now  and  the 
election this  year  they predict  the turnout  - 1992  hype  notwithstanding - to 
be  even  lower,  than  something  is  happening  which  cannot  leave  the  European 
Parliament  complacent. 
Support  for  increase in  power  of  the  European  Parliament  is another  issue with 
which  to test the  interactive  function  of Parliament.  Does  the electorate, 
do  European  citizens, support  an  increase  in  the  power  of  the  European 
Parliament?  The  reply  we  heard  in Group  3  is that about  50%  do  support  an 
increase  in  the  powers  of the  Parliament.  And  again  one  could  wonder  if this 
figure  is  high  or  low.  But  the  trend is declining.  Less  and  less people, 
we  heard  in  the session, are  supporting an  increase in the powers  of the 
Parliament.  That  is a  sign  on  the wall  that  is  not  ambiguous. 
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we  heard  in  our  Working  Group  that  the  quality  is  Low  by  comparison  to  the 
quality of dialogue  between  national  deputies  and  their electorate.  The 
number  of  encounters  is  lower,  the  quality,  by  the  indicators  developed  by  our 
reports,  is  lower,  and  the  ignorance  is  greater.  People  frequently  do  not 
know  their  MEPs  nor  do  they  know  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Parliament  - an 
ignorance  greater  than  comparable  national  scenarios. 
The  next  set  of  empirical  data  that  came  to  the  attention of  Working  Group  3 
was  the  quality of  dialogue  with  national  parliaments.  Here  the  picture 
often varies.  Generalisations  are  suspect.  What  is  true  for  Belgium  is  not 
true  for  France  and  so  forth.  In  some  parliaments,  notably  the  Belgian 
Parliament,  they  have  explored  new  models  of  cooperation.  But  the  general 
picture  which  emerged  was  one  of hostility.  A lack  of  confidence  in  MEPs, 
which  even  translates  into treating  MEPs  in  the party  hierarchy  - one 
mediating  instrument  between  the  European  Parliament  and  national  parliaments 
- as  second  rate  citizens. 
This  again  is  not  a  picture  which  suggests  a  concern  by  national  parliaments 
to  the  accentuation  of  the  democratic  deficit, and  not  an  image  which  suggests 
the  mobilisation necessary  for  a  good  inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
So  much  then  for  describing  the picture.  How  do  we  analyse  it?  Here  I  must 
be  much  less  dramatic  because  the  analysis  is  speculative;  the  Group  just 
threw  out  ideas. 
In  discussing  and  explaining  low  turnout  the first  explanation  was  the  most 
obvious  explanation:  that  of the vicious  circle.  If the  European  Parliament 
is not  an  important  intersection of power  in  Community  life it is only to be 
expected that voter  interest will  be  low.  It is  low  in  municipal  elections, 
it is  low  in  any  elections  where  the  stakes  are  low.  Why  do  I  say a  vicious 
circle?  If there  is  no  power  there  is  no  voter turnout,  if there  is  no  voter 
turnout  there  is no  power.  One  cannot  get  around  that,  and  since it is 
pointed out  that this  Chamber  does  not  dispose of the  power  it ought  to  have 
it is  not  surprising that it is difficult  to elicit voter attention.  It 
simply  does  not  matter  to  the voters  who  is elected. 
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of  the  twelve  Member  States,  the  direct  public  expenditure  of  the  European 
Co~munities is  a  mere  2~ of  total  national  public  expenditure. 
Third,  the  Parliament  in  the  eyes  of  the electorate - and  that  again  is proven 
by  empirical  analysis  in the  Euro-barometer  data  - is often  (and  to  me  this 
was  counter-intuitive)  synonymous  with  'Europe'.  The  questionnaires  asked: 
When  you  think  of  Europe,  what  do  you  think  of  first?  The  answer  was,  the 
European  Parliament.  So  if this  Parliament  means  Europe,  a  low  turnout  means 
possibly  a  low  turnout  for  Europe,  which  means  that  the  interactive  functions 
of  Parliament  suffer  from  a general  lack  of  interest  in  Europe. 
infra.) 
<But  see 
The  final  explanation  which  was  given  was  so-called  rational  voting.  A 
rational  voter  would  say:  Why  should  we  strengthen the  European  Parliament? 
If  I  am  interested in  pursuing  sectoral  interests or  my  specific  interest, is 
the  Parliament  going  to speak  for  me?  Or  am  I  going  to get  a  strong voice  in 
the  Community  through  my  Minister, or  through  some  other  forum?  Maybe  the 
rational  voters  say,  the  real  game  is  not  Strasbourg,  why  should  I  enhance  the 
power  of  the  European  Parliament,  and  what  confidence  do  I  really have  that 
through  that  channel  my  sectoral interest  will  be  vindicated?  This 
expl3nation  provoked  a  very  strong debate,  but  at  least  I  mention  it to  give  a 
reflection of  our discussion. 
Lastly,  very dramatically one  of our  rapporteurs  (Dr.  Reif)  said:  I  expect 
that  at  these  coming  elections,  turnout will  be  less than  SOX  and  the 
headlines will  read the day  after:  'Vote of no  confidence  in  Europe,  less 
than  50%  turnout'.  Is that  correct?  Is  a  vote of  less  than  50%,  a  turnout 
of  50%,  a  vote of no  confidence  in  Europe?  We  should be  cautious.  One  of 
the  things that has  happened,  in  my  view,  over  the  last several years  has  been 
an  all  too easy tendency to equate the notion of the  legitimacy of  the 
European  Community  with  the fortunes  of  the  European  Parliament.  As  if 
Parliament  is the only  body  that  bestows  legitimacy on  the  Community.  That, 
with  respect,  is not  so:  Parliament  is an  important  legitimator of the 
Community,  but  not  the only one.  Strangely enough  the  Commission  has 
legitimacy  and  bestows  legitimacy.  The  European  Council  has  legitimacy and 
bestows  legitima~y.  Legitimacy  is often derived  from  achievement,  from 
success,  from  satisfying welfare  needs of  individuals,  from  people  saying: 
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direct  reference  to  Parliament.  It  is  quite  plausible  that  if 1992  is  a 
success,  the  electorate will  find  the  European  Community  quite  legitimate  in 
terms  of  t~e welfare  payoff  (welfare  being  a  public  good  in  ~  very  broad 
sense,  not  just'pounds  and  pennies).  And  yet  the  European  Parliament  is  not 
at  all part  of  that  Legitimating  picture.  So  the  headlines  will  say:  'Vat~ 
of  no  confidence  in  Europe',  but  that  is  not  necessarily so.  The  Parliament 
is  not  only  fighting  for  the  legitimacy of  Europe  but  also  for  its  own 
Legitimacy  in that pattern. 
\~hat  about  the quality of  the  dialogue?  Not  simply  the  turnout,  or  support 
for  an  increase  in  the  power  of  the  European  Parliament,  but  this  Low  quality 
of  dialogue  between  MEPs  and  their electorate?  Here  are  some  explanations 
that  were  given.  The  first  is  very  simple:  the  constituencies  are  too big. 
Instead of  100,000  to  200,000  you  have  100,000 to 600,000  voters  per  MEP. 
There  is no  getting  round  that:  you  are  not  going  to  have  a  high  quality of 
dialogue  if the  specific  gravity of  each  voter  is  lower  in the  European 
context.  It  has  nonetheless  been  pointed  out  that  this can  only  be  partly 
true.  Senators  in  the United  States often  have  much  larger constituencies 
and  yet  the  quality of  the  dialogue  is still quite  high.  Obviously,  it is 
partly their newer  to deliver tangible benefits  to their constituents  which 
accounts  for  their high  interaction success,  coupled  with  means  put  at  their 
disposal  for  doing  so. 
It was  also  argued  that organisation of  constituency work  would  divert  too 
much  of  the  time  of  MEPs  from  other important  parliamentary  functions,  such 
plenary and  committees.  Put  simply the  ration of  work,  the  burden  of  work, 
the distribution of  work  in the  timetable of the  MEPs  is such  that, if more 
as 
time  was  dedicated to enhancing  the direct quality of dialogue  with  the voter, 
maybe  more  important  things  would  suffer in  terms  of the  European 
construction;  it is a  possibility that  has  to be  examined  in greater depth. 
Thirdly,  as  I  already mentioned,  MEPs  feature  low  in  party hierarchies.  This 
is not  true for  every  party  and  it is not  true for  every  Member  State, but 
several  people  from  the  floor  suggested that it is true  in general,  across  the 
board.  They  do  not  get  the party support  which  their national  counterparts 
get.  This  has  a  detrimental  effect on  the quality of the  dialogue  with  their 
voters. 
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serving  interest  groups,  but  in  thinking  about  the  general  European 
nersnPctive.  They  do  not  operate  on  the  classical principle of  re-election: 
the  need  to  satisfy  A,  B,  C and  D because  they  are  crucial  to  re-election. 
This  r.oint  was  controversial  because  it plays  both  ways:  what  is better for 
Europe,  to  be  clear  and  realistic  and  serve  Local,  often  national  interest, or 
to  take  the  more  high,  moral  principled ground?  One  way  or  another,  if the 
observation  is  true that  MEPs  do  not  act  clientalistically, this  in  some  way 
will  decrease  the  quality of  dialogue  with  their electorate. 
Finally,  bad  media  cover~ge was  given  as  another  explanation.  The  Parliament 
has  not  had  a  big  success  in  mobilising  media.  (This  might,  however,  be  the 
dilemma  of  the  half  full  or  half  empty  glass). 
The  Group  ended  by  discussing  future  perspectives.  This  was  a  brainstorming 
session  with  some  ideas, quite  frankly  most  of  them  not  new.  If  !  wanted  to 
summarise  the  whole  thrust of  the  suggestions  it would  be  that  the  Parliament 
has  to  rethink  the  balance  and  the priorities of  its own  self-perception and 
the  way  it orders  its attitude  towards  parties,  Member  States  and  the  EC  as  a 
whole 
Let  me  explain  by  examples  what  we  meant  by  that,  and  here  I  will  be 
deliberately dramatic  in  order to drive the  point  home.  Let  us  first 
slaughter one  holy  cow.  Maybe  it is not  such  a  sin  to  be  nationalistic  and 
to protect  vigorously  MEP's  national  interests as  a  way  of mobilising  public 
opinion.  ~f course  one  would  not  suggest  this  was  'the'  remedy,  but  as  part 
of  a  more  complex  strategy,  but it should not  be  considered,  perhaps,  any 
longer  as  a  cardinal  sin. 
Parliament. 
It could be  the  sign of maturity  for  the 
Likewise,  one  may  wish  to  rethink the  notion of partisanship - another well 
known  point  that  comes  up  again  and  again.  The  President of  the Belgian 
Chamber  was  in  our  Group.  His  perception  was  that  the  European  Parliament 
emerges  as  unfocused  in its ideological  cleavages.  When  you  relate to the 
Parliament,  in  his  view,  it is  'for' or  'against'  Europe.  I  think that  this 
has  been  changing  in  recent  years,  but  his  observation  is  that  the  change  is 
not  filtering  through.  So  the  second  thing  is that  partisanship in 
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shar~ as  possible  so  as  to  give  the  notion  that  it matters  whom  you  vote  for, 
it matters  who  your  MEP  will  be,  because  real  choices  are  there  to be  made. 
The  third  future  perspective  is differentiation  from  other  institutions.  The 
surveys  seem  to tell  us,  we  heard,  that  'Europe'  equals  the  European 
Parliament.  So  it  may  be  important  to breakdown  and  differentiate  the 
Parliament  from  the  other  institutions.  We  had  a  spell-binding  intervention 
by  Mr  Wijsenbeek,  MEP,  giving  us  a  blow-by-blow  account  of  how  the  previous 
motions  to  censure  the  Commission  had  failed,  and  why  they  had  failed.  In  a 
dramatic  way,  dismissing  the  Commission  is  something  which  will  enhance  the 
differentiation. 
Likewise  I  think  that  the budgetary battle waged  by  Parliament  had  some 
electoral  effect  in  this differentiation objective.  The  electorate must 
learn  to  think  of  the  European  Parliament  as  a  'counterforce', at  least  in 
some  contexts,  to the  European  'bureaucracy'. 
Fourth,  probably  the  biggest  success of  the  European  Parliament  in  its entire 
history is the one  issue which  is most  frustrating,  the  Single  European  Act. 
It is  clear,  at  least  to  me  as  an  outside observer,  that mobilisation  for  the 
Single  Act  would  not  have  happened  without  the  Parliamentary  Draft  Treaty. 
There  is a  lesson here,  and  it came  from  several  people  in  our  Group. 
Parliament  must  be  more  active,  and  can  be  more  active  in  setting the 
Community  agenda.  Why,  some  asked,  is the  Parliament,  in going  to the  next 
election, not  championing  the  issue of the  social  impact  of  1992  in  big  way? 
So  that it differentiates from  the  Commission  and  carries its own  special 
role?  Likewise,  the proposals  for  a  Declaration of  fundamental  human  rights, 
for  a  Bill of  Rights  for  the  Community,  is the same  kind  of issue, a 
mobilising  issue  as  Europe  integrates more.  In  these ways,  even  in the 
absence  of a  qualitative or dramatic  increase  in  the existing powers  of 
Parliament,  those  for  whom  the electorate votes,  and  the  reasons  why  the 
electorate should  vote will  be  enhanced. 
Finally  the  Group  discussed  relations with  national  parliaments.  One  vision 
outlined was  the vision  in  the  paper  submitted  by  Roger  Morgan  and  Ghita 
Ionescu,  which  you  have.  It is the  cooperative model  that  says:  'Let's have 
more  dual  mandates,  let's have  more  joint  committees,  let's have  more  common 
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other  vision  suggested  that  the  real  game  is  about  power.  When  the  European 
Parliament  says  it wants  to  assert  control  over  the  Council  of  Ministers,  in 
effect  it also  means  taking  power  away  from  national  parliaments.  This  might 
suggest  a  more  confrontational  attitude  towards  national  chambers. 
Does  it  have  to  be  a  dichotomous  choice  in  the  relationship with  national 
parliaments?  Cooperative  or  confrontational?  It  is  probably a  mixture  of 
both.  But  to  suggest  as  an  ideal  type  of  relationship  an  exclusive 
cooperative  model  is  a  bit naive  and  unrealistic.  It  is  not  only  about 
democracy  it is also  about  power. 
Vice-President  BARON:  Thank  you  very  much.  That  concludes  the  reports  from 
the  working  groups,  and  we  now  turn  to a  strategy for  the  European  Parliament. 
Professor  Jean-Paul  Jacque  from  Strasbourg is going  to present  his  paper  to  us 
now. 
Professor Jean-Paul  JACQUE,  University of Strasbourg:  Thank  you  Mr  Chairman. 
Ladies  and  gentlemen,  it falls  to  me  to  speak  to you  at  the-end of your 
Symposium  so  as  to present  to  you  the  basic  Lines  of  a  strategy  for  the 
Parliament.  This  is a  doubly  difficult task  to  the  extent  that  you  have  just 
heard  the  results of  the  work  that  has  been  carried out  in  the  working  groups 
and  it is  very difficult to try to  intertwine those  ideas  with  mine. 
It is equally difficult  from  another point  of  view,  because  working  out  a 
strategy for  the  Parliament  means  ultimately that  you  have  to assume  that  the 
Parliament  as  an  institution can  have  a  strategy.  I  myself  have  certain 
doubts  about  that being  the  case,  the so-called  'strategy'  of the  Parliament 
is  the  result of  reactions to topical  issues  and  of the political groups  which 
actually make  up  the Parliament.  Professor  Weiler  was  referring to the 
possibility of making  a  declaration of social  rights  and  putting a  definite 
focus  in  the  next  election on  the  social  dimension  of the  internal market. 
That  certainly covers  the  views  of  some  of Parliaments's political groups,  but 
also it  rubs  against  - and  sometimes  in  the wrong  way,  incidentally - the 
ideas of  some  other political groups  in the  Parliament. 
Thus  it is extremely difficult  for  the  Parliament  to define a  long  term  kind 
of  strategy.  This  is something  that  is always  being drawn  into question  once 
it is done  by  short  term  topical  issues.  It is also  something  that  is  very 
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parliaments  are  different  from  this  Parliament  insofar  as  the  Latter  is  an 
institution.  The  national  system  corresponds  to  a  developing  and  evolving 
kind  of  national  constitutional  form  which  is  slightly different  from  the 
European  Parliament.  Thus  here  we  have  specific  interests  to  defend  which 
actually  go  over  and  above  normal,  political distinctions  and  it actually does 
have  a  specific  institutional  role  to play  in  the  Community  system  which  is 
subtly different  from  the  constitutional  role  that  national  parliaments  have 
basically to  play. 
A~y strategy therefore  which  could  be  worked  out, or  any  ideas  that  are 
brought  out  in  the  Parliament  have  a  certain value  in that  context  because  the 
field  is  wide  open.  Whether  you  are  talking about  the  Parliament  as  an 
institution or  as  a  legislature all of  the different  aspects  of  the  work  and 
functions  of  Parliament  and  its members  have  some  value.  This  is a  point  that 
you  could  actually agree  with  and  that  I  would  actually agree  with,  subject to 
one  rider,  which  is  that  the  Parliament  has  to establish certain  kinds  of 
priority.  It  is totally impossible  to  work  on  a  strategy of  a  parliament  as  a 
Forum  and  also as  a  parliament  as  a  factor of  constitutionil evolution or 
governmental  function.  We  must  therefore  realise that  every one  of  the 
functions  that  you  have  been  discussing  in  your  work  actually costs  quite  a 
lot  in  administrative  input.  If therefore you  continue  to  develop  the  idea  of 
a  forum  - incidentally  running  the  risk that  the styles that  you  are  going  to 
have  to  defend  will  be  difficult to defend  in  line with  your  strategy of  forum 
- you  will  actually bring  into question  both  the general  nature of  your 
parliament  and  the value of its image. 
Also  if you  look  at all  the  reports, if you  revise all the  internal  rules of 
procedure, if you  take  into  consideration this gradual  evolution,  you  risk 
bringing into question  some  of  your  reputation and  image  on  a  world-wide  or 
international  level.  So  what  I  want  to talk about  is whether  you  should 
concentrate on  this  kind  of  strategy or  whether  you  should  look  for other 
ideas.  To  a  certain degree  the  Parliament  has  already grown  out  of the strict 
'forum'  age.  If one  were  to  revert  back  to  the  forum  strategy,  you  would  be 
actually taking a  backwards  step.  It has  already been  argued  that the 
Parliament  understands  the  impact  of  the  Single  European  Act,  and  it is 
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and  must  therefore  move  forward  rather  than  necessarily accepting  the  status 
quo. 
The  context  of  a  forum  is  only  a  base;  the  European  Parliament  has  got  to  try 
and  develop  in  a  different  style,  and  it must  take  into  consideration  the 
style of  the  Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe.  I  talk  about  this  in  some 
knowledge  of  the  f~cts, because  I  have  been  involved  quite often with  that 
Assembly.  This  is a  strategy which  has  a  degree  of  merit  in  an  institutional 
system  which  is  very  much  inter-governmental.  That  is one  of  the  ideas  one 
could  actually  look  at, but  I  do  not  really believe  that  that  is  the 
fundamental  objective of  your  parliament.  There  is  in  any  case  going  to  be  a 
style of discussion  in the  Chamber- a  forum  style -which will  be  of value  in 
the  future. 
I  don't  think  necessarily this  is  something  that  you  have  slavishly to  defend 
and  develop  in  the  future,  but  you  should  look  at  three  fundamental  areas  in 
which  you  can  move  forward.  One  of  these  is  something  that  has  been  brought 
up  probably very  little in  your  discussions  and  therefore  r·shall  concentrate 
on  this first,  and  then  on  the other two.  I  would  cite the gubernatorial  role 
that  the  Parliament  can  actually exercise.  This  actually sets  a  certain  style 
of election depending  on  the prevailing style of  government  and  governing 
authority within the  Community.  This  is something  that  is generally  followed 
in  all national  elections to  choose  parliamentary  representatives.  The 
general  lines of the mandate  of the government,  the  general  direction  in  which 
the  government  will  go  and,  apart  from  anything else,  the personalities  who 
will be  involved with  that function  are derived  from  participation  in a 
national election.  People  have  the  impression,  in  taking part  in  a  national 
election that they will  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  forms  of their executive 
and  legislative. 
Now,  whether  this is a  reality or  possibility in  the  European  situation is a 
very good  question.  It will ultimately be  possible because  the  European 
Parli~ment has  some  of  the  embryonic  capacity of being  able  to fulfil  that 
function.  There  are difficulties  as  to  the  nomination  of  the  Commission  - the 
Parliament  complains  of  not  being  able  to  nominate  or even  of  not  having  any 
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think  that  it would  be  a  good  idea  for  Parliament  to develop  some  influence  on 
the  nomination  of  the  Commission. 
However,  on  the  strategy side it is  clear that  the  Parliament  has  a  full  right 
to  get  rid  of  the  Commission.  The  Council  would  have  to  draw  its own 
conclusions  from  any  such  major  action,  but  the  Parliament  can  actually 
threaten  this  and  can  actually  make  a  conflict  develop,  which  could  give  rise 
to  a  full  vote  of  confidence  in  the  Commission.  This  is a  function  that 
should be  used  so  as  to  influence  in  some  sense  the  composition  of  the 
Commission,  to  modify  its attitude, to  modify  its line.  Therefore,  as  we  are 
moving  into  a  context  of  working  on  an  inter-governmental  line - which  is  not 
necessarily  always  in  Line  incidentally with  the  Treaty- and  so  as  to  have 
the  'call  to  order'  take  place,  if you  Like,  Parliament  can  certainly have 
some  impact  on  the  Commission,  because  of its no  confidence vote.  That  exists 
as  a  possibility.  This  would  involv~ the  Parliament  freeing  itself from  some 
of  the  trammelling difficulties of  the  past  so  that  it would  be  able  to get 
out  of  its cul-de-sac. 
I  believe it possible  to  establish  a  general  approach  which  could  have  some 
influence  on  the  Commission's  activity rather  than on  just the  national 
governmental,  European  Council  level  and  so  on.  If one  accepts  this  idea, 
then  the  Parliament  could  have  an  influence  on  the  composition of the 
Commission- subject to discussion with  the  Council  and  the  authorities 
involved.  But  you  will  realise that, if that  were  to  come  about,  the 
Parliament  would  be  able  to  make  up  a  type  of government  majority on  a 
specific programme.  Then  you  would  be  able  to  go  into the  next  phase  - which 
is  certainty the most  difficult - which  is to get  the  electors to vote  on  a 
specific mandate,  to  vote  on  a  platform which  would  be  put  up  by  this 
government  majority;  thus it would  no  longer  mean  that  people  were  working  on 
strict national  policy  ideas  when  they  voted. 
Now  here  is the  real  problem;  it is clearly the case that  national  policies 
have  a  major  impact  on  the voting styles of the people  when  they vote  in the 
European  elections.  It could  be  the case that  one  could  have  one  day  a  real, 
federal  kind  of party  and  another party on  the other side which  would  be  a 
national  rights  party  and  that  would  be  a  kind  of distinction to be  drawn 
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national  political  ideas  would  continue  to  work  along  those  lines  in  the 
future. 
It  is  important  to  take  very  carefully into  consideration  the  fact  that  the 
procedure  of  the  Single  Act,  as  it  involves  the  Parliament,  means  that 
coalitions  must  be  established to  obtain majorities  which,  if you  Like,  are 
federal,  or  which  actually  take  into  consideration  a  much  more  partisan  view 
on  the  national  Level.  Now  this  can  actually mean  that  you  tend  to  have  a 
tess  European  attitude or  a  more  European  attitude,  if  you  like  to  put  it as 
bluntly as  that.  This  however  is extremely  topical,  in  as  far  as  the  European 
Parliament  has  actually worked  as  a  little Council  trying  to  indicate  national 
demands  and  needs.  To  try and  involve this  in  the  process  of  trying  to 
achieve  an  absolute  majority and  allowing  people  to  actually vote  against  but 
not  with  any  real  veto  power  because  of the  entrenched  national  interest is 
something  that  is  ~lready evolving  in  the  Parliament.  Whether  or  not  it 
should be  set  on  a  more  official  level  so  as  realty to establish a 
government-style  approach  -actually to  have  a  majority view  with  a  programme 
linked  to it - is  something  to  be  looked  into. 
P~ple would  in  several  respects  resist a  Europe  splintered into  a  whole 
series of  small  political parties, but  in fact  there are national 
administrations  that  have  perpetually to be  in  a  state of negotiation  so  as  to 
win  people  over  to  support  them.  I  don't  know  whether it is really the 
strength of the  majority which  actually  imposes  compromises  on  the government 
or whether  it is open  discussion that throws  up  the  compromise.  There  could 
be  certain misgivings  about  the potential dictatorship of the  Commission.  The 
Commission  could  no  doubt  actually force  people  to take  into  consideration the 
kind  of so-called governmental  majority view  without  necessarily having  a  real 
convergence  of  consensus  policy. 
But  if you  are  going  to  play the  government  game,  a  major  obstacle exists, 
which  is the  resistance of national political  forces  to that game,  because 
they  see this  as  being  a  loss of their power,  a  toss  of their sovereignty and 
everything else.  One  of  the perfect  examples  of  the vicious  circle  in  this 
complex  is something  we  must  escape  from  because  the participation of  the 
elector means  that  you  must  have  a  clear programme  and  a  clear  impact  on  the 
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activities of  the  Commission.  But  this  implies  that  you  must  present  the 
programme  to  the  electors.  They  have  got  to  know  for  whom  they  are  voting  and 
for  what  ends  they  are  voting. 
Therefore  the  national  political  parties  are  inclined  to  see  the  European 
elections  as  being  a  test of  their own  national  policies.  It  is  not  a  real 
European  view.  The  idea  of getting majorities  and  so  on  at  the  government 
tevel,  the  use  of  the  European  elections  as  being  a  test of national  attitudes 
and  so  on  can  ultimately give  rise  to  the difficulty of  having  a  very  low 
turnout  because  there  is  likely  to  be  a  lack  of  comprehension  between  the  two. 
I  think  that  the  strategy therefore  for  the  Parliament  would  have  to  be  to 
construct  the  means.and  methods  to  get  out  of this double  stricture and  to  try 
to  make  sure  that  they  move  towards  a  clear European  government,  a  European 
idea,  a  European  style of politics.  This  will  not  happen  in  one  year,  two 
years  or  three  years  but  we  must  try to ensure  that  we  do  follow  the 
development  of  the  system  in  Europe.  You  can  see  a  very  good  comparison  in 
the  early years  of  federalism  as  it is established  in  the United  States. 
The  second  aspect  I  want  to bring up  is the  function  of  the  legislature.  I  am 
sorry not  to  have  heard  anyone  in  the  reports  from  the working  group  talk 
about  certain difficult  issues which  I  feel  could  have  come  out.  Mr  Hansch 
obviously  touched  on  this.  We  are  used  to him  doing  so,  and  he  has  actually 
forced  us  to make  steps  forward  quite often  in  very  useful directions.  But 
the  whole  idea  of  taking up  too  much  time  on  legislation is quite often a 
trap.  The  whole  idea of  legislation as  it links  up  with  the  Parliament's  own 
strategy is something  that obviously must  be  reinforced.  It should  be  taken 
into account  because  it already exists.  The  external  forces  playing on  the 
Parliament assume  that it will  actually intervene  in the  legislative 
procedure.  Professor Weiler  actually talked about  the  interaction of the 
interest groups  and  the  Lobbyists,  but  you  can  imagine  the  kind  of  lobby  that 
might  be  able to  impose  its point  of view  if it used  the  Parliament  as  a 
supporter.  It would  be  extremely difficult  if people  were  actually able  to 
force  Members  to vote  in  favour  of  baby  seals  rather  than  in  favour  of other 
major  ideas. 
- 127  -If  we  are  not  careful  we  will  see  a  gradual  undermining  of  our  Legislative 
strength  if we  do  not  further  get  involved  in  functional  legislative 
programmes.  This  is  something  that  I  have  referred  to  in  the past  quite 
often,  as  have  others.  In  effect  you  are  embracing  a  number  of  political 
ideas  and  trying  to  act  for  the  best  without  having  a  very  clear  idea  of 
Utopia.  Some  people  say  that  Europe  can  be  constructed  without  the 
Parliament,  yet  on  the  other  hand  others  quite often  accuse  you  of  being  the 
people  who  have  stood  in  the  way  of  having  satisfactory  European  legislation. 
They  say  that  Community  laws  are  badly drafted b,ecause  of  the  work  of 
Parliament  which  has  actually  got  things  wrong.  So  Parliament  is criticised 
for  being  utopian  on  the  one  hand  and  for  turning  out  badly drafted  laws  on 
the  other  hand. 
So  Parliament  should exploit  its position a  Little more  in  two  ways.  You  can 
argue  in  favou~ of  small  steps  forward,  the  gradualism  process  and  so  on,  as 
various  people  have  done  in  the  past.  But  I  argue  that  it is not  enough  just 
to  take  a  small  step  here  and  a  small  step there.  Parliament  must  fill all 
the  gaps  in  a  grey  zone  which  exists.  For  example,  Parliament  has  some  powers 
as  far  as  the  budget  is  concerned.  They  should  be  expanded  and  filled  in  so 
as  to  ensure  that it realises  its power  to  the full.  It is certainly the  case 
that  the  whole  process  of  European  integration would  not  be  the  same  now 
unless  there  had  been  full  exploitation of'the consultation procedure,  and 
there  is a  lot  more  that  can  be  done  in this direction.  There  could  be  a 
future  veto  right,  a  veto  power,  and  there  could  be  much  more  complete 
legislative powers  in  the  future.  But  the  Parliament  has  established its 
foundations  and  has  actually made  the  consultation procedure work.  If this 
process  were  to be  imposed  more  strongly on  the  Member  States  in  the  future 
you  would  make  further  progress  along  this  line. 
On  the other hand,  to reply to what  Professor Weiler  has  said,  there  is one 
factor wh;eh  I  think  is totally absent  from  this  process,  and  that  is the 
exploitation of  legislative procedure  so  as  to get  the national  policy makers 
involved  in the  Community  legislation procedure.  I  understood  him  to  be 
talking about  the agriculture policy  when  he  talked about  sacred cows. 
Parliament's  new  strategy will  mean  that  we  will  be  able to undermine  some  of 
these  sacred  cows,  not  to  say  slaughter them.  Parliament  has  to do  what  it 
can,  it must  try to fill  in  the gaps  as  I  have  said.  It must  exploit  to  the 
full  the  role  it can  actually  play  in this process,  and  make  sure that  its 
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European  Parliament  members  actually play  a  necessary  role  as  a  corollary  to 
that  of  their national  parliamentary colleagues. 
If  MEPs  move  away  from  the  forum  kind  of  context  they  will  actually  be  able  to 
be  real  actors  in  the  socio-economic  sense.  In  certain grass  roots  forms  the 
Parliament  will  become  much  more  national,  but  it should  try to  act  as  a 
corollary to  the  national  systems  and  not  be  taken  over  by  them.  I  think  that 
tha  role  of  the  groups  in  the  European  Parliament  is  to  inform  and  consult  the 
electors.  If this  role  were  to  be  reinforced,  it would  be  more  fruitful  than 
at  present,  when  we  have  these  rather  grand  publicity stunts  which  the  groups 
undertake  in  the  media  to  get  their message  across. 
Thus  Parliament  must  be  considered  as  a  partner which  is  really unavoidable 
for  the  other  institutions  and  indispensable  for  the  elector.  I  don't  want  to 
dwell  longer  on  this  point  because  I  have  actually written  on  the  subject  in 
the  past  as  well.  This  is  why  we  talk about  this dual  strategy of  reinforcing 
the  legislative power  so  as  to  make  it more  effective, of  creating  closer 
contact  with  the electors  and  improving  it by  means  of the  procedures  that 
have  been  actually established by  the  gradualistic  approach. 
If then  you  wish  to  change  and  reform  the  system  by  making  it evolve,  there 
are  various  specific  steps  that  you  must  take  so  as  to make  this  come  about. 
People  have  actually talked about  these  ideas  but  they  are  not  always 
necessarily that  clear.  I  believe that  there  is great  potential  in 
establishing a  new  kind  of  Single  European  Act,  because  everybody  knows  that 
if you  establish one  such  Act,  there will  be  another one.  Before  1992  we 
~cannot perhaps  do  anything more  about  that, but  that does  not  necessarily mean 
that  we  shouldn't  prepare  for  a  further  step into  the  future.  So  we  must 
therefore work  out  the generat  context  in which  we  are  intending to  function, 
a  strategy. 
Parliament,  using  its committees,  should  revise its Spinelli  Draft  Treaty  so 
as  to  adapt  its future  to the present situation as  it develops.  I  think  that 
this  is  a  very good  reference  context  in which  we  can  work.  There  have  been 
some  national  reactions  to this which  could  be  corrected  in the  future,  but  I 
believe that  the  Spinelli  idea  is  something  which  is  actually useful  in order 
to  make  some  progress.  It is not  a  case  of  creating a  type of  European  union 
- 129  -as  a  utopian  idea,  but  to  have  a  functional  written  strategy  for  attaining 
European  union.  Even  if we  realise  that  we  won't  actually achieve  it 
tomorrow,  it  is  a  horizon  to  which  we  can  work. 
Not  only  should  we  set  this  aim  but  use  it also  as  a  framework  for  thought,  if 
you  Like.  There  are  two  or  three  areas  in  which  Parliament's  functions  could 
actually be  extended  relatively  rapidly.  The  first  of  these  areas  is quite 
clearly the  question  of  a  European  monetary  union,  where  there  is  a  very 
definite  and  urgent  call  for  its achievement.  There  are  some  initiatives 
underway  already,  but  certain  institutional  initiatives will  have  to  be 
undertaken  in  this  field  to  develop  it further. 
Another  domain  which  is  very  important  for  the  extension of  Parliament's 
functions  is  the  opening  under  the  Single  Act  for  European  political 
cooperation.  The  Act  states that it wil  be  reviewed  in  five  years'  time,  that 
is, three  years  from  now.  We  must  not  start too  late  in  proposing  some 
changes  in  the  existing political  cooperation procedures.  There  is  a  great 
opportunity here.  If  you  don't  do  anything  I  am  convinced  that  the 
governments  will  conclude  after a  relatively  rapid  and  quick  discussion,  that 
the  time  is  not  ripe, etc., etc.,  to  develop  political  cooperation.  The 
Spaniards  and  the  Portuguese  are  now  actually  in  Western  European  Union  and  we 
must  take  account  of this  and  of  further  developments  in political  cooperation 
in  other  areas.  If the  Parliament  misses  the  boat  on  this  then  no  one  else 
will  try to  develop  political cooperation. 
Now  what  can  we  say  by  way  of  reply to Professor Weiler  on  the  subject  of 
fundamental  rights,  a  kind  of  Bill of  rights or  a  charter being  established? 
This  would  have  to  be  done  on  a  social  level  before  even  the  Commission  comes 
out  with  its own  proposats  for  a  social  charter.  If that were  to happen, 
obviously Parliament  would  not  be  anything  like  in  the vanguard.  But  the 
Parliament  has  got  to be  in  the  vanguard,  and  it must  make  sure that  it brings 
out  this  charter first. 
For  these  reasons,  Parliament  should  adopt  this framework  and  make  it develop 
in  these  two  areas,  monetary  union  and  in the direction of this social 
charter,  as  well  as  in other ways. 
- 130 -The  idea  of getting  the  elector  to  express  an  opinion  on  procedures  and  such 
matters  is not  very satisfactory.  What  you  should  present  to  the  electorate 
is  a  general  framework.  The  ~ind of  question  you  should  put  to  them  is, 
whether  you  should  endow  Parliament  with  constituent  powers  for  the  purpose  of 
creating  the  European  union.  To  get  the  electorate  to  actually  say  what  they 
think  about  this  constitutent  role  the  Parliament  must  have  a  draft,  a 
framework,  on  the  basis  of  which  you  could  actually put  the  question  to  them. 
So  in this  context  Parliament  has  obviously  something  to  do.  The  experience 
we  have  gleaned  under  the  Single  Act  is obviously  going  to  be  developed  in  the 
future,  demonstrating  that  the  Parliament  will  not  get  more  than  it asks  for. 
I  feel  that  here  is  the opportunity to ask  for  more,  and  indeed  to  be  very 
ambitious  in  this area. 
By  way  of  conclusion  I  would  argue  that  Parliament  has  a  three-way  strategy to 
follow.  There  is  the  governmental  strategy that  I  spoke  about,  which  is a 
very  long  term  idea  involving  the  restructuring of  the political  forces  that 
play  in  our  societies;  this  will  take a  long  time,  but  it is not  impossible. 
There  is  the  second  strategy,  which  is that  of  legislative action which  must 
be  reinforced.  And  there  is also  the  strategy of  the  development  of  the 
system.  A strategy which  already exists, but  which  demands  also a  greater 
degree  of  review  and  a  more  in-depth  review  than  that actually ongoing  at  the 
moment. 
Vice-President  BARON:  Now  as  we  have  some  time  I  would  like to  ask  you 
whether  you  have  any  questions  or any  comments  that you  would  like  to  make. 
We  have  about  ten minutes,  so  we  could have  a  brief question  and  answer 
session. 
Dr  Karlheinz REIF,  £uropean  co ..  ission:  Professor  Weiler  has  reported about 
Working  Group  3  and  its  results and  I  should  like  to  make  a  short  comment. 
When  I  said yesterday,  if we  have  less  than  SOX  turnout  newspapers  the  next 
day  will  write  'vote of no  confidence  in  Europe'  I  did  not  myself  mean  that 
this  would  be  a  true statement.  It wilt  be  part of  reality but  I  would  not 
myself  as  a  political scientist  subscribe to it.  Secondly,  I  do  not  believe 
as  a  political scientist  in opinion  polls being  able to give  legitimacy.  They 
cannot  replace elections  and  referenda - if one  adheres  to  the  idea  of 
referenda.  History tells us  that  Al  Rachid  at  one  time  went  himself  among  the 
masses  in  disguise  and  listened to  what  they were  saying.  President 
- 131  -Mitterrand,  Prime  Minister  Thatcher,  Chancellor  Kohl  and  President  Delors 
don't  do  it themselves  nowadays,  they  have  opinion  polls  done  instead.  Every 
now  and  then  an  old  custom  that  has  been  practised  in  Persia  a  couple  of 
thousand  years  ~go poses  a  professional  risk  today  to  those  who  do,  or  order, 
or  analyse  opinion polls.  If  the  messenger  arrived  with  bad  news,  he  was 
killed. 
~- Jacques  MALLET,  MEP,  Chairman  of the  External  Economic  Relations  Co••ittee: 
I  wanted  to  say  how  unfortunate  I  have  been  in  not  being  able  to  foLLow  all  of 
your  work.  We  had  a  heavy  agenda  in  the  Parliament  and  I  had  to  intervene  in 
a  debate  this  morning.  But  I  was  able  to  hear  at  least  some  of what  Professor 
Jacque  said. 
r  know  of  his  analyses  in this  field  in  the  past,  but  still I  would  like to 
put  a  question  as  to  the  real  risk  that  is  involved  <and  I  put  this  as  a 
Frenchman)  - the  real  risk of  people  not  participating  in  the  European 
election.  If you  take  into consideration what  has  happened  recently  in  my 
country  you  can  see this  is  a  real  risk.  I  think  that  we  would  be  tempted  to 
say  that  the best  remedy  for abstaining  in  the  election wou(d  be  to  inject  a 
tremendous  amount  of  political  heat  into it, even  though  that  is a  risk.  I 
think that  people  will  talk  a  lot more  about  Europe  in the  next  elections than 
maybe  in  the  past  because  the  approach  of 1992  is  something  that actually 
throws  up  a  Lot  of  questions.  It will  mean  that  in the  campaign  we  will 
obviously  have  to  play  an  educative  role,  for  the  average  citizen is clearly 
not  particularly able to get to grips  with  the  real  questions  which  come  up  in 
this field. 
The  seeond  comment  I  wanted  to  make  is not  necessarily on  a  legislative  level, 
but  rather  concerns  external  relations, for as  a  member  and  indeed  as  chairman 
of the  REX  committee  I  have  some  experience  in this field.  The  opinions  which 
Parliament  has  to give on  association and  accession  agreements  mean  that 
Parliament  is now  ptaying a  major  role  in  foreign  policy.  Some  people  have 
spoken  of this  as  a  kind  of  atomic  bomb. 
You  can  understand  this  in  two  different  ways;  the first  way  would  be  that  the 
Parliament  should not  use  the  strictly political dictates of  its power  in this 
field,  in which  it would  be  using  ideas  and  exploiting a  situation which  was 
completely different  from  the matter at  issue.  But  under  the  second  way  it is 
- 132  -certainly  the  case  that  by  using  this  weapon  the  Parliament  has  brought  about 
improvements  in  the  Israeli  financial  protocols  in  regard  to  the  physical 
exports  and  the  amounts  of  exports  and  so  on  from  the  Occupied  Territories  to 
the  Community.  So  there  have  been  actually some  improvements  in  the  matters 
strictly within  the  protocol  as  well  as  on  the political  issue. 
In  the  final  analysis  we  are  quite  often  faced  with  a  fait  accompli  kind  of 
agreement  - we  just  have  to  take  it or  Leave  it.  I  believe that  the  spirit of 
the  Single  European  Act  means  that  we  must  make  some  progress  in  the  quality 
of  the  infor~ation that  is  given  to  the  Parliament at  an  early stage  of  this 
kind  of  negotiation.  Clearly  there  are  certain  limits  which  would  apply  for 
the  purooses  of  confidentiality,  and  it is obviously the  case  that  the 
Commission  doesn't  want  the  negotiations  to  go  off  at  half-cock  by  having  to 
give  too  much  information  to  Parliament  too early. 
Nevertheless,  ~e must  strive for  a  major  development  in this field, 
particularly as  to  the  assent  procedure.  This  has  actually  recently  been 
considered  by  Commissioner  Willy  De  Clercq  in  terms  of  the  improved  dialogue 
with  the  Commission.  In  this  field the dialogue  with  the  Council  certainly 
leaves  someting  to  be  desired at  the  moment  but  we  can  try to  improve  that 
too.  I  would  say  that  the assent  procedure  has  given  us  a  new  power,  which  we 
still do  not  know  specifically  how  to exploit.  In  this field Parliament's 
role  and  its effectiveness  should  not  necessarily be  measured  in strict terms 
of  new  power  but  in  the  sense of  influence  that  it can  bring  to bear.  I  think 
it should therefore  use  this power  with  moderation,-with  a  great  awareness  of 
its  responsibilities  and  in very  close cooperation  with  the  Commission  of the 
EEC. 
The  other question  I  would  also  like to  have  brought  up  is the  development  of 
political cooperation.  I  am  a  substitute member-of  the Political Affairs 
Committee  and  I  would  say  that generally our  quarterly discussions  with  the 
Presidency  have  given  useful  results which  we  have  been  able  to  use  in the 
Press, apart  from  anything else.  But  these  colloquies  are  somewhat 
inadequate,  and  a  bit  anaemic  at  the  moment.  On  the  question of security and 
defence  the  field is wide  open,  and  I  feel  we  should try to  think  how  we  can 
view  the  development  of the  Parliament's  role  in the fields  of security and 
defence. 
- 133  -~r Sergio  SEGRE,  ~EP, Chairman  of the Committee  on  Institutional Affairs:  I 
would  tike  to  say  that  I  find  the  strategy and  scheme  that  has  been  put 
forward  by  Professor  Jacque  very  convincing.  It  is broadly,  in  any  case,  the 
same  system  that  the  Institutional  Committee  of  Parliament  has  been  following 
for  the  last  couple  of  years,  to  the  extent  that  we  must  constantly  emphasise 
the  potential  of  moving  towards  union,  and  keep  this  in  mind.  We  must  also 
analyse  ~ll  the  new  factors  in  this  field,  and  how  we  can  develop  all  the 
political  and  philosophical  principles  and  ideas  that  are  involved.  In  my 
view,  Parliament  has  undervalued  the  dynamic  of  the  Single  European  Act. 
I  would  also  out  a  question to  Mr  Jacqu~, as  if we  wish  to move  in  this 
direction,  !  would  Like  to  hear  his  opinion  on  the  subject.  We  think  we  ought 
to  identify  the  existence  in  Europe  of  certain major  problems,  because  what  we 
are  doing  today  will  certainty  have  a  major  impact  on  all  foreseeable  future 
developments.  In  the  context of  a  democratic  system  the powers  of  the  Council 
and  those  which  the  Parliament  should  have  must  be  looked  at  in the  context  of 
each  other. 
It  is obvious  that  the possibility of developing  in this field will  have  to 
take  into  consideration much  closer cooperation with  national  parliaments  who 
are  in  some  sense  natural allies.  I  believe that  the  European  Parliament  is 
very often  looked  at  as  being  a  kind of  competitor,  which  is not  necessarily 
the  case.  This  Parliament  is always  regarded  as  encroaching  on  national 
parliaments'  sovereignty and  taking  away  powers  from  them.  I  think  that  is 
not  the  case.  The  European  Parliament  will  probably actually take away  from 
the  Council  the overmighty  powers  which  it has  in  some  fields,  and  therefore 
be  a  natural ally for  the national  parliaments.  I  would  like to  have  some 
further  idea of Professor Jacque's  thoughts  on  this point. 
Vice-President  BARON:  I  am  going  to have  to close  our  speakers'  list 
otherwise  we  will  run  out of time.  I  wonder  whether  the  same  strategy of  the 
small  steps that  has  been  described by  Professor  Jacque  would  be  possible 
after the  number  of failures  that  we  have  suffered.  I  wonder  also whether  we 
could also  include  resident  foreigners  on  the electoral  rolls  in  the  Member 
States.  Could  that  be  part of  a  strategy?  It would  have  symbolic  force,  and 
I  think  that  it would  perhaps  be  a  way  in which  we  could  launch  our  strategy. 
- 134  -~e  ~arie-Claude VAYSSADE,  ~EP, First Vice-Chairman,  Legal  Affairs  Com•ittee: 
I  must  say  tha~  I  agree  with  a  Lot  of  what  Professor  Jacque  said  but  r  believe 
that  there  is  one  field  which  calls  for  further  argument.  He  said  that  there 
was  a  clear  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  the  forum  function  and  the 
legislative  function.  Now  there  may  be  a  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  the 
various  powers  of  an  institution but  I  wouldn't  accept  the  forum  function. 
The  most  important  power  we  have  is  our  own  ability to  take  initiatives,  but  I 
fear  that  at  the  moment,  since  our  workload  is  so  enormous,  it  is  very 
difficult  to  make  further  progress  in  terms  of  achieving  more  legislative 
power  as  the  work  on  the  Single  Act  takes  up  so  much  time.  It is all very 
well  to  say  that  political  cooperation  problems,  etc.,  should  be  given  a  fresh 
impetus,  but  the  problem  has  been  that  in the  Parliament  we  always  had  (and 
even  more  so  since direct  elections)  a  role  of  pointing  to  problems  in 
society,  of  trying to slot  them  into  a  Community  framework  even  if they  are 
not  mentioned  by  name  in  the  Treaty.  Now  that  is a  parliamentary  function  -
at  least  I  think  it is.  You  may  call  that a  forum  function;  I  wouldn't  use 
that  word,  but  I  do  think  that this is a  role which  we  will  always  keep  and  it 
should  not  be  sacrificed entirely. 
~r Fernand  H£R"AN,  MEP,  General  Rapporteur of the co ..  ittee on  Institutional 
Affairs:  Yes,  I  take  Mr  Jacque's  point  but  there  is one  thing  which  I  think 
hasn't  been  dealt  a  fair  hand  and  that  is the fact  that  the  Parliament  does 
now  have  better means  at  its disposal  to  make  its voice  heard.  I  think  that 
after 1992  and  even  today,  the  pressure on  the  further  enlargement  of  the 
Community  will  become  enormous.  Pressure is already  being  brought  to bear  on 
us  at  the moment,  and  as  a  result of  the need  for  legislation on  future 
enlargement  the  Parliament  has  been  given  a  lot  more  leverage.  Mr  Mallet 
picked this point  up  and  said that  the  Parliament  may  well  decide  to use  its 
powers  in  an  unselfish  manner.  It is all very well  to  say  that  we  cannot 
blac~mail others with  this power,  but it is totally consistent to  say that 
there  is no  point  in having  a  Community  if it is diluted down  from  its present 
institutional model.  That  in  my  view  is the  tool  and  the  leverage  that  we 
have,  and  I  think  that this  is something  that  we  should more  or  less  shout 
about  from  the  rooftops,  rather  than  giving  in  and  saying  to everyone,  Well, 
join the  club.  It  is always  nice to please all  and  sundry,  but  the  Community 
would  be  totally diluted  in  the end. 
- 135  -Professor  JACQUE:  Very  briefly,  Mr  Chairman,  I  take  Mr  Mallet's  points  and  I 
do  agree  with  him  that  a  leverage  of  future  Community  enlargement  should 
certainly be  used  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  the  Council  to  change  the 
existing  institutional  structures.  We  agree  totally,  I  think.  With  regard  to 
Mrs  Vayssade's  comments,  the  concept  of  a  forum  is  not  necessarily  the  ideal 
word,  and  one  should  bear  in  mind  that  Parliament  has  a  certain  right  of 
initiative which  is part  of  its  legislative powers.  But  to  go  as  far  as 
forcing  the  Commission  to  enable  Parliament  to  take  full  initiatives would  be 
to  do  what  the  Parliament  is not  at  the  moment  empowered  to  do,  that  is  to 
take  initiatives.  So  one  has  to  be  very  cautious  wheri  opting  for  certain 
debates  in  order  to  avoid  problems,  although  it seems  to  me  that  Members  of 
the  Parliament  tend  to  choose  in  an  intelligent manner  from  among  the  subjects 
they  can  tackle  in that field. 
In  regards  to  comments  made  on  the  vote  being  given  to  foreign  nationals, 
there  are  various  sides  to this.  I  may  have  overlooked  some  of them,  but  this 
is  something  that  has  to  do  with  the  strategy of national  governments.  The 
most  important  thing  is to  come  back  to  a  uniform  electoral  law.  At  the 
moment  things  seem  to  be  blocked  to a  certain extent,  and  at· the  end  of the 
day  of  course national  political  parties will  never  have  a  full  grip  over 
European  elections  unless  the voting  system  itself has  been  harmonised  and 
standardised  throughout  the  EEC.  Because  obviously  the  minimum  requirement  is 
that  EC  nationals  can  vote  wherever  they  wish  during  European  elections.  As 
to their rights  to vote  in  local  elections  and  regional  elections  in  their 
countries of  residence,  that will  have  to  be  debated  in  the  future. 
In  reply to  Mr  Mallet  I  would  like to say that  what  applies  to  Mr  Herman 
applies  to him  as  well.  We  may  not  be  ruled by  those  who  possess all 
knowledge,  but  I  do  remember  the  President of  the  French  Republic  saying  on 
the  subject of nuclear  weapons  that  they  would  remain  with  us  in  Europe  for  a 
long  time  because of their deterrent  role,  and  that  implies that the  nuclear 
deterrent  is effective.  I  am  sure  that  Parliament  too  has  its own  deterrent 
which  will  be  effective provided it is used  at  the most  appropriate moment. 
If it is used  left, right  and  centre it is no  longer effective,  and  then  the 
Parliament  realty will  look  like  the  constant  spanner  in the works,  trying to 
grind  the  whole  European  machinery  to  a  halt.  So,  as  I  said,  the deterrent 
function  may  be  important  but  it is better possibly to move  from  a  deterrent 
role to  a  cooperative  rote.  It may  in the future  possibly  include  security 
- 136  -matters  and  that  would  certainly  imply  progress  on  political  cooperation 
through  which  Parliament  might  be  involved  in  more  serious  matters.  But  for 
the  time  being  I  don't  see  how  we  could  enhance  the  role  of  the  Parliament  in 
EPC  because  ~f its very  nature  compared  to  that  of other  national  parliaments; 
it would  in  my  view  be  better to  concentrate  on  the  Parliament's  present 
efforts  to  be  involved  in  European  political  cooperation  and  also  to  be  heard 
in  terms  of  security debates. 
Vice-President  BARON:  Before  closing  I  would  like  to  read  out  a  message  that 
Mrs  Veil  gave  me  before  she  left: 
'I would  ask  you  to  accept  my  apologies  that  I  cannot  be  present at  the 
closing  session as  I  would  have  wished.  Unfortunately I  had  to  go  to  Paris 
yesterday  and  I  have  certain  commitments  in  Portugal  tonight  so  I  can't  come 
back  to  Strasbourg.  I  would  like  to  thank  all  of  those  who,  through  the 
studies  and  scholarly papers  presented,  have  been  able  to  help  us  to  think 
about  the  matters  that  have  been  on  the  agenda  over  the  last  two  days,  and  I 
trust  that  we  will  be  able  to  draw  fruitful  conclusions  from  them.  Not  only 
for  the  future  of  your  work  but  also  with  a  view  to  creating the  European 
citizen  and  enhancing  the prestige of its Parliament.  I  was  certainly 
interested to  hear  what  the  experts  had  to  say  in their  learned papers  and  I 
am  sorry that  I  was  not  able  to  be  present at  your  working  sessions.  I  know 
that parliamentarians  have  been  to your  sessions  and  that  you  have  been  able 
to  benefit  from  their experience.  They  have  been  able to guide  the  experts 
along  practical  lines  in their approach  to parliamentary matters. 
I  know  too that it is not  always  possible for outsiders to understand  the 
dynamism  of the political groups  within the  Parliament  and  the  actual  role 
that  they  have  to ptay,  so  as  to understand the  richness  of our  diversity,  and 
the unity in diversity that exists within  the Parliament. 
We  also  have  to  consider the  importance  of the  role of the Parliament  which  is 
directly elected.  The  choices  that  have  been  expressed by  the  Parliament  are 
choices  which  are  made  on  behalf of  the electorate.  Most  people  would  want  to 
have  greater  European  integration and  therefore as  a  legislator we  cannot 
underestimate  the  importance  of this.  Here  we  are  talking about  joint 
legislation and  with  that  view  the  Parliament  is going  beyond  what  has  been 
- 137  -suggested  by  the  Commission.  We  will  certainly  look  at  ways  in which  we  can 
integrate.  It  is  not  just  abstruse  matters  that  we  are  debating  here,  these 
are  precise  problems  which  require  a  political  answer.  This  Europe  should  be 
inspired  by  Conservative,  Socialist,  Christian  Democratic  ideas  and  that  is  of 
course  very  much  our  debate  at  the  moment.  We  all  have  our  ideas  that  we  want 
to  out  across.  Behind  these  technical  discussions  we  are  really talking  about 
political will  and  the political decisions  that  will  be  taken.  Of  course  we 
will  have  to  look  at  what  the  actual political majority  is.  Since  the  Single 
Act  we  now  have  the  system  of  a  qualified majority  and  this  is  certainly based 
on  a  considerable  compromise.  We  must  try to  push  Europe  forward,  and  we  have 
also  to  make  sure  that  this  is  in  the minds  of  our  citizens and  we  hope  that 
their  ideas  can  be  expressed  through  the  Parliament  in all  its actions. 
I  am  sorry  that  I  cannot  be  with  you  this morning,  but  I  did  want  to  give  you 
some  ideas  that  had  occured to me  when  considering  the activity of this 
Parliament.'  Signed:  Simone  Veil. 
Vice-President  BARON:  I  am  not  going  to make  the  speech  which  I  prepared,  but 
I  will  attempt  to draw  together  some  loose  ends  and  reach  some  conclusions  on 
the basis  of  what  we  have  heard  in this very  interesting seminar.  I  think  the 
academics  and  the  scientists who  have  been  at  this meeting  have  worked  very 
well.  I  remember  during  the  Franco  dictatorship  in  Spain  there  was  an 
anecdote  of  a  journalist  who  went  round  the  country  and  when  he  spoke  with  the 
people  about  the situation  he  was  told that  everything  was  very  bad.  He  told 
this to a  person  in  power,  who  said,  If you  think  things  are very  bad  you 
should  not  travel around  the  country  and  you  mustn't  read the  newspapers,  and 
then  you  will  think that  everything  in  the  garden  is wonderful. 
So  r  really think that what  you  did  was  a  good  idea.  You  have  travelled 
about,  you  have  been  all  ears but  you  have  read  less perhaps,  you  have  been 
like St.  Thomas;  you  have  really put  your  finger  into the wound,  you  have  been 
deliberately doubtful,  you  wanted  to have  it proved  to you. 
We  discussed this meeting  at  length  in the  Bureau  of  Parliament  and  with  our 
friends  from  TEPSA,  and  we  thought  that  it would  be  a  very good  idea  for  all 
of  us  to  hold this brainstorming session  so  that  we  could  have  a  frank  and 
fearless  debate  between  academics,  parliamentarians,  journalists and  all those 
- 138  -who  are  interested  in  European  affairs.  It  is  interesting  to  Look  at  the  work 
that  has  been  done  and  particularly that  based  on  what  I  might  catl  the 
profits  of  the  past.  It  has  been  very  good. 
It  is of  course  important  that  this  is being  done,  because  the  European 
process  is  speeding  up  now  and  it is  against  that  backdrop  that  this  meeting 
has  been  held.  The  Community  today  is  moving  towards  a  union  of  twelve 
parliamentary democracies,  which  each  possess  democratic  and  institutional 
elements.  But  as  yet  this  process  is  not  really  fully defined at  European 
level  and  there  certainly is  a  democratic  deficit  in  that  sense  which  was 
pinpointed  by  Mr  Toussaint's  recent  report  to  Parliament. 
There  is  also  a  question of dialectic  here.  The  return  to majority voting 
embodied  in  the  Single  Act  is certainly different  to  an  inter-governmental 
system  of alliances  between  countries;  this is going  to  mean  that  the 
Parliament  has  a  greater  role  to  play. 
But  we  do  have  to  face  up  to  the  reality of where  most  decisions  which  are 
taken,  and  we  were  reminded  this morning  that  Jacques  Oelors  has  said  that  in 
ten  years'  time  80%  of  social  and  economic  decisions  would  be  taken  at 
Community  level.  You  can  certainly discuss  the  actual  percentage  but  you  can 
be  sure  that  basically speaking  there will be  a  great  deal  more  done  at 
Community  level.  Without  claiming  that  everything will  be  done  within  the 
Community  and  that  there will  be  a  uniform  Europe,  as  Napoleon  himself  wanted 
to  have  in  his  day,  we  are  going  to  have  much  more  give  and  take  and  much  more 
cut  and  thrust  in the  system. 
Members  of  the  Parliament  and  political scientists  are  here  from  twelve 
countries  and  some  of  them  are  monarchies  and  some  have  a  presidential  system. 
But  we  have  no  difficulty in  agreeing  as  to  how  a  democratic  assembly  should 
actually work  in  spite of the  different  backgrounds  that  we  come  from.  I 
think  that  this  indicates  very clearly  th~t  we  do  have  shared  ideas  of  the 
concept  of  a  democracy.  I  was  very  interested when  we  discussed the 
Parliament  as  a  forum  or  as  a  legislator and  as  a  governing  body.  On  this 
aspect  I  think  there  has  been  something  of a  metamorphosis  in the Parliament 
since  the  Single  Act  came  into  force  in July  1987.  The  Parliament,  which  was 
a  sort  of  cross  between  the  UN  and  a  student group  of  May  1968,  has  now  really 
changed.  It  has  developed. 
- 139  -In  spite of  certain misgivings  which  some  of  us  had  at  the  outset, Parliament 
~as  learnt  to  work  with  the  new  system  of  voting  by  a  majority  of  Members. 
This  is  subject  to  much  more  stringent  rules  than  voting  in  a  national 
parliament  because  systematically  you  require  a  majority  of  Members  to  vote 
together,  ~hich  in  the  normat  way  would  only be  needed  in  national  parliaments 
for  electing  a  head  of  government  - the  so-called  'Kampfermehrheit'  in  the 
German  system  - or  for  a  constitutional  change.  So  you  have  to  have  260  votes 
and  all  260  have  to  vote  for  the  same  thing,  which  is  of  prime  importance. 
This  means  that  the  Parliament  has  to  work  with  broad  majorities,  and  this 
makes  it very  interesting  in  a  Parliament  where  no  group  has  an  absolute 
majority.  There  are  eight  political groups,  so  to  achieve  260  votes  means 
that  there  has  to  be  agreement  beween  the  Socialists  and  the  Christian 
Democrats  at  least;  then  you  have  to  broaden  that  agreement  to  bring  in  other 
groups,  and  this  is often done  with  the  Communists,  particutarly the  Italian 
Communists,  or  with  the Liberals  or  with  the  Conservatives  or  the  Democratic 
Alliance.  So  I  think  it is  a  very  good  idea  for  us  to  look  closely at this 
whole  process  of  decision making. 
At  the  same  time  we  still argue  about  things  from  ideological  platforms.  For 
example,  when  the  United  States attacked Libya,  or  when  we  were  debating 
Nicaragua,  or  South  Africa  there  were  very  clear splits along  Left/Right 
lines;  we  also debated  problems  of decolonisation,  such  as  in  New  Caledonia, 
and  often there  are splits within political groups,  along national  lines or  on 
other bases,  so  we  are  not  mealy-mouthed.  I  think it is very  important  that 
this  should  continue  in  the next  term  of office of the  Parliament. 
I  believe that the  Commission  has  done  its duty  and  the  Parliament  is 
beginning to shoulder its responsibilities, but  the problem  occurs  in  the 
'  Council.  Certainly certain directives, particularly those  on  plant  and  animal 
health  and  on  the  free  movement  of  people, are held  up  in  Council,  and  this  is 
creating a  very  serious  problem.  As  it is the  Council  that  holds  the whip 
hand  up  to  1992  we  are going  to  have  to make  it very clear that decisions  will 
have  to be  taken  every week  by  the  Council  so  that they  can  stick to their 
deadlines.  This  will  be  very difficult  indeed,  because  the  Parliament  at  the 
moment  only  has  negative  rights. 
- 140  -I  would  now  like  to  say  something  very  quickly  about  the  main  topics  that  the 
Parliament  is  going  to  have  to  face  and  the  present  Line-up  of  political 
forces  in  Europe.  I  think  the  essence  of  the  Single  Act  is  that  as  we  want  to 
advance,  as  we  want  to  develop  the  institutions and  so  on  and  as  we  want  to 
m~k~ security a  priority,  we  have  to  concentrate  on  a  main  theme,  and  try  to 
crente  the  notion  of  citizenship of  Europe.  Our  citizens  need  a  European 
identity. 
You  can  argue  that  th~re could  be  two  parts  in  a  new  constitution for  the 
Community;  first,  the  dogmatic  part  - and  here  I  think it would  be  difficult 
to  improve  on  the  Convention  on  Human  Rights  of the  Council  of  Europe.  It  has 
taken  a  very  long  time  to  get  human  rights  enshrined  in  Law,  so  I  don't  think 
we  are  going  to  achieve  many  changes  on  that  front.  But  we  also  have  to  Look 
at  the  organic  side  of  a  constitution.  Here  we  often  find  that  the  Community 
institutions don't  work  in  the  same  democratic  way  as  their  counterparts  do  in 
their own  countries.  This  is  something  that  we  Latin  constitutionalists  like 
to  say  and  this  is  the  way  we  think  to  a  certain extent.  You  will  find  this 
approach  in  Spain,  Italy and  Portugal  and  there  are  about  a  half a  dozen 
countries where  we  think  along  these  lines.  In  other countries - the 
Commonwealth  countries  and  the  UK  for  example  - there is a  very different 
approach  to  the  whole  matter. 
But  I  think  that  in spite of  these differences  and  these different  backgrounds 
it is  important  that  we  agree  as  to  how  the  Commission  can  become  a  democratic 
federal  government  or  as  to  how  the Council  can  actually work  better,  so  that 
we  can  progress  beyond  the  current  context.  It is vital that this be  taken 
into account.  For  example,  it is  important  that the Minister  who  is 
responsible  for  a  certain area,  having  taken  a  Community  decision in Brussels 
in  the morning  does  not  put  a  nationalistic gloss  on  that  decision  when  he 
returns  home  in the  afternoon.  So  there  is some  schizophrenia,  and  it is 
often quite difficult to explain that  to  people.  This  is one  of the most 
important  facets  of the  future  of  the  Community,  and  I  think  that it is  also 
something  that  is directly  related to the  creation of  European  political 
forces. 
In  1984  people  said that  European  political forces  were  at  a  low  point,  a  low 
ebb.  On  the other  hand  the  fundamental  issue  is to  take  into  consideration 
the  European  political  forces  which  actually did play a  part.  This  is 
- 141  -something  of  very  great  importance.  If  you  reflect  on  the  recent  EPP  Congress 
which  took  place  in  Luxembourg,  for  example,  you  will  realise that  they 
actually managed  to  agree  on  the  idea  of  voting  by  majority  in  the  internal 
context  of  the  party.  This  is very  important  to  note,  and  the  same  question 
has  come  up  in  the  Socialist  Group  as  well.  There  is  an  increasing  awareness 
that  it is essential  to  achieve,  at  least  cautiously,  some  kind  of 
relationship between  the national  party programmes  and  the  Community 
programmes. 
By  way  of  conclusion  I  would  like  to  say  that  the  security  and  defence  of  the 
Community  are  realty of  major  importance.  We  should  seek  to make  progress 
towards  Community  security and  defence  policies,  because  they  do  appeal  to  the 
public,  or  they  are  understood  by  the  public  in  the  context  of  the economic 
policies.  And  again,  the so-called social  cohesiveness  that  we  are  trying  to 
establish  in  the  Community  must  not  be  forgoten.  I  believe  that  gradually 
people  will  behave  less egotistically and  will  become  less blinkered.  When 
you  take  into  consideration  the  regional  and  social  programmes  you  really do 
see progress  being  made,  and  people  have  already  a  sense of  the  Community's 
objectives.  This  can  be  seen  in  France  and  it is  coming  in· various  countries 
in  the  Community.  The  Parliament  has  made  a  great  contribution  to this 
evolution,  and  will  continue  to do  so. 
Professor Jacques  VANDAMftE,  Chairman  of TEPSA:  Mr  Chairman  I  would  like to 
thank  you  very warmly  for  your  concluding  statement  today  and  also  for  your 
participation in our work.  You  have  played the  role of a  good  partner,  and 
you  have  helped  us  greatly.  We  are  very grateful  to  you  and  to all the 
Members  of  Parliament  who  have  actually participated  in  our  discussions  during 
the  last two  dAys.  I  think  we  have  achieved  our  objective which  was  to 
organise a  discussion between  the people  who  are  on  the political side of  the 
Parliament and  those  in the outside world.  With  my  thanks to the  Members  of 
the  European  Parliament  go  my  thanks  to  the officials who  have  organised this 
Symposium  so  satisfactorily.  Mr  Neunreither particularly,  Mr  Poehle  and 
Mr  Millar  have  all  been  involved  from  the outset  and  I  would  very  much  like to 
thank  them  for  their efforts and  their commitment,  which  made  possible the 
success of the  Symposium. 
- 142  -I  would  also  like  to  thank  the  representatives  of  the  national  parliaments  who 
stayed  here  until  the bitter end,  if  we  can  call  it that.  That  is  not  always 
a  very  easy  thing  to  do,  taking  into  consideration  their other  commitments, 
but  their presence  has  obviously  made  our  debate  much  more  rich  and  fruitful 
than  would  otherwise  have  been  possible. 
Vice-President  BARON:  The  Symposium  is  conctuded. 
* * * * * 
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